SECTION IV

HAZARD SPECIFIC APPENDICES

Section IV Hazard Specific Appendices

Hazard-Specific Appendixes provide guidance on unique aspects of each possible hazard identified in the Regional Hazard Summary and / or Installation hazard assessments are documented and applied to the common incident notification, reporting, and management procedures and process provided by the Basic Plan.

Appendix 1: Destructive Weather Preparedness and Response

- Tab A: Weather Definitions
- Tab B: Sources of Weather Information
- Tab C: Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (COR) Checklist
- Tab D: Emergency Preparedness Kits
- Tab E: Recovery Operations
- Tab F: Evacuation and Safe Havens
- Tab G: Structural Information
- Tab H: Message to Report Destructive Weather Damage
- Tab I: Format to Report Destructive Weather Damage
- Tab J: Emergency Operations Center Concept of Operations
- Tab K: Hurricane Aircraft Evacuation (HUREVAC) Plan
- Tab L: Winter Storm
  - Enclosure 1: Winter Storm Watch Checklist
  - Enclosure 2: Winter Storm Warning Checklist
  - Enclosure 3: Winter Storm Advisory Checklist
  - Enclosure 4: Snow Clearing Priority Maps

Appendix 2: Seismic / Geological Hazards

Appendix 3: Fire Hazards

Appendix 4: Pandemic Influenza

- Tab A: N-95 Order Matrix

Appendix 5: Hazardous Materials Spill / Release

- Tab A: Installation Spill Event Decision Tree
- Tab B: Solomons Spill Event Decision Tree
- Tab C: Sill Event Notification Decision Tree

Appendix 6: Transportation Accidents

Appendix 7: Structural Failure / Collapse

Appendix 8: Infrastructure or Utility Loss

Appendix 9: Financial System Interruption or Collapse

Appendix 10: Environmental Pollution and Contamination

Appendix 11: Agricultural Incident / Food Quarantine

Appendix 12: Terrorism Incidents

Tab A: Active Shooter

Tab B: Hostage Situation

Appendix 13: Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Plan

Appendix 14: Explosive or Incendiary Terrorism

Appendix 15: Electromagnetic or Cyber Terrorism

Appendix 16: Civil Disturbance (Riot, Strikes, Protests, or Mass Panic)

Appendix 17: Commercial Nuclear Reactor Accident / Incidents

Tab A: Radiological Emergency CDO Checklist

Tab B: Radiological Emergency EOC Checklist

Tab C: Radiological Emergency Individual Response Actions

Appendix 18: Shelter-in-Place and Lockdown

Tab A: Checklists

Appendix 19: Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)

Tab A: Destructive Weather

Tab B: A&E Structural Failure

Tab C: Transportation Accident

Tab D: Physical Security

Tab E: Sabotage / Terrorism to A&E

Tab F: Fire

Tab G: Evacuation plan

Tab H: Recovery Operations

Tab I: Hurricane Action / Recovery checklist

When using the Hazard Specific Appendices (HSA), they will often have relevant content in associated Functional Area Appendixes (FAA) and Support Appendixes (SA). The below chart denotes related FAA's and SA's for each HSA.

	HSA-1 Destructive Weather	HSA-2 Seismic / Geological	HSA-3 Fire Hazards	HSA-4 Pandemic Influenza	HSA-5 Hazardous Materials	HSA-6 Transportation	HSA-7 Structural Failure /	HSA-8 Infrastructure or Utility	HSA-9 Financial System	HSA-10 Environmental	HSA- 11 Agricultural Incident	HSA-12 Terrorism Incidents	HSA-13 Chemical Biological,	HSA-14 Explosive or	HSA-15 Electromagnetic or	HSA-16 Civil Disturbance	HSA-17 Commercial Nuclear	HSA-18 Shelter-in-Place and	HAS-19 Arms, Ammunition,
FAA-A Regional Operation Center	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-B Installation EOC	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-C CAT / IMT	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-D Regional / Installation Dispatch Center	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-E Comms Systems	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-F Category 1 Personnel	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-G Emergency Management	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-H F&ES	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-I EMS	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		
FAA-J Naval Sec Forces	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
FAA-K EOD Shore-Based Detachments												X	X	X	X	X			
FAA-L Health Service Support	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
FAA-M Industrial Hygiene Support			X		X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	
FAA-N Occupational Safety and Health			X		X		X			X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-O Public Works / Debris Management	X	X	X	X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		
FAA-P Finance and Emergency Accounting	X	X	X		X				X	X		X	X	X	X		X		
FAA-Q Public Affairs	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
FAA-R Mass Care	X	X	X	X	X	X	X			X		X	X	X		X	X	X	X
FAA-S Environmental	X	X	X		X	X				X	X	X	X	X			X	X	
FAA-T Meteorology and Oceanographic Support	X		X							X		X	X				X		
FAA-U Fatality Management	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
FAA-V Supply and Logistics	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	

FAA-W Search and Rescue (SAR)	X	X			X		X									X		X	X
FAA-X Evacuation Management Team	X	X	X		X	X		X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
FAA-Y Safe Haven Management Operations	X	X	X														X		X
FAA-Z Shelter-in-Place Management Teams	X		X		X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
FAA-AA ERT					X					X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X
FAA-BB NEPLO	X	X	X		X	X	X				X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
SA-A Mutual Aid Agreements	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
SA-B MOU/MOA	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
SA-C Support Agreements	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
SA-D Support Contracts	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X
SA-E Contract Development, Execution, and Management	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X		
SA-F Evacuation	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X
SA-G Personnel Accountability	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SA-H Safe Haven Operations	X	X	X														X	X	X
SA-I Shelter-in-Place Procedures	X		X		X	X	X			X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	
SA-J Long-term Support for Evacuees	X		X				X					X	X	X		X	X		
SA-K Special Needs Management	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SA-L Animal Care Management	X	X	X		X	X	X	X		X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SA-M Volunteer and Donations Management	X	X	X			X	X					X	X	X	X		X		
SA-N Sampling and Evidence Collection			X			X						X	X	X	X	X			
SA-O Personnel Decontamination					X					X	X	X	X	X			X	X	
SA-P Inventory Management	X	X	X			X	X			X		X	X	X	X		X		X
SA-Q Special Events Management																			
SA-R BSI Management	X	X	X																
SA-S NEO or Repatriation Operations																			
SA-T Public Awareness Program	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
SA-U Warning-Notification Procedures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X

Appendix 1: Destructive Weather Preparedness and Response

References:

a. OPNAVINST 3140.24
b. NAVOCEANCOMINST 3140.1
c. CNIINST 3440.17 Navy Shore Installation Emergency Management Program Manual
d. OPNAVINST 3100.6H Special Incident Reporting

1. Purpose. To define destructive weather terminology, establish conditions of readiness, delegate responsibility, assign tasks and prescribe procedures to be employed to minimize injury to personnel and damage to property in the event of destructive weather. This instruction has been completely revised and should be read in its entirety.

2. Discussion. References (a) through (d) provide destructive weather guidance and establish tropical cyclone and non-tropical; cyclone Conditions of Readiness (COR) in anticipation for weather related hazards. Tabs A through L provide amplifying information for education and coordination. The intent of this plan is to minimize weather related risks to operations, personnel and assets by creating an NASPR Complex-wide, integrated plan that addresses all phases of response from mitigation through recovery. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

3. Guidance. Special attention needs to be placed on elected groups and individuals that will rely primarily on our command for basic life services. These include but are not limited to:

a. Housing residents on base

b. Military personnel residing in barracks on base

c. Guests staying at temporary lodging facilities, to include Navy Gateway Inn & Suites, Navy Lodge, Visitor's Quarters, camp grounds, and the Solomon's Recreation Center

d. Transient military personnel staying off base in the local area

2. Responsibilities

a. EM.

(1) Overall destructive weather preparedness and recommending actions to the Commanding Officer for all weather related responses.

(2) Oversee evacuation of station personnel and safe haven management operations.

(3) Coordinate Emergency Communications.

(4) Ensure the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) is operational.

(5) Ensure Emergency Dispatch remains functional at all times.

(6) Determine manning level for EOC and develop watch bill to support incidents and activate IAW FAA Annex B.

(7) Coordinate with St. Mary and Calvert Counties' EOCs and the NDW ROC.

(8) Maintain records on key / essential personnel.

b. N1

(1) Supervise personnel accountability operations.

(2) Coordinate with PSD for issuance of travel orders (if required).

(3) Publish orders / instructions.

(4) Coordinate with staff sections, subordinate agencies, and tenant commands for additional personnel as required.

c. Command Duty Officer (CDO)

(1) Maintain updated recall information and phone rosters.

(2) Retain the most recent copy of this instruction.

(3) Identify, train and deploy County Liaison Officer to county EOC as directed.

(4) Monitor emergency communication systems.

(5) Receive and disseminate information until secured from DX / WX event.

(6) Inform Commanding Officer, Staff and Tenant Commands of key events.

(7) Prepare reports and transmit to NDW until EOC is operational.

(8) Activate EOC in the event of emergency IAW FAA Annex B, if not complete by EMO staff, as appropriate.

d. Supply

(1) Coordinate the procurement of emergency supplies

(2) Assist in emergency purchases and financial accounting

(3) Ensure fuel is available for all emergency vehicles and generators

e. MWR

(1) Ensure capability to feed key and essential personnel.

(2) Communicate with boat owners, campers, and guests at NAS and Solomon's NRC upon notification of warnings and evacuations.

(3) Identify equipment that can be used in case of emergency (saw, stoves, tents, and etcetera).

(4) Assist in the coordination of base sponsored child care issues.

(5) Identify safe haven teams to be stood up at designated locations around the base upon activation during an emergency.

f. Port Operations

(1) Ensure port facilities remain operational

(2) Identify vessels that could be used to evacuate personnel, conduct rescue operations, or move logistics.

(3) Assist marina in securing and stowing equipment in Boathouse #3.

g. NHC

(1) Maintain adequate first aid supplies and personnel to support lifesaving functions.

(2) Provide a representative for the EOC.

(3) Perform mass casualty triage for Category 3 and 4 patients.

(4) Coordinate with local medical facilities.

(5) Coordinate with American Red Cross if additional medical services are required.

(6) Advise the Commanding Officer of any medical related hazards.

h. PW

(1) Maintain and update structural information for all facilities.

(2) Maintain maps and provide Geographic Information System (GIS) information.

(3) Identify resources for use through all phases of weather related events.

(4) Maintain and operationally check all emergency generators periodically.

(5) Coordinate with utility companies for system recovery efforts.

(6) Identify vehicles and equipment for use in an emergency.

(7) Ensure a cadre of qualified drivers and operators are available for response.

(8) Train and deploy Damage Assessment Teams.

(9) Coordinate and prioritize recovery efforts based off of Commanding Officer's intent and mission criticality of facilities.

(10) Coordinate for Base Operating Support (BOS) contracts.

(11) Provide transportation to county emergency shelters for personnel without transportation residing on NAS and Solomon's NRC.

i. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

j. Housing Program Director

(1) Coordinate with residents through Lincoln Military Housing to ensure destructive weather preparedness.

(2) Comply with established emergency evacuation and accountability plans.

(3) Coordinate with Lincoln Military Housing to ensure the capability to support recovery operations in housing areas.

(4) Monitor and report the status of housing during normal conditions monthly to N-37 and real time during emergency to the EOC.

(5) Appoint the senior military member on the Bachelor Housing staff to organize and prepare working parties to support preparedness and recover missions using active duty personnel residing in the barracks.

(6) Identify and report billeting space available.

k. F&FSC

(1) Operate as a Family Assistance Center (FAC) for military members and families.

(2) Perform as “Information & Referral” center for military members and families.

(3) Coordinate through EOC for resources from military and community agencies.

(4) Perform Emergency counseling and provide safe haven support during emergencies.

(5) Coordinate assistance with Navy Marine Corps Relief Society (NMCRS).

(6) Coordinate with Chaplain’s office for onsite assistance.

(7) Coordinate with Red Cross on issues not pertaining to Medical Support Functions.

l. Navy Gateway Inns & Suites / Navy Lodge

(1) Notify residents and guests of emergency situation.

(2) Identify and report billeting space available to EOC.

(3) Develop occupant emergency plan and accountability procedures.

m. Air Operations

(1) Maintain airborne search and rescue capability during recovery operations

(2) Take actions to maintain aircraft safety

(3) Monitor and pass relevant WX info to A/C.

(4) Develop and implement aircraft evacuation procedures in conjunction with Naval Test Wing Atlantic (NTWL).

(5) Use and maintain the (DX WX) circuit to pass weather related information to appropriate personnel.

(6) Make recommendations to CO on when to close the Air Field.

(7) Maintain Emergency Communications equipment not under the ELMR contract.

(8) Assist in developing Emergency Communications Plans.

n. Police / Security / ASF

(1) Maintain base security and FPCON level posture.

(2) Identify any possible civil disturbances.

(3) Take action to prevent looting.

(4) Provide security in safe haven facilities.

(5) Conduct disaster assessment/reporting for all bases.

(6) Assist in recovery operations.

(7) Coordinate with local law enforcement personnel.

(8) Provide security to all AA&E storage facilities during destructive weather conditions.

o. Safety

(1) Inspect safe havens for health / comfort / safety issues.

(2) Conduct Destructive Weather-related Safety Training.

p. Fire and Emergency Services

(1) Conduct lifesaving operations as required.

(2) Prior to DX / WX arrival, inspect base structures for potential hazards.

(3) Support / Assist PW during recovery operations.

q. N6

(1) Maintain emergency communications circuits and equipment.

(2) Publish and test communication plans.

(3) Provide and maintain ELMR equipment.

(4) Support data interconnectivity for emergency response.

(5) Coordinate with NMCI to ensure network connectivity.

(6) Provide secure data connections as required.

r. DECA / NEX

(1) Maintain an adequate stock of emergency supplies for approved customers. Emergency supply list items include water, flashlights, first aid, generators, chain saws, charcoal, batteries, tarps, can openers, lighters, and other items.

(2) Coordinate with Regional/Navy assets to receive and distribute “push packages” for emergency use.

(3) Monitor gasoline levels and order additional supplies.

s. Navy and Marine Corps Relief Society

(1) Establish Evacuation Financial Assistance Center in Building 401 to support eligible personnel prior to evacuations.

(2) Support the Family Assistance Center (FAC) as required.

(3) Maintain the capability to deploy mobile teams to provide financial assistance to eligible personnel located at county emergency shelters.

t. Tenant Commands

(1) Identify and prioritize mission critical facilities to enable efficient restoration.

(2) Develop disaster preparation and destructive weather plans in concert with base plans.

(3) Establish and maintain liaison with NAS EM. Ensure emergency contact information is current and accurate for all facilities.

(4) Upon request of CONAS, prepare to provide support to NAS DX/WX plan with personnel and assets as required.

(5) Prepare personnel and aircraft evacuation plans.

(6) Prepare to support damage assessment and recovery operations as directed.

3. Logistics. Evacuation routes require signs to ensure traffic flow efficiency. Current signs identify main direction of travel; however, do not identify specific zone routes. Therefore, a high volume of traffic may utilize the same routes; causing congestion and potential accidents.

4. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

TABS:
Tab A: Weather Definitions
Tab B: Sources of Weather Information
Tab C: Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (COR) Checklist
Tab D: Individual Preparedness Kits
Tab E: Recovery Operations
Tab F: Evacuation and Safe Havens
Tab G: NAS Structural and Environmental Information
Tab H: Sample Message to Report Destructive Weather Damage
Tab I: Format to Report Destructive Weather Damage
Tab J: EOC Concept of Operations
Tab K: Hurricane Aircraft Evacuation (HUREVAC) Plan
Tab L: Winter Storm

Tab A: Weather Definitions

Sustained Winds. The National Weather Service adopted a two-minute average standard for defining the sustained wind speeds.

Destructive Winds. Sustained winds of 50 knots (kts) or greater.

Hazardous Winds. Sustained winds of 35 kts or greater.

Small Area Storms

Gale. Non-tropical windstorm with wind speeds of 34-47 knots.

Northeaster (Nor'easter). A non-tropical cyclonic storm affecting the east coast of North America, named after the winds over the impacted coastal areas arise from the northeast. Nor'easters may occur at any time of the year but are most frequent and most intense between September and April. They typically develop within 100 miles of the coast, generally progress northward to northeastward, and typically attain maximum intensity near New England and the Canadian Maritime provinces. Abundant precipitation and winds of gale force are frequently associated with a Nor'easter.

Storm. Windstorms with wind speeds 48 knots or greater.

Thunderstorm. Small-scale storms produced by cumulonimbus clouds that are always accompanied by lightning and thunder and usually only affect a small geographical area. Hail is frequently associated with thunderstorms and may inflict major damage. Thunderstorms may be accompanied by extremely strong winds with gusts of 40 knots to occasionally more than 100 knots. These winds are usually of short duration and the direction may be radically different from the prevailing winds before the storm.

Tornado. A violent, rotating column of air, which emanates from a thunderstorm type cloud and often touches the ground. It is one of the most destructive types of storms. The wind spirals upward around the column axis in estimated speeds between 100 and 300 knots. The updraft within the tornado may have a speed of 75-175 knots. The speed of movement of a tornado over the earth is comparatively slow, at 20-35 knots. The life of a thunderstorm that generates a tornado is short, averaging only a few hours. The life of an average tornado is approximately 20 minutes.

Waterspout. A tight rotary windstorm over water.

Small Area Storm Warnings

Gale Warning. Sustained winds between 34 and 47 kts are forecast to impact land, harbor, and / or inland waters within 12 hours.

Severe Thunderstorm Warning/Watch. Severe thunderstorms (with wind gusts equal to or greater than 50 kts and / or hail of 3/4 inch diameter or greater) are forecast to impact the warning area.

Small Craft Warning. Harbor and inland waters are experiencing winds between 18 and 33 kts and wind-driven waves, or are forecast to experience, winds between 18 and 33 kts of concern to small craft.

Special Weather Advisory - Tropical Wind Warning. This warning will be issued for winds greater or equal to 35 kts and less than 50 kts associated with tropical systems.

Storm Surge Warning. High tides, 4 feet or greater, above normal tides are forecast for coastal areas, harbor, and / or inland waters. This warning will most likely be issued in conjunction with a tropical cyclone or gale/storm warning. However, storm surge warnings may also be issued due to the impact associated with non-tropical warnings like Nor'easters.

Storm Warning. Sustained winds 48 kts or greater are forecast for land, harbor, and / or inland waters within 12 hours.

Thunderstorm Warning/Watch. Thunderstorms are forecast to impact the designated warning area.

Tornado Warning. Tornadoes have been sighted in or adjacent to the warning area or have a strong potential to develop in the warning area.

Thunderstorm Conditions of Readiness

Fujita Scale 0 (F0). Less than 73 MPH Wind Light damage. Some damage to chimneys, trees and signs.

Fujita Scale 1 (F1). 73-112 mph Wind. Moderate damage. Peels surface off roofs; mobile homes pushed off foundations or overturned; moving autos blown off roads.

Fujita Scale 2 (F2). 113-157 mph Wind. Considerable damage. Roofs torn off houses; mobile homes destroyed; boxcars overturned; large trees snapped/uprooted; light-object missiles generated; cars lifted off ground.

Fujita Scale 3 (F3). 158-206 mph Wind. Severe damage. Roofs and some walls torn off houses; trains overturned; most trees uprooted; heavy cars lifted and thrown.

Fujita Scale 4 (F4). 207-260 mph Wind. Devastating damage. Well-constructed houses leveled; structures with weak foundations blown away some distance; cars thrown; large missiles created.

Fujita Scale 5 (F5). 261-318 mph Wind. Incredible damage. Strong houses leveled and swept away; car-sized missiles fly more than 100m (109 yds.); trees debarked; phenomena occur.

Gale/Storm COR III. Destructive winds of the force indicated are possible within 48 hours. Commands should take locally developed preliminary precautions at this time.

Gale/Storm COR II. Destructive winds of the force indicated are possible within 24 hours. Execute organizational destructive weather directives and take full precautionary measures to establish the next higher condition on short notice.

Gale/Storm COR I. Destructive winds of the force indicated are possible within 12 hours. Complete the precautions to safeguard personnel and material.

Thunderstorm Watch Condition II (TII). Set by individual installations based upon forecasts / recommendations from NAVLANTMETOCCEN or its detachments. Thunderstorms are expected within 25 Nautical Miles (NM) of the immediate area or within six hours. Associated lightning, torrential rain, hail, severe downbursts, destructive winds, and sudden wind shifts are possible. Take precautions that will permit establishment of an appropriate state of readiness on short notice.

Thunderstorm Warning Condition I (TI). Set by individual installation based upon forecasts/recommendations from NAVLANTMETOCCEN or its detachments. Thunderstorms are expected within 10 Nautical Miles (NM) of the immediate area within one hour. Associated lightning, torrential rain, hail, severe downbursts, destructive winds, and sudden wind shifts are possible. Take immediate safety precautions and seek shelter.

Tornadoes Watches. Conditions are conducive for tornadic activity and severe thunderstorms within and close to the watch area. NAVLANTMETOCCEN readdresses Tornado Watches issued by the National Weather Service to affected areas.

Wind Storm Conditions of Readiness. When conditions permit sufficient advanced forecasting of impending gale/storm force winds of significant duration, Gale/Storm Conditions of Readiness will be issued by the NDW ROC as specified below:

Tropical Systems

Hurricane. A tropical cyclone that meets the following conditions: sustained winds of 64 knots or greater and higher than normal tides and waves. Besides the destructive wind velocities and immediate dangers from tidal and wave action, hurricanes provide extremely heavy rains, flooding, lightning, thunder, and may spawn a tornado or series of tornadoes. Hurricanes affect wide geographic areas and normally sustain themselves for a period of several days. Hurricanes are sub-categorized using the Saffir-Simpson Hurricane Destructive Potential Scale, ranging from 1 (least intense) to 5

(strongest). This scale indicates the potential winds, storm surge, and damage associated with each:

Category 1. Winds 64-82 knots (74-95 miles per hour mph). Damage primarily to shrubbery, trees, foliage and unanchored mobile homes. No real damage to permanent building structures. Storm Surge 4'-5' above mean water level. Low-lying coastal roads inundated minor pier damage.

Category 2. Winds 83-95 knots (96-110 mph). Considerable damage to shrubbery and tree foliage, some trees blown down. Major structural damage to exposed mobile homes. Some damage to roofing material, windows and doors - no major damage to permanent building structures. Storm Surges ranging from 6'-8' above mean water level. Coastal roads and low-lying escape routes inland cut by rising water. Considerable pier damage, marinas flooded. Evacuation of some shoreline residences and low lying island areas required.

Category 3. Winds 96-113 knots (111-130 mph). Damage to shrubbery and trees. Foliage off trees, large trees blown down. Some roofing material damage, some window and door damage, some structural damage to small residences and utility buildings. Mobile homes destroyed. Minor amount of certain wall failures. Storm Surges 9'-12' above mean water level. Serious flooding at coast with many smaller structures near coast destroyed. Larger structures damaged by battering of floating debris. Low-lying escape routes inland cut by rising water.

Category 4. Winds 114-135 knots (131-155 mph). Shrubs and trees down. Extensive roofing material, window and door damage. Complete failure of roof structures on many small residences and complete destruction of mobile homes. Storm Surges ranging from 13'-18' above mean water level. Major damage to lower floors of structures near the shore due to flooding and battering action. Low-lying escape routes inland cut by rising water. Major erosion of beach areas.

Category 5. Winds greater than 135 knots (155 mph). Roofing damage considerable and very severe/extensive window and door damage. Complete failure of roof structures on many residences and industrial buildings. Extensive glass and some complete building failures. Small buildings blown over or away. Major power distribution failures causing loss of water and sewer for an extended period. Storm surge in excess of 18' above mean water level. Major damage to lower floors of all structures. Low-lying escape routes inland cut by rising water. Evacuation of residential areas situated on low ground within 5 to 10 miles of the shore line may be required.

Tropical Cyclone. A warm-core, non-frontal synoptic scale cyclone originating over tropical or subtropical waters, with organized deep convection and a closed-surface wind circulation about a well-defined center (includes tropical depressions, tropical storms, and hurricanes).

Tropical Depression. A tropical cyclone with sustained wind speeds of less than 34 kts.

Tropical Storm. A tropical cyclone with wind speeds of 34 to 63 kts.

Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness

Tropical Cyclone COR V. Destructive winds of 50 kts or greater associated with a tropical system are possible in the NDW AOR within 96 hours. All commands are directed to maintain COR V as a minimum state of readiness from 1 June – 30 November. NDW will order COR V on 1 June of each year via naval message.

Tropical Cyclone COR IV. Destructive winds of 50 kts or greater associated with a tropical system are possible in the NDW AOR within 72 hours.

Tropical Cyclone COR III. Destructive winds of 50 kts or greater associated with a tropical system are possible in the NDW AOR within 48 hours.

Tropical Cyclone COR II. Destructive winds of 50 kts or greater associated with a tropical system are possible in the NDW AOR within 24 hours.

Tropical Cyclone COR I. Destructive winds of 50 kts or greater associated with a tropical system are possible in the NDW AOR within 12 hours.

Winter Storms/Blizzards

Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale (NESIS) Category 1. Notable, these storms are notable for their large areas of 4” (10cm) accumulations and small areas of 10” (25cm) snowfall.

Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale (NESIS) Category 2. Significant, large areas of greater than 10” (25cm) snows; some small areas of 20” (50cm) snows. A few cases may include small areas of heavy snow accumulations greater than 30” (75cm).

Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale (NESIS) Category 3. Major Large areas of 10” (25cm) snows with significant areas of 20” (50cm) accumulations.

Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale (NESIS) Category 4. Crippling, huge areas of 10” (25cm) snowfalls. Each case is marked by large areas of 20” (50cm) and greater snow accumulations.

Northeast Snowfall Impact Scale (NESIS) Category 5. Extreme, snowfall blankets more than 200,000 sq. mi. with more than 10-30” (25-75cm) and affects more than 60 million people.

Tab B: Sources of Weather Information

Commander Navy Installations Command (CNIC)
- Operations Center @ 202 433-3110 (DSN 288-3110)

Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) Weather
- https://www.dtic.mil/REGateway/groups/dtra-meteorological-data-user-forum-prototype

FEMA Mapping Service (Flood Waters)
- http://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/FemaWelcomeView?storeId=10001&catalogId=10001&langId=-1

FEMA Disaster Information
- http://www.fema.gov/hazard/types.shtm

Flooding
- Forecasted Flooding - http://water.weather.gov/ahps2/forecasts.php?wfo=lwx
- Current Flooding - http://waterwatch.usgs.gov/?id=ww_flood
- Stream gage information - http://waterwatch.usgs.gov/index.php?id=real&sid=w__gmap

Naval Meteorology and Oceanography Center Norfolk (METOC)
- Command Duty Officer @ 757-564-2553 (DSN 564-2553)
- ado@nlmoc.navy.mil
- http://www.nlmoc.navy.mil

National Hurricane Center
- http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/

National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)
- http://www.noaa.gov

NOAA Weather Radio
- http://www.nws.noaa.gov/nwr

NOAA Tides and Currents
- http://tidesandcurrents.noaa.gov/

NOAA Tide Data
- http://tidesonline.nos.noaa.gov/

National Weather Service (NWS)
- http://www.nws.noaa.gov

Scott Air Force Base (CAC required)

- https://ows.scott.af.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=main&UID=&BW=H&UF=O&AOR=1&USEHF=1&AOI=7

Time Zone Conversions

- http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/zones.html

Tab C: Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (COR) Checklist

TROPICAL CYCLONE COR V – WARNING PERIOD WITHIN 96 HOURS

ACTION ITEMS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY NASPR CO

No	Action	Responsibility	Time/Date
1	Convene a preliminary planning meeting of all appropriate action officers to initiate Tropical Cyclone COR V.	CO	
2	Inform tenant Commands identified on the EM distribution list TCCOR V has been set.	CDO	
3	When all activities acknowledge TCCOR V has been set, contact the NDW ROC (202-433-5180) informing them NASPR, MD has issued Tropical Cyclone COR V.	CDO	
4	Notify the Air Operations Duty Officer of the setting of TCCOR V. Disseminate weather condition updates until secured from Hurricane Conditions.	CDO	
5	Disseminate WX advisories and warnings of meteorological conditions and forecasts from NAVMETOC and National Hurricane Center (NHC). Disseminate updated information until secured from Destructive WX bill.	CDO	
6	Review requirements for Tropical Cyclone COR IV and unit/individual preparedness plans.	ALL N-Codes / Tenant Command EM Reps	
7	Establish communication links and test lines.	EMO / N6	
8	Review list of EM managers to ensure proper communications are passed, provide updated information to Emergency Management and CDO's office.	ALL N-Codes / Tenant Command EM Reps	
9	Create paper copies of muster reports for accountability during power outages.	ALL N-Codes / Tenant Commands	
10	Provide up to date Flood Plain Data and Building Structural Information to EMO.	PW	

TROPICAL CYCLONE COR IV – WARNING PERIOD WITHIN 72 HOURS

ACTION ITEMS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY NASPR CO

No	Action	Responsibility	Time/Date
1	Set TCCOR IV	CO	
2	Inform personnel and tenant commands TCCOR IV status and provide updates to WX conditions.	CDO	
3	Report to Regional Operations Center (ROC) that TCCOR IV is set for all of NASPR when all tenants acknowledge receipt.	CDO	
4	Identify and provide updated information to County EOC Liaison Personnel.	CDO	
5	Coordinate with St. Mary's County EOC 301-475-8016 or 475-4581, Fax: 475-4512/4370.	EM	
6	Identify EOC personnel available and prepare watch rotation.	EM	
7	Inform MWR of additional chow requirements for personnel remaining on board throughout the event.	EM	
8	Ensure information is being disseminated to all personnel. Coordinate with county PAO for current information on Emergency Shelters.	PAO	
9	Determine potential equipment shortfalls during preparedness and recovery operations, including personal protective equipment (PPE).	PW	
10	Disseminate information on sandbag distribution plan, to the tenant commands and report information to Emergency Management.	PW/CDO	
11	Determine number of personnel that will remain on station for duration of storm and any additional berthing/feeding requirements, report information to Emergency Management.	PW, Security, Fire, Medical, Air Ops	
12	Convene HUREVAC meeting.	Air Ops / NTWL	
13	Poll residents of base and private / public housing if they desire to use on base facilities.	Lincoln Military Housing, CBQ	
14	Identify the number of personnel and locations that will remain onboard during the duration of the hurricane and support requirements, report information to Emergency Management.	Tenant Commands	

15	Begin inspections for debris/hazard removal.	All Facilities Managers	
16	Inform EMO on status of Push Packages.	NEX	
17	Ensure ample supplies of emergency provisions are available to customers and identify anticipated shortfalls.	NEX / DECA	
18	Identify shortfalls of resources for preparation activities.	Tenant Command N-Codes	

TROPICAL CYCLONE COR III – WARNING PERIOD WITHIN 48 HOURS

ACTION ITEMS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY NASPR CO

No	Action	Responsibility	Time/Date
1	Set TCCOR III.	CO	
2	Inform all hands and tenant commands that TCCOR III has been set and provide updates to WX conditions.	CDO	
3	Report to ROC when all tenants acknowledge setting TCCOR III.	CDO	
4	Provide WX updates at least every 6 hours.	CDO / ATR Weather Office	
5	Establish Battle Rhythm for scheduled meetings of key personnel and tenant command reps.	EM	
6	Hoist out and secure all small Navy boats. Secure all non-Navy boats as practical.	Port Ops MWR / CTR / STU	
7	Coordinate with contractors performing construction projects on base to ensure they are advised of pending storm conditions and to begin actions to secure potential hazards.	PW	
8	Begin distribution of sand bags or other supplies.	PW	
9	Fill portable water tanks with potable water to ensure clean water availability post-storm.	PW	
10	Establish primary, secondary and tertiary voice communication links exists between EOC and ROC and County EOC.	N-6	
11	Notify occupants of campground of situation and the possibility of evacuation.	MWR	
12	LNO attends meetings at county EOC as required	LNO	
13	Identify actual or projected shortfalls of emergency supplies. Continue reporting until recovery is complete.	NEX / DECA	

14	Contact each housing mayor and ensure updates are being received and action is being taken.	Lincoln Military Housing	

TROPICAL CYCLONE COR II – WARNING PERIOD WITHIN 24 HOURS

ACTION ITEMS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY NASPR CO

No	Action	Responsibility	Time/Date
1	Set TCCOR II.	CO	
2	Consider authorizing liberal leave, liberty, or telework for personnel not performing a mission essential function or involved in preparedness activities.	CO, Tenant Commands	
3	Determine if Local Safe Haven is required.	CO	
4	If local Safe Haven is required, coordinate activation.	EM	
5	Inform tenant commands of setting TCCOR II.	CDO	
6	Report to ROC that TCCOR II is set when all tenant commands acknowledge receipt.	CDO	
7	EOC is Operational w/ minimum crew – assume reporting responsibility.	EM	
8	Ensure cots and food supplies are readily available for EOC watch standers.	EM	
9	Begin reporting to EOC any changes or degradation in capabilities (FPCON, OPS, Electric, Water / Sewage, Facilities / Buildings, Communications / IT, Medical, Personnel Support, Environmental); continue until restoration is complete.	ATFP, PW, Air Ops, Supply, N-6, Medical, Fire, N-1	
10	Be prepared to make emergency purchases as needed throughout the duration of the event.	Supply	
11	Close Campgrounds and Solomon's Island Recreational Complex to customers.	MWR	
12	Activate Evacuation Financial Assistance Center in Building 401.	NMCRS	
13	If non-essential personnel are secured, provide guidance on condition of office spaces – unplug/cover computers, elevators left on second deck, remove furniture and equipment from known trouble spots.	EM / Facilities Managers	

TROPICAL CYCLONE COR I – WARNING PERIOD WITHIN 12 HOURS

ACTION ITEMS TO BE TAKEN WILL BE DETERMINED BY NASPR CO

No	Action	Responsibility	Time/Date
1	Set TCCOR I.	CO	
2	Determine if base residents must evacuate housing areas.	CO	
3	Provide guidance for a cutoff time on all non-CAT 1 and non-designated CAT 5 personnel that must be off station.	CO	
4	Deploy LNO to County EOC.	CDO	
5	Inform Tenant Commands of setting COR I.	EOC	
6	Report to ROC TCCOR I set when all acknowledge receipt.	EOC	
7	Make space available in vicinity of the EOC to host tenant command's LNOs if desired.	EM	
8	EOC is Fully Operational-minimally manned with general staff.	EM	
9	Begin reporting on NASPR military personnel at Safe Haven and Emergency Shelters.	LNOs	
10	Begin shuttling personnel to county Emergency Shelters.	PW / MWR / NAVFAC	
11	Conduct final readiness inspections and take appropriate corrective action, report information to EOC.	PW / Security / Fire	
12	Block off and report areas that present a flooding hazard.	Security	

Tab D: Emergency Preparedness Kits

The following information retrieved from ready.navy.mil as a guide for emergency preparedness. These lists are not all-inclusive and require modification to meet any special requirements.

To prepare your family for an emergency, create one or more emergency kits, well in advance of a crisis, that include enough supplies for at least three days. If you live in a disaster-prone area (hurricanes, floods, earthquakes), consider extending your capability to five days. Throughout the year, your kit should expand and evolve depending on your family's needs, the season, and the situation.

Because emergencies can happen with little to no advance notice, you may need to evacuate quickly and may not have time to gather or shop for supplies. We recommend having kits at home and portable versions to maintain in your car or at work. These kits will enable you and your family to respond to an emergency quickly and will be useful whether you have to shelter in place or evacuate.

Basic Home Kit

- Necessary
  - Water - at least one gallon per person per day for at least three days
  - Food - nonperishable food to support everyone in the household for at least three days (Include canned goods with low salt and high liquid content.)
  - Manual can opener
  - First aid kit
  - Prescription medications - enough for at least three days
  - Dust masks or cotton t-shirts for every member of the household to help filter the air
  - Personal sanitation supplies - items such as moist towelettes (one container for every two people in the household), garbage bags, and plastic ties
  - Flashlight - one flashlight for every two people in the household
  - Battery-powered or hand-crank radio
  - National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) weather radio
  - Extra batteries - sizes and quantities based on flashlights, radios, and other items in kit)
  - Money (at least $100 in small denomination local currency)
  - Wrench or pliers for turning off utilities
  - Local maps and your family emergency plan
  - Your command muster information
  - Important personal and financial documents - printed or electronic copies on a durable storage media such as a thumb drive and stored in waterproof container
- Additional
  - Infant formula - enough for at least three days
  - Diapers - enough for at least three days
  - Food and water for your pet - enough for at least three days

- Items for individuals with special needs, such as wheelchair batteries or other medical equipment or supplies
- Paper plates, paper cups, plastic utensils, paper towels
- Disinfectant
- Matches in a waterproof container
- Whistle to signal for help
- Sturdy shoes
- Hats and gloves
- Sleeping bag or other weather-appropriate bedding for each person
- A weather-appropriate change of clothes for each person
- Coats, jackets, and rain gear
- Fire extinguisher
- Paper and pencil
- Books, games, puzzles, toys, and other activities for children
- Any items necessary for a specific type of disaster; such as, a power, gas, water, or sewage outages. Additionally, you may want to consider having supplies for sheltering for up to two weeks.

Portable Emergency Kit

- Take this kit with you when you are ordered to evacuate.
- Place items in a designated area that will be easily accessible in the event of an emergency.
- Make sure every member of your family knows where the kit is.
- If you are required to shelter in place, keep this kit with you.

Workplace Emergency Kit

- This kit should be portable and maintainable at your workplace; you may need to evacuate from work or shelter up to 24 hours.
- Make sure you include comfortable walking shoes in case you have to walk long distances.
- This kit should include, at minimum, food, water, and first aid kit.
- Make sure you include your family's communication plan.

Vehicle Emergency Kit

- In the even you are stranded while driving, keep this kit in your vehicle at all times.
- This kit should contain at a minimum: food, water, flashlights and extra batteries, first aid kit and necessary medications, signal flares, repair tools, portable AM/FM radio, seasonal items (coats, rain gear, engine fluids, shovel, ice scraper, warm clothes, and gloves), comfortable/sturdy shoes, and blankets or sleeping bags. Also consider: cell phone and phone charger, reflective triangle, and baby formula and diapers if you have a small child.

- Make sure you include your family's communications plan.

Maintaining your Kits

- Make sure to constantly evaluate your kit and their relevance to the threats in your area.
- Throw away and replace any expired or damaged medication, food, or water.

Where to Find Additional Information

- Department of Homeland Security (Ready.gov) & FEMA
  - http://www.ready.gov/build-a-kit
  - http://www.ready.gov/maintaining-your-kit
  - http://www.ready.gov/kit-storage-locations
  - http://www.ready.gov/sites/default/files/documents/files/checklist_1.pdf

Tab E: Recovery Operations

1. Situation. Due to the unpredictable and often complex nature of recovery operations after a destructive weather event, terrorist attack or other undesirable event, detailed planning is difficult. However, to expedite lifesaving and restoration of operations, NASPR utilizes the Incident Command System organizational structure; providing a modular and scalable recovery methodology that can be modified on the scope and magnitude of the event.

a. Friendly Forces. All NASPR N-Codes and Departments will support recovery operations.

b. Attachments. Tenant Commands must be aware of NASPR Recovery Operations and may be called on to support these operations with personnel or assets.

c. Higher/Adjacent. NDW, surrounding counties, and State of Maryland.

2. Mission. To provide direction and coordination to effectively restore the NASPR to an operational condition following an event that causes damage to infrastructure or personnel on board NASPR, Webster Field, or Solomon's Island Recreational Facilities.

3. Execution.

a. NASPR coordinates available assets to save lives, provide basic services, and restore operations based off Commander's intent and guidance.

b. Establish an Installation Recovery Working Group (RWG) early in the recovery phase of an emergency. The RWG is a task organized working group focused on the evaluation, prioritization, and coordination of recovery requirements.

RECOVERY WORKING GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Command	
Supply/Fiscal	Public Works
Public Affairs	Security
Fleet and Family Services	Fire
Air Operations	Administration
Command Duty Officer	Operations
ATFP	Medical
METOC (If Available)	Tenant Commands (Affected)

(1) The RWG with technical direction of the Installation Emergency Manager and the Installation Public Works officer conduct recovery planning at the installation level.

(2) While the Installation Emergency Operations Plan facilities response and short-term recovery, the recovery plan should provide detailed, incident-specific

procedures for immediate restoration of critical support functions and other activities necessary for successful long term recovery from an emergency.

4. Coordinating Instructions

a. Request for outside support will be coordinated through the EOC.

b. Depending on the scope of the event, departments may need to establish Departmental Operations Centers to oversee operations supporting the recovery efforts.

c. N-Codes and tenant commands must identify infrastructure that supports their Mission Essential Functions or Critical Mission Functions. Recovery efforts will be prioritized and largely based on this information.

d. N37 coordinates and provides information concerning potential COOP sites.

e. Each N-Code should build a detailed plan upon receipt of this order. Identify and inform the N37 of any shortfall in resources or capabilities that would prevent or hinder mission accomplishment.

5. Admin/Logistics

a. Admin. Personnel accountability reporting as well as completing other reporting requirements directed by NDW and CNIC will be accomplished form the EOC.

b. Logistics. See base plan.

6. Command and Signal

a. Command. The NASPR CO has overall responsibility for recovery operations. The XO or other designated representatives supervise activities from the EOC.

b. Signal

(1) To maintain maximum extent possible, the CNIC C4I portal will be used for online collaboration on NASPR and to the NDW Regional Operations Center. It is critical to keep the EOC informed and provide up to date information on recovery operations.

(2) The N37 has a limited supply of hand held radios for use. If radios are required make requests through the EOC.

Tab F: Evacuation and Safe Havens

Reference

a. CNIC 3440.17 Tab U (Evacuation Planning and Execution)

b. NASPR Safe Haven Designation memorandum dated 10 May 2016

1. Evacuation Overview. Evacuation decisions greatly affect the installation's personnel welfare and mission readiness. An effective evacuation depends on several factors: nature of event, number of personnel involved, and amount of warning and prior planning efforts.

2. Evacuation Authority. The Commodore of Naval District Washington is the primary authority to order an installation evacuation after consulting with the NASPR Commanding Officer. Tennant Commands may evacuate prior to this notification however they will not be reimbursed for the costs incurred.

3. Evacuation Plans. Two types of evacuations will be used to facilitate the reduction of the number of personnel on board the NASPR Complex.

a. No-notice. An emergency or no-notice evacuation will be used when a specific threat permits only Category 1 personnel, personnel safe guarding classified information and designated Category 5 personnel to remain on base. In the event of a no notice evacuation, personnel will proceed in a calm and orderly manner to the following gates:

(1) NASPR (refer to Figure 1)

(a) Gate 1 supports evacuation of Zone 1 (area surrounding the NAVAIR HQ and marina). Personnel exiting Gate 1 proceed north on RT 235 (right turn). All lanes will be used for outbound traffic.

(b) Gate 2 supports evacuation of Zones 2 (center of the base) and 4 (north side of Runway 6-24). Personnel exiting Gate 2 proceed straight onto Great Mills Rd. All lanes will be used for outbound traffic.

(c) Gate 3 supports evacuation of Zones 3 (east side of the base) and 4 (south side of Runway 6-24). Personnel proceed out Gate 3 and continue straight on Hermanville Rd, turning right onto Rt 5 North. Gate 3 utilizes one lane open for emergency/essential personnel to enter the base.



Figure 1

(2) Solomons Island (Refer to Figure 2)

(a) Personnel precede through gate 1 and turn left on Rt 4 North.



Figure 2

(3) Webster Field (Refer to Figure 3)

(a) Personnel will proceed through the nearest gate and proceed north (left) on Rt 5.



Figure 3

Note 1: The goal of an emergency evacuation is to evacuate the base as quickly and orderly as possible not to return personnel to their residences in an expedient manner.

Note 2: Personnel should be aware of coworkers that need transportation, handicapped workers that require assistance and attempt to car pool to the maximum extent possible.

Note 3: Public Works and MWR will provide transportation for the day care center or other facilities where large groups of people (summer camp) don't have personal transportation if requested.

b. Planned. A planned evacuation will occur over a period of time. A phased approach will be used to ensure an orderly exit. When possible Category 2 through 4 (non-essential) will be released first. In general, personnel aboard NASPR going north should exit through Gate 1, personnel going west should exit through gate 2 and personnel going south should exit through Gate 3. All gates will process inbound and outbound traffic.

c. Air Operations / Airfield

(1) Within 12-hours of a Hurricane, evacuating aircraft becomes difficult due to the closure of the airfield

(2) Decision to evacuate aircraft occurs between COR III (48 hours) and COR I (12 hours)

(3) Winds.

(a) Aircraft outside hangars receive full fuel and tie downs. P-8 wind limit is 75 Knots (65mph); special consideration for the P-8 normally in hangar 305 due to partial exposure. P-3 wind limit is 63 Knots (55mph); otherwise, evacuated. NASPR is limiting the P-3 population and soon to be phased out. KC-130 wind limit is 82 Knots (72mph).

(b) Winds < 52 KTS. Hangar as many aircraft as possible and Heavy WX tie-down remaining Winds 52-74 KTS sustained. Hangar as many AC as possible and evacuate all AC that cannot be hangared.

(c) Winds 75-90 KTS sustained. Evacuate all aircraft that cannot be hangared and move all hangared AC to higher wind rated hangar.

(d) Winds > 90 KTS. Evacuate all flyable aircraft.

(4) High Water > 9 FT. Remove aircraft from low-lying hangars and hangar in a more suitable hangar.

d. The Emergency Management Office oversees base evacuations with the direct support of Security and ASF personnel. To the maximum extent possible, coordinate base evacuations with County Officials. However once off base, base personnel will comply with the evacuation orders of the surrounding counties. It is critical for personnel to actively seek out the most up to date information from local officials - particularly for those personnel using the bridge on route 4 and the bridge on route 301 into VA.

4. Safe Havens and Emergency Shelters. Safe havens are designated facilities that personnel will use in an emergency situation. The type of safe haven will be in proportion with the magnitude and duration of the event.

a. Arm, Ammunitions, and Explosives (AA&E). The Ordnance Transfer Facility (Building 2659) provides a Safe Haven for AA&E cargo. Reference NASPR Safe Haven Designation memorandum dated 10 May 2016.

b. Safe Rooms. Utilize safe rooms for incidents with little or no warning where a desired basic level of protection exists. Leaders at all levels should identify potential

Safe Rooms prior to an incident. A Safe Room may provide inadequate protection against CBRN or HAZMAT threats. Characteristics of a safe room include:

(1) Interior of the building

(2) No windows

(3) Door with locking mechanism for security

(4) Solid concreate or ballistic resistant walls

(5) Basic communications

(6) Recognizable / visible under low light conditions

(7) Space is proportional to amount of personnel in the immediate area

(8) Capable of use for a few hours

(9) Ability to shut off HVAC or Baffle Ventilation system (required for Shelter-in-Place)

c. Lockdown. Some examples of “Lock Down” incidents include Active Shooter or incidents where a human imposed life threatening condition exists within the immediate area. “Lock Down” is different from “Shelter-in-Place” and Safe Rooms may not provide an adequate level of protection against the threat.

d. Sheltering (Local). Designated areas on base that could be used for emergency sheltering of personnel from a few hours to a few days. NASPR designated Safe Havens:

(1) Drill Hall

(2) Base Theater

(3) Navy Lodge

(4) Navy Gateway Inns & Suites

(5) Building 1489 TFSMD

Note 1: These facilities can be activated at the discretion of the NAS Commanding Officer. If this occurs, military personnel and immediate family members (no pets) will be authorized to use these facilities. Personnel should be advised that no food, medical supplies, baby formula, or other personal items will be immediately available to them – therefore they should plan on bringing supplies for 1 – 3 days.

Note 2: If one or all of these facilities are activated as a safe haven, representatives from Medical and Security must be present at all times. Supply, NEX and DECA will acquire and distribute food and emergency supplies. Public Works will fill water buffalos (tested by medical) and make available at each site along with an ample amount of "porta johns".

Note 3: For prolonged recovery operations, these facilities may be used as reconstitution sites for CAT 5 personnel.

e. County Shelters. These shelters are sites off base for emergency sheltering for a period of a few hours to several days. County governments are often better equipped and supplied to support personnel for an extended stay. Personnel should familiarize themselves with county facilities nearest to the location of their residence. Current local facilities include:

(1) St. Mary's County

(a) Chopticon High School

(b) Great Mills High School

(c) Leonardtown High School

(d) St. Mary's County Fairgrounds for pets

(2) Calvert County (North)

(a) Huntington High School

(b) Northern High School

(c) Northern Middle School

(d) Windy Hill Middle School

(3) Calvert County (Central)

(a) Calvert High School

(b) Plum Point Middle School

(c) Calvert Middle School

(4) Calvert County (South)

(a) Southern Middle School

(b) Patuxent High School

(c) Mill Creek Middle School

(5) Charles County

(a) General Smallwood Middle School (Indian Head)

(b) John Hanson Middle School (Waldorf)

(c) Mattawoman Middle School (Waldorf)

(d) Matthew Henson Middle School (Indian Head)

(e) Milton Somers Middle School (La Plata)

(f) Piccowaxen (Newburg)

(g) Henry E. Lackey High School (Indian Head)

(h) La Plata High School (La Plata)

(i) Maurice McDonough High School (Pomfret)

(j) Westlake High School (Waldorf)

Note 1: In the event of an emergency where base personnel are using local safe havens, a representative from base safety will monitor the status of these facilities for safety and health conditions.

Note 2: Public Works and MWR are responsible for transportation of military personnel residing on base with no transportation to get to a selected facility.

f. Safe Haven (Distant). The NASPR CO or NDW Commander will designate a location (preferably a military installation) or geographic area in the event that a catastrophic attack or disaster is imminent. Military personnel will be ordered to this location and reimbursed. Possible distant safe havens for NASPR:

(1) Fort AP Hill, VA

(2) Richmond, VA

(3) Charlottesville, VA

(4) Fort Indian Town Gap, PA.

5. Command and Control. Utilize the NASPR River EOC to the maximum extent possible to coordinate evacuation actions. In the event the primary and alternate EOC locations are compromised, the St Mary's, Calvert, or Charles County EOCs provide potential off-site locations; otherwise, utilize locations identified in the COOP Plan.

6. Orders and Funding. The N-1 coordinates orders and funding data during the event of an ordered evacuation.

7. Require Equipment. Evacuation signs for each route (red, blue, green, and yellow).

Tab G: Structural Information

1. Hangars. All hangars were built to withstand 85-mph winds. Age, design, and location of some of the hangars deem it necessary to consider them as unsafe during a hurricane for personnel and storage of planes. Newer hangars were designed to withstand 104 mph winds.

Sustained winds less than 85 mph	101 T.A.P 109 V-22 306 VX-20 305 NRLDET/VX-1 110 USNTPS 111 HX-21 115 VX-23 201 VX-23
Sustained winds greater than 85 mph, but less than 104 mph	2133 Hazelrigg 1669 Hush House 144 Chamber (door closed) 2191 Anechoic Chamber
Below Flood Plain	110 USNTPS (tidal surge) 111 HX-21 (tidal surge) 115 VX-23 (Bayside) 201 VX-23 (Roadside)

a. Hangar 101 - Considerable glass.

b. Hangar 110 - Approximately 7 feet of hanger located within the 10-foot flood plain.

c. Hangar 111 - Approximately 7 feet of hanger located within the 10-foot flood plain.

d. Hangar 115 – Below the 10-foot flood plain.

e. Hangar 144 - Constructed of wood.

f. Hangar 201 - Constructed of wood, approximately 10 feet of hangar located within the 10-foot flood plain, on the bay side of the building.

g. Hangar 301 **-** Considerable glass, approximately 10 feet of hangar located within the 10-foot flood plain.

2. Required Evacuation. Most buildings will withstand a hurricane with minimal damage. However, because of design or location, the following require evacuation

a. Gold Coast. Located within the 10-foot flood plain and susceptible to high wind damage. The following buildings / quarters will be evacuated: A through Z, and 478.

b. Wood and glass constructed buildings: 144, 304, 1461, and 1597.

c. Buildings constructed underground and susceptible to flooding: 195, 162, and 1353.

d. Building 1485 is located within the 10-foot flood plain.

e. Building 1406 susceptible to possible flood isolation and water erosion.

f. All temporary buildings.

3. Structural Damage.

a. Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives. Damage to A&E could cause the packing or body of ordnance related material to be exposed to the elements greatly increasing the cause of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of ammunition or explosives. NSF follows Tab D to Appendix 19 when reporting on scene. Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate ammunition or explosives.

(1) When slight damage is apparent or suspected

(a) Building facilitator contact Public Works Department (PWD) to have an engineer inspect damaged area of facilities. Keep log of trouble ticket.

(b) Notify installation Explosives Safety Officer (ESO).

(c) Prepare to move personnel and A&E from facility.

(2) When moderate damage is apparent or suspected

(a) Complete 3.a(1) above.

(b) Notify EOC, as applicable.

(3) When heavy damage is apparent or suspected

(a) Notify EOC, ESO, and Emergency services.

(b) Contact Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) as required.

(c) If A&E can be safely removed from facility, do so under supervision and permission of ESO.

Tab H: Message to Report Destructive Weather Damage

OPREP-3 NAVY BLUE REPORT
(NON-PERSONNEL INCIDENT REPORTS)

IMMEDIATE
O DDHHMMZ MMM YY ZYB
FM COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON DC//JJJ//
TO CNO WASHINGTON DC
COMFLTFORCOM NORFOLK VA//N3/N5/CD0//
CNIC WASHINGTON DC
INFO CHINFO WASHINGTON DC//00//
COMNAVREG MIDLANT NORFOLK VA//
COMNAVREG NE GROTON CT//
NAVLANTMETOCCEN NORFOLK VA//30//
JFHQ NCR MESSAGE CTR//
ALNDW//
BT
UNCLAS//
ALNDW XXX/06
MSGID/OPREP-3, USMTF 2006/COMNAVDIST WASHINGTON DC/XXX
FLAGWORD/NAVY BLUE/-//
SUBJ/HURRICANE XXXXX ACHIEVED HURRICANE CONDITION OF READINESS (COR) XXXXX WITHIN NDW AOR//
REF/A/DOC/COMNAVDIST WASH DC/JUN06//
REF/B/XXX//
NARR/REF A IS NDWINST 3141.1 NDW HAZARDOUS AND DESTRUCTIVE WEATHER GUIDANCE. REF B IS XXX.
POC/REGIONAL DUTY OFFICER/-/COMNAVDIST WASH DC REGIONAL DUTY OFFICER/LOC: WASHINGTON DC/ TEL:COM202-369-7683/ TEL:FAX 202-433-0483//
1. INCIDENT: DAMAGE TO USN PROPERTY DUE TO HURRICANE
2. DATE OF INCIDENT: DDMMMYYYY
3. TIME OF INCIDENT: TTTTL
4. LOCATION OF DAMAGE: XXXXX
5. MISSION READINESS:
A. OVERALL MISSION CAPABILITY: X
B. FLEET ASSETS: N/A
6. PERSONNEL MUSTER / STATUS REPORTS:
A. PERSONNEL MUSTER: ### / ### PERSONNEL ACCOUNTED FOR
B. PERSONNEL STATUS: ## CASUALTIES / ## INJURIES / ## EVACUATED
7. FORCE PROTECTION / SECURITY:
A. FPCON: XXXXX
B. STATUS OF SECURITY FORCES: *If Security is impacted in any way, enter that information here.*

8. HOUSING: (*If there is any damage to Housing (i.e. broken windows, projectile damage, water damage, and etcetera), enter that here. Make an assessment as to whether housing is habitable or not.)*
9. FACILITIES: (*If there is any damage to the following facilities, enter specifics here. Otherwise, if all are mission capable enter "Green.")*

A. C2 SPACES: GREEN
B. AIRFIELDS AND / OR PORTS: GREEN
C. MEDICAL AND / OR DENTAL: GREEN
D. HAZMAT / HAZWASTE RELEASES: NONE
10. COMMUNICATIONS: GREEN. (*If there is any impact to Communications enter it here. This includes phone lines, mobile phone service, SAT phones, radios, and NMCI. If there is no damage enter "Green.")*
11. UTILITIES: (*If there is any damage to Utilities enter it here. Otherwise enter "Green.")*
A. ELECTRIC - GREEN.
B. POTABLE WATER - GREEN
C. FIREFIGHTING WATER - GREEN
D. SEWER - GREEN
12. MWR / NEX / COMMISSARY / GALLEY: *(If there is any damage to MWR, NEX, Commissary, and Galley Facilities enter it here, otherwise enter "GREEN".)*
13. LOGISTICS, RELIEF PERSONNEL (RESIDING ON FACILITIES): *(Enter the number of Relief Personnel on facilities here.)*
14. MEDICAL: *(Enter status of Medical here including shortages of medical supplies or personnel.)*
A. SUPPLIES, INCLUDING IMMUNIZATIONS - GREEN
B. PERSONNEL - GREEN
15. MISCELLANEOUS / SUPPORT NEEDED: *(If there is any support or supplies needed enter that information here. Otherwise enter "NONE".)*
16. NAVY EPLO DEPLOYMENT DATA: NONE CURRENTLY ASSIGNED
BT
#XXXX (*The message itself must be serialized. This number can be obtained from the NDW message record books. This is not necessarily the same serial number as the "ALNDW" serial number above.)*
NNNN

Tab I: Format to Report Destructive Weather Damage

From: Naval Air Station, Patuxent River, Maryland
To: Naval District Washington

Subj: DAMAGE SUSTAINED DURING HURRICANE

1. Mission Readiness:
a. Overall mission capability: *(If your mission is impacted in any way, enter specific information here.)*
b. Fleet Assets: N/A

2. Personnel Muster / Status Reports:
a. Personnel Muster: ### / ### Personnel Accounted For
b. Personnel Status: ## casualties / ## injuries / ## evacuated

3. Force Protection / Security:
a. FPCON: XXXXX *(Enter the correct FPCON your installation is in (i.e. ALPHA, BRAVO, CHARLIE, DELTA).)*
b. Status of Security Forces: *(If Security is impacted in any way, enter that information here.)*

4. Housing: *(If damage to Housing exists (i.e. broken windows, projectile damage, water damage, and etcetera), enter that here. Make an assessment as to whether housing is habitable or not.)*

5. Facilities: *(If there is any damage to the following facilities, enter specifics here. Otherwise, if all are mission capable enter "Green".)*
a. C2 spaces: Green
b. Airfields and / or ports: Green
c. Medical and / or Dental: Green
d. HAZMAT / HAZWASTE releases: None

6. Communications: *If there is any impact to Communications enter it here. This includes phone lines, mobile phone service, SAT phones, radios, and NMCI. If there is no damage, enter "Green".*

7. Utilities: *(If there is any damage to Utilities enter it here. Otherwise enter "GREEN.")*
a. Electric - Green.
b. Potable water - Green
c. Firefighting water - Green
d. Sewer - Green

8. MWR / NEX / Commissary / Galley: *(If there is any damage to MWR, NEX, Commissary, and Galley Facilities enter it here, otherwise enter "GREEN.")*

9. Logistics:
    a. Relief Personnel (residing on facilities): X
        1) DoD (AC/RC/Guard/contractors: total) - 0
        2) FEMA: 0
        3) Other Federal: 0
        4) Non-Federal: 0

10. Medical: *(Enter status of Medical here including shortages of medical supplies or personnel.)*
    a. Supplies, including immunizations - Green
    b. Personnel - Green

11. Miscellaneous / Support Needed: *(If there is any support or supplies needed enter that information here. Otherwise enter "NONE.")*

Tab J: Emergency Operations Center Concept of Operations

1. Overview. The NASPR Emergency Operations Center (EOC) primary located is Building 2184 and alternate in Building 469.

2. Mission. The EOC supports the Incident Commander (IC) during emergencies.

3. Authority. The EOC executes operational control (OPCON) overall assigned Installation assets and may reallocate those assets on its own volition to support effected areas during an emergency.

4. Functions. When operational the EOC will perform the following functions:

a. Establish priorities between incidents and / or Area Commands in concert with the ICs involved

b. Acquire & allocate resources in concert with the priorities established by the ICs

c. Anticipate & identify future resource requirements

d. Coordinate & resolve policy issues arising from the incident

e. Coordinate with higher and adjacent agencies

f. Ensure that each agency involved in incident management activities is providing appropriate situational awareness and resource status information

5. Staffing. The staffing level of the EOC scales to support the event as required.

6. Communications. To the maximum extent possible the EOC will maintain communications with the Naval District Washington Regional Operations Center and Saint Mary's County Emergency Operations Center.

7. Administration. The Emergency Management Officer will designate an EOC Manager to ensure the EOC's readiness and compliance with the guidance set forth in CNIC Instruction 3440.17.

Tab K: Hurricane Aircraft Evacuation (HUREVAC) Plan

1. Discussion. To establish procedures for the sheltering and evacuation of aircraft during threatening destructive weather, example tropical cyclone conditions. Information concerning weather and hurricane conditions will be disseminated to tenant aviation activities via the Destructive Weather Net and e-mails generated by the installation EOC. When discussing hurricane conditions, it is imperative that all personnel know the distinction between HUREVAC and Tropical Cyclone Conditions of Readiness (TCCOR / COR).

2. Action.

a. Commanding Officer. Responsible for setting the appropriate Hurricane Aircraft Evacuation Condition; normally initiated by NDW.

b. Commander, Naval Test Wing Atlantic (NTWL).

(1) Formulate plans for hangaring non-evacuating aircraft.

(2) Approve aircraft hangaring and evacuation plan.

(3) Assist in the coordination of the annual aircraft HUREVAC drill.

(4) Maintain liaison with facility managers that support or that are supported by aircraft movements and security.

c. Tenant Aviation Activities.

(1) Establish command HUREVAC bills.

(2) Appoint a command AIREVAC Officer to coordinate the HUREVAC bill and liaison with the Installation AIREVAC Officer and NTWL.

(3) Send representative to the aircraft hangaring and evacuation coordination meetings when convened and provide Installation AIREVAC and NTWL with aircraft status and hangar requirements and hangar space available.

(4) Identify refuge airfields and coordinate evacuation with host airfields.

(5) Ensure evacuated aircrews inform Flight Planning, Air Operations, via any means possible, when safe on deck at refuge airfield. This information will be consolidated and submitted to CONAS.

d. NASPR Air Operations Officer.

(1) Appoint an aviator from the Air Operations Department as the Installation AIREVAC Officer.

(2) Ensure all Air Operations personnel are familiar with the contents of this instruction and are able to execute applicable sections.

(3) Conduct an annual HUREVAC drill prior to 15 May to provide an overall increase in awareness of aircraft evacuation and sheltering procedures.

e. NASPR AIREVAC Officer. Responsible for coordinating and planning aircraft evacuation actions for NAS, NTWL and tenant aviation activities during both destructive weather and applicable Force Protection conditions.

(1) Liaison between the installation, NTWL, and tenant aviation activities.

(2) Maintain a roster of tenant command and NTWL points-of-contacts for aircraft hangaring and evacuation planning.

(3) In conjunction with NTWL, convene the aircraft hangaring and evacuation meetings as required.

f. Aviation Duty Officer, Naval Aviation Forecast Center, Norfolk Virginia.

(1) Advise CONAS of significant weather affect the setting or conduct of HUREVAC operations.

(2) Ensure the current HUREVAC condition is reflected on the weather-vision.

3. HUREVAC Plan.

a. The following discussion and action steps presume HUREVAC conditions progress in order from TCCOR IV to I. However, all aviation units must be prepared to skip any condition and go directly to a higher condition of readiness (example, from Condition IV to Condition I), as weather forecasts dictate. Under no circumstances may the Commanding Officer or Officer in Charge of aviation activities set a HUREVAC Condition less stringent than NDW.

b. The Installation AIREVAC Officer shall direct the AODO to announce the appropriate HUREVAC Condition via telephone or Destructive Weather Circuit. Each activity shall acknowledge with the initials of the person receive the call and ensure their AIREVAC Officers are informed as soon as possible.

c. Aircraft hurricane evacuation conditions will be announced using the following terminology: “Set HUREVAC Condition (I, II, III or IV) at NASPR.”

d. The Installation AIREVAC Officer will keep the EOC advised of HUREVAC progress.

e. Wind speed limits.

(1) 50 knots - begin evacuation of aircraft 24-12 hours prior to landfall

(2) 52 knots - NTWL clears ramps

(3) 75 knots - NTWL clears hangars, P-8 evacuated

(4) 82 knots - KC-130 evacuated

4. HUREVAC Condition IV. (Winds in excess of 50 knots expected within 72 hours).

a. All tenant commands shall begin planning for the hangaring or evacuation of all aircraft. Advise Installation AIREVAC Officer and NTWL of additional hangar space or support requirements.

b. The Installation AIREVAC Officer, in conjunction with NTWL, shall convene a meeting of all tenant AIREVAC Officers and support facility managers to formulate aircraft hangar and evacuation plans. Subsequent meetings will be convened as required.

c. The NAS Air Operations Officer shall ensure Air Operations is properly manned to accommodate the increased traffic of evacuating aircraft.

d. The NTWL shall liaison with tenant aviation activities concerning available hangar space.

(1) Formalize plan for hangaring non-evacuating aircraft.

(2) Shall coordinate facility requirements to support aircraft hangaring plan.

e. Tenant Commands shall begin final preparations to evacuate or secure aircraft.

(1) If operational requirements and weather permit, aircraft operations should be scheduled to produce the least possible congestion and confusion if evacuation becomes necessary.

(2) Take actions necessary to ensure that aircraft with restrictions or limitations that could affect their ability to reach the refuge airfield and for which there is inadequate hangar space can be evacuated on two-hour notice.

(3) Submit form 3140/2 to the Installation AIREVAC Officer, NAS Fuels Officer, and NTWL and update as necessary.

5. HUREVAC Condition III. (Winds in excess of 50 knots expected with 48 hours).

a. The Installation AIREVAC Officer shall ensure Washington ARTCC is notified of a possible aircraft evacuation, giving number and type of aircraft involved.

b. The NTWL shall direct overall effort to hangar non-evacuating aircraft.

c. Each aviation unit shall:

(1) Prepare to send liaison officers to refuge airfields. Liaison officer should arrive at the refuge airfield far enough in advance of the main party to make sure all arrangements are confirmed.

(2) Tenant AIREVAC Officers shall deliver necessary flight plans to Flight Planning; schedule a collective weather forecast brief for evacuating aircrews and update form 3140/2 with the Installation AIREVAC Officer as necessary.

(3) Weather permitting, evacuate aircraft with restrictions or limitation that could affect their ability to reach the refuge airfield in deteriorating weather conditions and for which there is in inadequate hangar space.

d. Air Traffic Controller (ATC).

(1) Notify personnel COR III is in effect.

(2) Obtain number of aircraft flying out if evacuated from each tenant command. Notify Terminal Radar Approach Control (TRACON) via Destructive Weather Net (wx net) and have evacuation flight plans ready for filing.

(3) Upon direction from ATCFO/ATC Management suspend all tenants training and / or stereo routed flights.

(4) If intent to evacuate is made Flight Planning Branch sends NOTAM on base evacuation / airfield closure. If no evacuation order is given send NOTAM limiting aircraft operations to official business only when directed by the ATCFO or ATC Management.

(5) Notify Category 1 personnel remaining behind in the event of COR II.

e. Control Tower

(1) Secure / remove loose objects from the catwalk.

(2) Utilize a roll of plastic and tape (stored in the tower) to cover consoles and all sensitive equipment in case of overhead leakage, when directed to do so by ATC Management.

(3) Ready to move the Light gun, binoculars, and FM radios to MRC/RADAR when directed.

f. Flight Planning.

(1) Tape windows and remove all equipment off floor and cover all electronics with plastic

(2) Notify ATCFO and CDO when COR-III attained

g. Radar Room.

(1) Prepare the Radar room and back office to be used as a storage area for ATC equipment.

(a) Remove all loose objects from wall

(b) Cover unused equipment with plastic and tape in case of roof leakage

(2) On the 1st deck move all sensitive equipment off the ground at least 2 feet in case of flooding. Cover unused equipment with plastic and tape in case of roof leakage

(3) Review COR II and I actions and ensure all personnel are thoroughly briefed on their duties and responsibilities; conducted by LPOs and Chiefs.

(4) Notify the ATCFO that COR III is set and report to Flight Planning who notifies ATCFO.

6. HUREVAC Condition II. (Winds in excess of 50 knots expected within 24 hours).

a. The Installation AIREVAC Officer shall track evacuating aircraft and compile a list of safe-on-deck times for all evacuated aircraft.

b. Each aviation unit shall evacuate all flyable aircraft and all necessary ground support equipment and crews, as operational and weather conditions permit.

(1) Ensure evacuating aircraft utilize the word “HUREVAC” in their call sign.

(2) Report to Air Operations, Flight Planning the safe-on-deck times of all evacuated aircraft at their refuge airfield.

c. The AODO issues a NOTAM closing NASPR after all evacuating aircraft have departed or when warranted by weather conditions.

d. ATC.

(1) Ensure areas are fully secured.

(2) Place sandbags at bldg. entrances at least 2 high.

(3) Once all aircraft have departed close the airfield and notify TRACON that the field is closed. Cover Tower consoles with plastic and secure with tape. Take MRC to GEMD for garage storage.

(4) Notify the ATCFO or his/her representative that COR II is set.

e. Flight Planning

(1) Notify remaining personnel COR II is in effect.

(2) Notify Operations Officer or designee and the CDO or EOC COR II attainment.

(3) Enter all evacuation flight plans.

(4) Notify NOTAM the airfield is closed to all aircraft except those conducting hurricane evacuation flights. Fleet Weather Service assists if Flight Planning cannot notify NOTAM.

(5) NOTAM Webster Field closed. Direct staff to cover all tower equipment with plastic and report to Building 103.

f. Radar Room.

(1) Notify TRACON upon completion of the evacuation flight plan.

(2) Remove all prepared Tower items (ALDIS Lamp, binoculars, FM radios, strips/pens) and store in RADAR.

(3) TRACON notifies POTOMAC TRACON if securing in the event COR-I is directed.

7. HUREVAC Condition I. (Winds in excess of 50 knots expected within 12 hours).

a. Notify personnel COR-I initiated

b. Cease flight operations and secure all remaining aircraft

c. Take all necessary precautions to minimize damage due to possible flooding and high winds

d. Aircraft not hangared should be secured in open areas away from hangars, storage areas, and ground handling equipment to preclude the possibility of damage due to windblown debris

e. Coordinate with POTOMAC TRACON to release all airspace

f. All remaining Category 1 and 5 personnel report to Building 103

g. Notify EOC COR-I preparation actions completed

h. Vacate and secure Building 2800

8. Emergency Stay-Behind Team.

a. When deemed safe and directed by the EMO the team inspects Buildings 103 and 2805 for damage and safe entry.

b. Following inspection of spaces notify the EOC of any damages.

c. Conduct a FOD sweep of the runway, report airfield status to the EOC, and advise if operations can resume.

d. When directed by GEMD personnel conduct equipment checks.

e. Upon completion of equipment checks notify the EOC, GEMD Technicians, and lead Operations Department members of any equipment outages.

f. Once runway is suitable for operations and necessary equipment is checked and deemed usable open the airfield for aircraft directly supporting hurricane relief efforts.

g. Send NOTAM on airfield status and availability; notify TRACON, the EOC, and lead Operations Department members.

9. Securing from HUREVAC Conditions.

a. Installation Commander directs securing from HUREVAC conditions.

b. Upon securing from HUREVAC conditions and when weather and airfield conditions permit, the AODO reopens the airfield.

c. The Installation AIREVAC Officer issues a "Recall" over the Destructive Weather Net to tenant aviation activities.

d. The Installation AIREVAC Officer coordinates the return-to-base to ensure that the aircraft recall is safe and supported.

e. After all aircraft and personnel return to NASPR aviation units report each evacuated aircraft status to Air Operations Flight Planning Officer.

f. Returning personnel muster at Building 103.

g. Conduct an inspection of assigned areas and report damages, losses, and / or hazardous / emergency situations to the EOC.

h. Inspect vehicles.

i. Return all removed items.

j. Notify the EOC “Recovery Phase Complete.”

_____ DATE/HOUR COR LEVEL _____

NASPR
AIRCRAFT DESTRUCTIVE WEATHER EVACUATION PLAN

SQUADRON:					DATE:	
BUNO & SIDE NUMBER	STATUS: UP / DOWN	STATUS: IFR/VFR CAPABLE	STATUS: SAR CAPABLE	FLY AWAY (REFUGE BASE)	NOT EVACUATED HANGARED	NOT EVACUATED NOT HANGARED
TOTAL						

REFUGE BASE COORDINATOR: (RANK/NAME/TELEPHONE/FAX)

EVACUATION CONTROL OFFICER: (RANK/NAME/TELEPHONE/FAX)

REMARKS:

NASPR Form 3140/2

Tab L: Winter Storm

1. Purpose. Precautions outlined in this chapter provide information necessary for Naval Air Station Patuxent River (NASPR) facility management and supported commands to adequately prepare for approaching winter storm conditions.

2. Background. Measures and responsibilities outlined in this chapter provide information necessary for NASPR facility managers and supported commands to adequately prepare for an approaching winter storm.

a. A winter storm can range from moderate snow over a few hours to blizzard conditions with blinding wind-driven snow that lasts several days.

b. Low temperatures accompany all winter storms and blowing snow, which can severely reduce visibility. A severe winter storm is one that drops 4 or more inches of snow during a 12-hour period, or 6 or more inches during a 24-hour span. The aftermath of a winter storm can impact the installation or region for days, weeks, and even months.

3. Discussion. NASPR installations will remain open during inclement weather to support the supported commands missions. However, there may be times when weather conditions warrant NASPR Commanding Officer to delay opening of the installation due base streets are not safe for vehicular traffic or parking lots are not cleared of snow, and work crews need more time to remove the snow.

a. During winter storm advisories or as directed by the Commanding Officer, NASPR will be setting inclement weather hours. NASPR inclement weather hours are from 0730 hours in the morning to 1630 hours in the afternoon. Media notification will only occur if there is a change in base status that would necessitate the opening of the base after 0730 hours.

(1) Inclement weather hours will be set the day before based on projected weather forecast. The purpose of inclement weather hours is to allow snow removal teams to clear the roads and parking lots.

(2) To help facilitate snow removal, the installation will be closed to vehicular traffic. Incoming traffic will not be permitted on base prior to 0730 hours. Only designated essential personnel will be allowed access. NOTE: Base housing residents are excluded from this policy concerning entry/exit through the gates but will adhere to the inclement weather hours for work.

(3) If it is determined that snow removal cannot be accomplished NASPR CO issues a minimum of 2 hour delay of opening the installations to employees starting at 0730 hours.

b. The decision for supported commands to stay open, open late or close is the responsibility of each supported commands Commanding Officer. The decision for supported commands to open must not be before 0730 hours when inclement weather hours are in effect or when NASPR CO issued a later opening time. It is the responsibility of each supported command to notify their employees of inclement weather hours and / or any additional changes to their normal work hours. This includes media outlets (television, radio, etc.)

c. Supported commands will notify the NASPR CDO or ACDO of their plan to open late or close.

4. Action. Concept Of Operations

a. NASPR managers will identify to the Emergency Management Officer which employees are needed to support base operations during inclement weather. These employees are expected to report to work on time for their normally scheduled shifts. NASPR Commanding Officer will designate annually in writing those employees.

b. Supported commands will need to identify to NASPR Commanding Officer which employees are needed to support mission essential operations or functions during inclement weather.

c. Develop procedures and task checklists to enable prompt and positive mitigating actions when hazardous or destructive weather threatens.

d. To help reduce damage, general procedures are listed in the following checklists for NASPR facility managers or supported commands based on the condition of readiness that has been set.

e. Progress through the conditions of readiness may not be as expected, since a change in course or acceleration of the storm system could bring a more rapidly change in conditions.

f. The Public Works Departments (NAVFAC) implements the Standard Operation Procedures (SOP) for snow and ice removal upon notification of an impending winter storm.

5. Responsibilities.

a. NASPR Commanding Officer

(1) Annually review policies and procedures for Winter Storm Conditions.

(2) When inclement weather warrants, the day before, will set inclement weather hours.

(3) During normal work hours, if advised of adverse weather conditions by the EMO, determine any need for change in status for NASPR employees.

b. NASPR N00P Public Affairs

(1) Notify supported commands that NASPR is setting inclement weather hours.

(2) Coordinate with the EMO and CDO to ensure completion of the Winter Storm Checklist.

(3) Notify the Commanding Officer of all storm-related information as appropriate.

(4) Develop the installation's announcements for release to the media, base status telephone and web page.

(5) Notify the designated radio and television stations regarding a change in status for NASPR. All supported commands will notify media/employees independently.

c. NASPR Dispatch

(1) Furnish CDO / ACDO / Supported Command's and / or EOC (if activated) information from state police of road conditions, accidents or significant incidents that would pose significant delays or hazardous conditions for employees.

(2) Information via the Maryland State Police and St. Mary's County Sheriff's Office.

(3) Advise Fire Department of base road conditions and hazards requiring road closure, rerouting of traffic, placement of barricades, safety lights, warning signs, and etcetera.

(4) If shift relief cannot report due to hazardous conditions, the on-duty shift will remain on duty.

d. NASPR N30 Emergency Services

(1) Provide the CDO or ACDO and / or EOC (if activated) status reports of bridge or street icing, snow accumulation, hazardous road conditions, downed power lines or poles, and / or other weather related hazards.

(2) Furnish CDO or ACDO and / or EOC (if activated) information from local law enforcement (St. Mary's County Sheriff's Office) on current road conditions.

(3) Advise the CDO or ACDO and / or EOC (if activated) of hazards that require road closure, rerouting of traffic, placement of barricades, safety lights, warning signs, and etcetera.

(4) Notify supported commands, facility managers and owners of privately owned vehicles that require moving to facilitate snowplow operations.

(5) On-duty shift remains on duty if shift relief cannot report due to hazardous conditions.

(6) Operation of police vehicles during severe weather conditions will be kept to an absolute minimum, consistent with mission requirements.

e. NASPR N37 Emergency Management

(1) Implement any change in status decided by the NASPR CO.

(2) Coordinate with NASPR CDO, ACDO, and supported commands CDOs to ensure the Winter Storm Checklist is completed.

(3) Notify the Commanding Officer of all storm-related information as appropriate.

(4) Implement any change in status decided by the NASPR Commanding Officer.

(5) Advise CBQ regarding the number of emergency personnel that may require billeting during winter storm conditions.

(6) (If activated) Staff the Emergency Operation Center (EOC).

(7) Coordinate with Senior Watch Officer and Public Affairs Officer on conducting CDO / ACDO training on Winter Storm policies and procedures not later than 31 October each year.

f. NASPR N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Direct actions required by the Public Works SOP for snow and ice removal.

(2) Provide updates regarding snow and ice removal to CDO and / or EOC (if activated).

(3) Make recommendation of base readiness, specifically regarding roads, parking lots and sidewalk conditions.

(4) Provide status of electrical distribution.

(5) If shift relief cannot report due to hazardous conditions, the on-duty shift will remains on duty.

(6) Designate winter emergency personnel with an annual letter of notification no later than 31 October each year and provide a list of designated emergency personnel to EMO.

g. Messing & Billeting

(1) Arrange emergency messing and billeting for emergency personnel required staying aboard NASPR installations during severe weather conditions.

(2) Coordinate plans for messing and billeting with NASPR EMO.

h. Base Residents

(1) Shovel walkways and driveways to ensure routes remain clear for Fire, Medical, and Law Enforcement personnel.

(2) Not drive on base roads unless absolutely necessary to allow snowplows to complete their work.

(3) Not sled or skate on roads in order to ensure resident's safety.

i. Base Housing (Lincoln Military Housing)

(1) NASPR will provide snow and ice removal operations for identified streets and alleyways within housing.

(2) Remind residents to watch for snow removal and move their vehicles so the street can be cleaned of snow.

(3) Ensure that boats, campers, and utility trailers are removed from side of the streets.

j. NASPR Command Duty Officer

(1) Coordinate with the Emergency Management Officer (EMO) and supported commands' CDOs to ensure the Winter Storm Checklist is completed.

(2) Notify the Commanding Officer and supported commands' CDOs / POCs of all storm-related information as appropriate.

(3) Update NASPR base status phone lines in the event of inclement weather.

(4) Notify supported command's CDOs / POCs of any changes in NASPR status.

(5) Implement any change in status decided by the NASPR Commanding Officer.

k. Fire Department

(1) Report fire apparatus limitations during inclement weather to the EMO.

(2) If shift relief cannot report due to conditions, the on-duty shift remains on duty.

l. Supported Commands

(1) During normal work hours, if advised of adverse weather conditions, determine any need for change in status for their command employees.

(2) Notify NASPR CDO / ACDO of any changes in command status.

(3) Update their command status web pages, as needed.

(4) Designate winter emergency personnel with an annual letter of notification not later than 31 October each year, and will provide a list of designated emergency personnel to EMO.

6. Administrative. The EMO tracks Lessons Learned and provides a report to the EMWG.

ENCLOSURES:
Enclosure 1 - Winter Storm Watch Checklist
Enclosure 2 - Winter Storm Warning Checklist
Enclosure 3 - Winter Storm Advisory Checklist
Enclosure 4 - Snow Clearing Priority Maps

Enclosure 1: Winter Storm Watch Checklist

National Weather Center (NWC) has issued a Winter Storm Watch. Winter storm conditions are possible *within the next 36-48 hours*.

The EMO and CDO / ACDO shall ensure the items on this checklist are completed, whether the incident occurs during or after normal duty hours.

- ❑ EMO - monitor the NWC, NAVLANTMETOC DET, state and local law enforcement, local area newscasts, and listening to NOAA weather radio forecast information.
- ❑ EMO - forward all weather information received from County Sheriff's Office and State Police to the CO and CDO.
- ❑ NASPR EMO –provide periodic weather condition information briefs to NASPR CO, PWO, and CDO / ACDO.
- ❑ NASPR CDO / ACDO - updates, as needed, the base status phone lines at both NSF Dahlgren and NSF Indian Head with the most current status information.
- ❑ (NAVFAC) Public Works - make appropriate preparations for Winter Storm Conditions and / or Snow Removal Operations.
- ❑ Base Housing (Lincoln Properties) - make appropriate preparations for Winter Storm Conditions and / or Snow Removal Operations.
- ❑ EMO / PAO - brief identified CDO and ACDO who have duty over the next 7 days on current notification procedures and weather information.
- ❑ EMO - coordinates with messing and billeting personnel on possible requirements.
- ❑ Force Protection / Physical Security Office - coordinate with Public Works (if required) to remove barricades for Entry Control Points (gates) and other locations.
- ❑ Law enforcement Shift Supervisor - ensure that patrol vehicles have adequate antifreeze, windshield washer fluid, and oil levels normal.
- ❑ MWR - review upcoming scheduled events and activities, making appropriate preparations for Winter Storm Conditions.
- ❑ Facility Managers / Supported Commands - make appropriate preparations for Winter Storm Conditions.
- ❑ EMO - verifies all contact numbers and update CDO / ACDO Notebooks.

- ❑ Facility Managers / Supported Commands - verify their “Emergency Personnel Listing” and provide copy to NASPR EMO.

- ❑ Facility Managers / Supported Commands - verify and update employees’ after-hour contact information.

- ❑ EMO - review facilities “Emergency Personnel Listing” and verify with facility managers that required personnel are identified, ensuring that lists are posted at Entry Control Points.

- ❑ Law Enforcement Shift Supervisor - ensure employees are notified and removed vehicles from parking lots.

- ❑ Facility Managers / Supported Commands - Report to NASPR EMO when facilities have completed all measures for implementation for Winter Storm Watch.

Enclosure 2: Winter Storm Warning Checklist

National Weather Center has issued a Winter Storm Warning. Life-threatening severe winter conditions have begun or will begin *within 24 hours*.

The Emergency Management Officer and CDO / ACDO shall ensure the items on this checklist are completed, whether the incident occurs during or after normal duty hours.

ALL PERSONNEL CONTINUE TO IMPLEMENT ALL MEASURES FOR WINTER STORM WATCH CHECKLIST

- ❑ CDO / ACDO - update, as needed, the base status telephone lines with the most current status information.
- ❑ PAO - send out notifications of setting inclement weather hours.
- ❑ EMO - monitor the National Weather Center, NAVLANTMETOC DET, state and local police departments, local area newscast, and listening to NOAA weather radio forecast information.
- ❑ EMO - forward all weather information received from law enforcement to the CO and CDO.
- ❑ EMO - provide periodic weather conditions information briefs to NASPR CO, PWO, and CDO / ACDO.
- ❑ CDO - provide periodic weather condition updates to School House, Supported Commands CDOs and POCs as needed.
- ❑ Law Enforcement Shift Supervisor - conduct periodic check with county sheriff's office for most current road conditions, and report to NASPR EMO.
- ❑ Law Enforcement Shift Supervisor - check the availability of oncoming Police Officers reporting for duty.
- ❑ (NAVFAC) Public Works Supervisors - check the availability of Public Works employees reporting for duty for snow removal operations.
- ❑ EMO - check the availability of oncoming Dispatchers reporting for duty.
- ❑ CBQ - report to Emergency Management Officer the number of available rooms.
- ❑ Facility Managers - (if needed) notify EMO of the messing and billeting requirements for their facilities employees.
- ❑ EMO - identify to messing and billeting requirements for "Emergency Personnel".

- ❑ Law Enforcement / Public Works Shift Supervisors - pick up traffic control items (example, traffic cones, signs, and portable barriers) from streets and parking lots.

- ❑ Facility Managers / Supported Commands - Report to NASPR EMO when facilities have completed all measures for implementation for Winter Storm Warning.

Enclosure 3: Winter Storm Advisory Checklist

National Weather Center has issued a Winter Storm Advisory - weather conditions are expected to cause significant inconveniences and may be hazardous.

The EMO and CDO / ACDO shall ensure the items on this checklist are completed, whether the incident occurs during or after normal duty hours.

This checklist assumes an early morning scenario. If winter storm conditions trigger a change in status during the duty day, ignore the suggested timeline and complete actions as soon as possible.

- ❑ EMO - monitor the National Weather Center, NAVLANTMETOC DET, State and local police departments, local area newscast, and listening to NOAA weather radio forecast information.

H+0

- ❑ CDO and Public Works / Police / Fire Supervisors - tour the installation checking on roads and parking lots providing surface conditions, as to icing, snow accumulation in parking lots, hazardous road conditions, and / or other weather related hazards; including information regarding snow and ice removal.

- ❑ EMO - provide CO and PWO the most current weather reports from:
    - Virginia (VCIN) State Police Information Network
    - Maryland State Police
    - St. Mary's County Sheriff's Office
    - Calvert County Sheriff's Office
    - Charles County Sheriff's Office
    - Harry W. Nice Bridge

H+30 minutes

- ❑ EMO - conduct a telephone conference call to review information collected on road conditions, base conditions, and current weather forecasts, and snow removal operations. Conference call includes:

    - Commander
    - Executive Officer
    - Emergency Manager
    - Command Duty Officer
    - Public Works Officer

H+45 minutes

- ❑ EMO - advise the CO on a delayed opening past inclement weather hours (0700).

- ❑ CDO / ACDOs - call supported Commands to advise them of NASPR current status.

H+45 - 60 minutes

- ❑ NASPR- Supported Commands need to report their status of opening to NASPR CDO by H+45 minutes to make media notifications.

H+60 Minutes

- ❑ PAO - notify the media if we require a delay past inclement weather hours (0730).
- ❑ NASPR EMO / EOC - implement any change in status decided by NASPR CO and notify supervisors of emergency services / first responders.
- ❑ CDO / ACDO - update, as needed, the base status telephone lines with the most current status information.
- ❑ PAO - update the Base Status Web Page, as needed.

Enclosure 4: Snow Clearing Priority Maps



Webster Field
Snow Priority Map



Appendix 2: Seismic / Geological Hazards

1. Purpose

a. General. A major geological event, however unlikely, can cause an immense number of casualties, extensive property damage, fires, loss of utilities, flooding, and numerous other hazards. Aftershocks can delay rescue efforts and cause secondary fires, landslides, dam failures, and other hazards. Geological events are unpredictable and may occur without warning.

b. Scope. This Appendix assigns responsibility and outlines emergency procedures for seismic and geological hazards, if they occur within NASPR's AOR, which could directly affect the lives and property of the Navy family.

2. Background

a. An earthquake is caused by a slippage of the boundary between two of the earth's tectonic plates. The event is immediate and the installation is not expected to receive an advanced warning.

b. Shaking causes most earthquake damage, but other damaging effects can also occur. Damage and effects include, but is not limited to, the following:

(1) Fires can be created from ruptured gas lines or electrical shorts.

(2) Tsunamis may be generated.

(3) Power lines and trees can fall blocking roads and limiting access and vehicle traffic.

(4) Roads and bridges can be damaged hindering response and recovery efforts.

(5) Geological events can also trigger dam or levee failure.

(6) HAZMAT spills or release.

(7) Landslides.

(8) Liquefaction of the ground can occur during the shaking making the soil behave as a liquid and damage the foundations of structures by eliminating the earth support. Liquefaction often damages buried gas and water lines.

(9) Multiple injuries and deaths.

(10) Collapsed structures.

(11) Trapped individuals.

(12) Loss of normal and / or emergency utility services.

(13) Blocked or impassible roads.

(14) Utilities may be interrupted, including communication, water, waste water, and electricity.

(15) Debris flows, sometimes referred to as mudslides, mudflows, lahars, or debris avalanches, are common types of fast-moving landslides. These flows generally occur during periods of intense rainfall or rapid snow melt. They usually start on steep hillsides as shallow landslides that liquefy and accelerate to speeds that are typically about 10 miles per hour, but can exceed 35 miles per hour. The consistency of debris flow ranges from watery mud to thick, rocky mud that can carry large items such as boulders, trees, and cars. In areas burned by forest and brush fires, a lower threshold of precipitation may initiate landslides.

3. Discussion

a. Overview. Earthquakes strike suddenly, violently, and without warning. If an earthquake occurs in a populated area, it may cause many deaths, injuries, and extensive damage. The main hazards associated with an earthquake are unstable structures, fire, electrical hazards, carbon monoxide, physical injury, heat and cold stress, hazardous materials, and confined spaces. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Geological events will result in structure damage, lifeline systems damage, damage to highways and roads, and damage to utilities.

(2) Geological events will adversely affect security, Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and continuity of business.

(3) Depending on the intensity and location of the geological event, emergency services could be quickly overwhelmed requiring NASPR personnel to be self-reliant for a period of time.

(4) The loss of electricity, water, and sewage will further impact NASPR Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and continuity of business.

(5) The far reaching effects of a geological event can cause dam and water tank failures, fuel storage tank failures, and tsunamis. These events can occur miles away yet cause extensive damage to NASPR facilities and personnel.

(6) Responder populations will be reduced due to fatalities, tending to their families, or inability to respond due to interrupted transportation and road systems.

(7) There will be little time, if any, to warn the Navy family about an earthquake.

(8) Depending on when the earthquake hits, it may take additional time to muster and obtain accountability of personnel.

(9) NASPR personnel that live off-base will be dependent on civilian response resources, which may affect their ability to fulfill their DoD responsibilities.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, and seizures of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogation of civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked for consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on, and maintenance of, proffered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which state governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action. Concept Of Operations

(1) Prepare. Schedule annually the Geological Hazard Protection Self-Survey. This survey is to be conducted region-wide at the beginning of each calendar year to understand the preparedness level of the Navy family during geological hazards

(2) Prevent Mitigate. Transition to Prevent/Mitigate while reconciling deficiencies identified during inspections and / or exercises. NASPR will continue to maintain the appropriate readiness level to mitigate the effects of a geological hazard.

(3) Respond

(a) Priority considerations should be given to utility shut off, fire protection and rescue to the areas with a high population density. Next in priority should be structures that possess high hazard potential such as fuel storage, hazardous material, etc.

(b) All programs and supporting commands will establish an internal action plan for ensuring the maximum safety of personnel as well as minimizing property loss. To be included are procedures and recall lists for implementing the earthquake plan both during and after working hours.

(c) Personnel subject to recall should consider the possibility that communications may be out of service or jammed with emergency calls for service. In the case of a severe geological incident, immediately after ensuring their families are safe and the situation at home has been stabilized, emergency service personnel should report or make contact with their sections without waiting for recall.

(4) Recover

(a) Provide supplies and equipment for recovery and shelter operations.

(b) Identify and initiate detailed damage assessment.

(c) Report damage to the N4 via installation Public Works departments.

(d) Update casualty information to the Casualty Assistance Office.

(e) Secure / cordon damage or dangerous area.

(f) Determine the status of communications systems.

(g) Identify assets available to support rescue and recovery operations.

(h) Activate Support / Recovery Teams to provide emergency communications.

(i) Re- Establish primary mission capability.

(j) Activate emergency sheltering facilities as necessary.

(k) Monitor shelter activation and operations.

(l) Patrol damaged facilities/housing area to prevent looting.

(5) Restore.

(a) All damage assessments are complete and the Navy family needs are identified. The restore phase is complete when the installation returns to pre-incident operational capability and all facilities are returned to pre-incident condition.

(6) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

5. Responsibilities

a. CO

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions.

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required.

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The NASPR PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The NASPR PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the IC.

(4) Activate and staff the installation media center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a PAO representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs related activities.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident.

c. N1 Manpower

(1) Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required.

(2) Assist supported commands with the development and issuance of evacuation orders.

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Identify all facility security shortfalls with response, and request additional support as needed.

(2) Protect critical mission facilities.

(3) Assist in evacuation operations.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide emergency medical response.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident/accident communication requirements.

(4) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident.

(5) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(6) Maintain an event log of all EOC during the incident or accident.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Turn off utilities to effected buildings to prevent leaks or possible injury to responders.

(2) Restore utilities when possible.

(3) Provide recovery equipment (i.e. forklifts, dumpsters, and etcetera).

(4) Conduct damage assessments to determine the re-occupancy status of effected buildings (i.e. structural integrity, smoke or water damage).

(5) Activate support contracts for recovery operations.

h. N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

i. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Be prepared to (BPT) set up safe havens and / or family assistance centers if a significant amount of housing structures are affected.

(2) BPT coordinate mass care with NDW N9.

j. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

k. CDO

(1) Make notifications as directed in the basic plan and / or as directed by the IC.

(2) Report to the CP and coordinate actions with the IC and obtain available facts and brief the appropriate NASPR representatives.

(3) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and brief the Regional Duty Officer (RDO), and continue to do so throughout incident or accident.

(4) Maintain an event log of all CDO / ACDO actions during the incident or accident.

(5) Activate EOC in the event of emergency IAW FAA Annex B, if not complete by EMO staff, as appropriate.

l.Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a tenant representative to the EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed.

6. Administrative

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 3: Fire Hazards

1. Purpose

a. General. This Appendix provides guidance for notification and response to fire incidents within NASPR's AOR. Fire is a great hazard to life and property, especially when ammunition and explosives are involved. Fires occurring in buildings or magazines that contain ammunition or explosives vary in intensity and effect depending on the material involved in the fire.

b. Scope. NASPR Fire Department personnel are responsible for combating and controlling fires on board NASPR, OLF Webster Field, and NSF Solomon Island. Priority consideration is to save/protect lives, prevent destruction or mitigate damage to property and environment.

2. Background

a. Wildland Fires. Wildfires can occur at any time of year if the conditions are optimal. Optimal conditions for wildfires include periods of drought, low humidity, high temperatures, and high winds. Drought increases the potential for catastrophic wildfire. Other factors include wildland fuels, overcrowded tree stands, and the overgrowth of brush and grasses mixing with urban fuels at the wildland-urban interface.

b. Structural Fires. A structural fire is an uncontrolled fire in populated areas that threatens life and property and is beyond normal day-to-day response capability. Most structural fires are quickly contained, and only cause localized damage. This Appendix is applicable mainly for structural fires that significantly exceed local response assets, and affects numerous structures on an Installation. If the structural fire effects a location that has Hazardous Materials, refer to the Hazardous Materials Hazard Specific Appendix for additional information.

c. Shipboard Fires. Shipboard fires are the primary responsibility of the shipboard firefighters with secondary support from NASPR Fire Department when the ships are in port.

d. Aircraft Fires. Generally, aircraft fires are quickly extinguished by the initial Aircraft Rescue Firefighting (ARFF) units. NASPR's EM should be notified of all aircraft fires that occur regardless of the severity.

3. Discussion

a. Overview. Fires can occur at any time of the year. Such events can endanger life, cause significant personal injury, destroy or damage property and equipment, and require expenditure of funds for repair. Analysis of fire events for the NASPR indicates that the most serious threat comes from structural fires. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Communication systems may experience outages in the affected area. Some essential personnel may not be able to be notified immediately.

(2) Injuries ranging from minor cuts and scrapes to extensive burns are likely.

(3) Depending on level of damage, essential function may need to be relocated to alternate sites.

(4) The need for evacuation will be based on the specific fire. Incident Commander will make evacuation recommendation to the NASPR CO.

(5) In buildings affected, work absenteeism may occur due to lack of access to work locations.

(6) Depending on the status and location of the fire, normal mass warning and notification systems may not be available.

(7) Wildfires will likely also affect the local responders and mutual aid may be unavailable or significantly delayed.

(8) The military will likely be called upon to support DSCA missions.

(9) Wildfires may have negative impacts on CMFs causing the need to move to the Emergency Relocation Site.

(10) Transportation affects including the loss of use of certain roadways. This in turn may affect the ability of first responders to access certain areas, or people may not be able to report for duty. This can also produce delays in the “supply chain” mechanisms for an effected location.

(11) Fires may also be accompanied with loss of utilities.

(12) Housing areas may be affected causing Navy families to be sheltered or relocated.

(13) Fires may burn through locations that contain hazardous materials, causing a secondary event.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected

criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action

a. Planning Considerations. This Appendix is applicable mainly for structural fires that significantly exceed local response assets, and affect numerous structures on an Installation. If the fire affects a location that has hazardous materials, refer to the HAZMAT Appendix for additional information.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) Prepare

(a) The prepare phase is continuous situational awareness and preparedness.

(b) Actions in this phase include interagency coordination (with local, state and federal agencies), exercises, and public affairs outreach on fire safety and prevention.

(2) Prevent/Mitigate

(a) The purpose of the prevent/mitigate phase is to position forces to speed up a possible response to a fire, and mitigate the spread.

(b) Prevent/Mitigate success equals evacuation of the fire area and activating mutual aid agreements with federal, state, and local officials.

(c) The phase ends when a fire has started or has spread throughout the installation.

(3) Respond

(a) The respond phase begins with response forces and resources mobilized and transitioning to the incident.

(b) Many fires will be handled primarily by NASPR Fire Department assets, and not require regional/mutual aid assistance.

(c) Regional assistance will be coordinated by the installations through the ROC. Respond phase ends when the fire is contained and controlled.

(4) Recover

(a) The recovery phase begins when the fire is contained and controlled, and efforts are being made to extinguish.

(b) Recover phase success is when NDW and civil authorities have the fire incident extinguished and all the needs of the Navy family have been identified.

(5) Restore.

(a) This phase begins when NDW and mutual aid partners have extinguished all fires and the "clean-up" process is in progress.

(b) The phase with the "clean-up" process complete and installations are moving toward pre-incident conditions.

(6) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

5. Responsibilities

a. CO

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions.

b. N00P Public Affairs.

(1) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required.

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The NASPR PAO media releases will be coordinated with each tenant's PAO prior to release. The NASPR PAO may request a tenant's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the Incident Commander (IC).

(4) Activate and staff the installation Media Center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a PAO representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident.

c. N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required.

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Secure critical infrastructure.

(2) Ensure the safety of evacuees.

(3) Request supplemental security for installations affected by a civil disturbance.

(4) Establish lines of communication (LOCs) with local authorities.

(5) Notify NCIS if deaths have occurred and / or if assistance is needed with the investigation.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide emergency medical response.

(4) Conduct HAZMAT operations if necessary.

(5) Activate applicable MAAs / MOUs additional resources.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident/accident communication requirements.

(4) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident.

(5) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(6) Maintain an event log of all EOC operations during the incident/accident.

(7) Identify and activate EOC, as appropriate, IAW FAA Annex B.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Ensure all utilities are turned off to effected buildings to prevent leaks or possible injury to responders, and restore when possible.

(2) Provide recovery equipment (i.e. bobcats, forklifts, dumpsters, and etcetera).

(3) Ensure debris removal and repair damage as needed.

(4) Conduct damage assessments to determine the re-occupancy status of effected buildings (i.e. structural integrity, smoke or water damage).

(5) Ensure building plans are available to F&ES for search and rescue operations.

(6) N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

h. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) BPT set up safe havens and / or family assistance centers if a significant amount of housing structures are affected.

(2) BPT coordinate mass care with NDW N9.

i. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

j. Command Duty Officer

(1) Make notifications as indicated in the basic plan and / or as directed by the IC.

(2) Report to the CP and coordinate actions with the IC and obtain available facts and brief the appropriate NDW representatives.

(3) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and brief the RDO, and continue to do so throughout incident or accident.

(4) Maintain an event log of all CDO / ACDO actions during the incident or accident.

(5) Activate EOC in the event of emergency IAW FAA Annex B, if not complete by EMO staff, as appropriate.

k. Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a tenant representative to the identified EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions for the IC.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed at the ICP.

6. Administrative

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 4: Pandemic Influenza

1. Purpose

a. General. This Appendix describes and provides guidance for NASPR's preparations and response to Pandemic Influenza (PI). It elaborates on NDW preparations and response using the DoD six-phase construct, the decisions to be made with regards to resource protection efforts and response, and outlines tasks to installation programs. Refer to the NASPR Installation Biological Preparedness Plan (IBPP) as required.

b. Scope. NASPR executes measures to prepare for and prevent outbreaks and the spread of PI to Sailors, civilian workforce and families. If a PI outbreak occurs, NASPR will contain, respond to and recover from the effects of PI in order to minimize the effects and maintain mission readiness and freedom of action.

2. Background

a. The potential for PI to infect personnel assigned to NASPR presents a significant threat to the health of our armed forces, civilian workforce and families. Though the virulence and transmissibility of a particular threat strain will not be known until it emerges, the H5N1 and H1N1 strains circulating throughout the world demonstrates the ability to cause very high mortality rates among affected populations. A widespread outbreak among the forces of a strain with similar characteristics would have significant adverse impacts to our readiness, and must be prevented. The lack of assurances of how effective an existing vaccine or antivirals will be requires that procedural measures be developed and implemented to protect the health of Sailors, the civilian workforce and families.

b. PI outbreak(s) on NASPR will require implementation of control measures similar to those for an outbreak outside the region. Planning and execution of protective measures, and the supporting public information campaigns must instill confidence in local authorities and the local community that the military is fully collaborating with them to contain the outbreak within the region. Control measures must allow continued delivery of essential goods and services from the private/commercial sector of the economy, while protecting those personnel who are providing the goods and services. A requirement to establish a safe haven for quarantine of returning or in-transit personnel could be viewed as being very similar to this scenario. Instilling confidence in the local government(s) and populations that the base/installation is capable of containing a local outbreak should also help provide confidence that the military can safely process returning and / or transiting personnel coming from a threat area.

3. Discussion

a. Overview. It is estimated that 40 percent of personnel may be absent from duty for extended periods of time. These absences may be the result of personal illness,

taking care of family members who have contracted the virus, or simply because they feel safer at home and less likely to be exposed to the virus. A viable PI plan must therefore include a health focus. Each of the following elements of a PI plan includes specific guidance in the event of an influenza pandemic. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

(1) Plans and Procedures. The DoD will have a comprehensive and effective Defense Continuity Program that ensures mission essential functions continue under all circumstances across the spectrum of threats. To reduce the pandemic threat, a portion of the PI plan's objective should be to minimize the health, social, and economic impact of a pandemic on the installation. Additionally, all plans and procedures should be developed to correlate to the organization, its personnel, and mission.

(a) The ability to maintain sustained operations until normal operational activity can be reconstituted, which may be longer than 45 days (six to eight weeks).

(b) Procedures to ensure mission essential tasks (N-METS) can be provided when personnel absenteeism is extraordinarily high.

(c) Activation phases based on pandemic alert levels, the proximity of outbreak to organization's offices/facilities, and reoccurring outbreaks.

(d) A health focus to minimize the effects of a pandemic on staff and operations.

(2) Missions Essential Tasks. NMETS are functions that enable NASPR to maintain mission assurance and operational readiness. During a pandemic, or any other emergency, these essential tasks must be continued to facilitate emergency management and overall recovery. To effectively identify essential tasks, organizations must:

(a) Select essential tasks considering the dynamic nature of a pandemic.

(b) Reexamine prioritization of essential tasks resulting from duration and personnel impact.

(c) Identify essential tasks that cannot be performed from home or other locations.

(d) Identify critical systems and operations that can be redistributed and supported from other offices.

(e) Consider additional critical tasks to meet organizational missions. Review the effect of a pandemic on essential contract and support services and organizational operations, and develop mitigation strategies.

(f) Consider the need for cross-training to ensure essential staffs are available to perform functions.

(g) Continue to perform essential tasks beyond normal requirements.

(3) Delegation of Authority. Clearly pre-established delegations of authority are vital to ensuring all personnel know who has authority to make key decisions in a PI situation. Because absenteeism may reach a peak of 40 percent at the height of a pandemic wave, delegations of authority are critical. These delegations of authority must:

(a) Be at least three deep per responsibility to take into account the expected rate of absenteeism.

(b) Plan for geographical dispersion, taking into account the regional nature of an outbreak.

(4) Alternate Operating Facilities. The identification and preparation of alternate operating facilities and the preparation of personnel for the possibility of an unannounced relocation of essential functions and personnel to these facilities is part of PI planning. During an influenza pandemic, however, special consideration must be given to “social distancing” in the workplace through telecommuting or other means, as an alternative to staff relocation/co-location. Identifying and acquiring alternate operating facilities should include consideration of the following.

(a) The geographical location.

1. Initiate distributed or dispersed DoD operations.

2. Make use of existing department or agency field, branch or satellite locations.

3. Ensure accessibility for handicapped employees.

4. Telecommuting locations.

5. Telecommuting from home.

6. Virtual offices.

7. Joint or shared facilities.

(b) Determine which essential functions can be conducted from a remote location (e.g., home) and those that need to be performed at a designated department or agency facility.

(c) Consider reliable logistical support, services, and infrastructure systems at facilities that remain open, including alternate operating facilities.

(d) Prioritization/determination of accessible facilities/ buildings (as alternative to relocating to remote facility).

1. Necessary support staff.

2. Social distancing policies.

3. Medical screening of employees.

4. Health/medical units.

5. Sanitation.

6. Essential services.

7. Food/water.

(e) Consider the impact local quarantines may have on open/accessible facilities and operating plans.

(f) Perform a risk assessment to determine the risk to personnel of moving them to an alternate facility if there is a potential for exposing personnel to infected individuals.

(g) Ensure the health, safety, and security of relocated individuals include medical screening and health monitoring, if available and sustainable at the alternate facility.

(h) Ensure a timely and orderly recovery from the alternate facility only after it has been verified that the PI threat has been neutralized at the pre-deployment site.

(5) Interoperable Communications. The success of a viable PI plan capability from alternate facilities or telecommuting from home depends on the identification, availability, and redundancy of critical communication systems to support connectivity to internal organizations, external partners, critical customers and other key stakeholders, and the public. Pandemic plans should carefully consider the use of portable computers, high speed telecommunications links, personal communication devices and other systems to minimize illness among essential personnel and restrict workplace entry of people with influenza symptoms. Elements of an interoperable communications capability should include:

(a) Planning that carefully considers the use of laptops, high-speed telecommunications links, Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs), and other systems that enable employees to perform essential functions while teleworking. A mass notification system may also support this connectivity.

(b) Test and exercise telework impact on internal networks as well as impact of government wide mandated telework. Be mindful of INFOSEC when considering personnel telework.

(c) Backup plans should communication infrastructure fail as a result of surge in demand.

(6) Vital Records and Databases. The identification, protection, and availability of electronic and hardcopy documents, references, records, and information systems required to support essential functions during a PI situation is another critical PI planning requirement. Along with the ability to access vital records and databases, PI planning must include the identification and maintenance of vital systems that rely on periodic physical intervention by essential individuals. An effective vital records program must also include:

(a) Identification of records required to sustain operations for 45 days or longer because vital records at alternate facilities may not be accessible. Determine whether files can be accessed electronically from a remote location (e.g., an employee's home).

(b) A plan for the maintenance of vital systems that rely on periodic physical intervention/servicing by essential individuals.

(c) Assignment of responsibility of the vital records program, including identifying alternates with sufficient training to assume the role.

(d) Identification and acquisition of the appropriate medium for accessing vital records, ensuring the primary and alternates are sufficiently trained to include required clearances, passwords and / or access codes.

(7) Human Capital. Each organization is responsible to design, update, and carry out comprehensive plans to take into account and respond to the threats its employees are most likely to face. Installation officials should ensure union notification and bargaining obligations have been met prior to implementation of the plan. Human resources staff should be contacted to assist in determining management's bargaining obligations. These plans interact with and impact on human capital management during a pandemic, and should consider organizational policies that encourage sick employees to stay home; and, enable staff to use telecommuting. Considering the impact/implications of PI on employees, plans must include:

(a) Updating human capital and organizational policies for:

1. Compensation for nonessential and essential employees.

2. Sick leave.

3. Mandatory sick leave.

4. Family medical leave.

5. Processing grievances.

6. Telework policy.

7. Family Assistance Programs.

(b) Coordinating modifications to human capital policies and plans with labor relations.

(c) Review terms and conditions of contract work to ensure contractor responsibility for essential functions (where relevant) and to suspend non-essential work.

(d) Evaluating the need for hygiene supplies, medicines, and other medical necessities to promote the health and wellness of essential personnel and plan for distributing such supplies.

(e) Procedures for medical screening and clearing essential personnel.

(f) An employee accountability system.

(g) Guidance and awareness plans and materials for individuals, including:

1. Occupational risk reduction strategies.

2. Infection control.

3. Personal hygiene.

4. Social distancing techniques.

5. Travel restrictions.

(h) The provision of relevant information and advisories about the pandemic to employees, via mass notification system, or

1. Hotlines.

2. Web sites.

3. Voice Messaging System alerts.

4. All hands messages.

(i) An ability to provide employees with cross-training to ensure essential staff is available to perform functions.

(j) For further information on Human Capital Planning for PI, please see the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) guide, same subject, at www.opm.gov/pandemic.

(8) Testing, Training, and Exercises. Testing, training, and exercising a PI plan's capabilities are essential to assessing, demonstrating, and improving an organization's ability to execute its PI plans and programs. PI plans must also test, train, and exercise "social distancing" techniques, including telecommuting, to help minimize contact with others and reduce the spread of infection. Additional requirements include:

(a) Testing established triggers and procedures for activating and terminating the organization's PI plan and emergency response plan in the event of a PI.

(b) Annual awareness briefings on PI.

(c) Testing plans through Tabletop and functional exercises activating the PI plan in the event of a PI.

(d) Testing, training, and exercising should include social distancing techniques, including telework capabilities and impacts of a skeleton staff on facilities and essential functions and services.

(9) Devolution of Control and Direction. The devolution option of a PI plan must be developed to address how an organization will identify and conduct its essential functions during an emergency that renders the organization's leadership and staff incapable or unavailable to execute those functions either from its primary or alternate operating facilities. Because an influenza pandemic may hit earlier, longer, or harder in various parts of the country, devolution planning may need to consider rotating operations among regional offices as the pandemic wave moves throughout the United States. Additional considerations include:

(a) How an organization will conduct essential tasks if PI renders leadership and essential staff incapable or unavailable to execute those functions. Full or partial devolution of essential tasks may be necessary to ensure continuation.

(b) Develop detailed guidance for devolution, including:

1. Essential tasks.

2. Rotating operations geographically as applicable.

3. Supporting tasks.

4. Points of contacts.

5. Resources and phone numbers.

(c) Ensure the devolution site can provide for the health, safety, and security of the personnel. This includes the provision of vaccines and antivirals.

(10) Reconstitution. Reconstitution embodies an organization's ability to recover from a catastrophic event and consolidate the necessary resources that allow it to return to a fully functional entity of the federal government. The objective during this recovery and reconstitution phase during a pandemic is to expedite the return of normal services to the nation. Additional considerations include:

(a) A method to acquire verification that the PI threat has passed and that it is safe to return to the point of embarkation.

(b) Plans for replacing employees unable to return to work and prioritizing hiring effort.

(c) In conjunction with public health authorities, developing plans and procedures to ensure the facilities/buildings are safe for employees to return-to-normal operations.

(d) Recognition that facilities may require decontamination before they can occupy with a return-to-normal operation.

(e) The need for counseling and other mental health and social services.

(11) Additional Actions.

(a) Identification of "Social Distancing/Shelter-in-Place Techniques. OPM will provide interim PI guidance through, Telework: A Management Priority, A Guide for Managers, Supervisors, and Telework Coordinators; Telework 101 for Managers: Making Telework Work for You; and Telework 101 for Employees: Making Telework Work for You. Shelter-in-place guidance and plans are available through the American Red Cross.

(b) Development of a Pandemic Internal Communications Plan is critical to prepare personnel for a pandemic by keeping them informed of the status of current

outbreaks, symptomology, available vaccines, and antivirals and activation of PI and emergency response plans.

(c) Ensure adequate availability of essential supplies, services, and contracts. Plans must anticipate and prepare for the requirement for additional resources in the event of a pandemic, including:

1. Providing sufficient infection control supplies (e.g., hand sanitizers, environmental cleaning supplies, and educational materials).

2. Enhancing communications and infrastructure as required to support personnel telecommuting and remote customer access.

3. Ensuring available medical consultation and advice for medical response.

4. Cleaning facilities and equipment, which may require new or modifying current housekeeping contracts

b. Assumptions.

(1) A PI outbreak has the potential to cause critical and inadequate military and civilian staffing levels among affected units.

(2) PI will have second and third order effects, including adverse impacts on sustaining essential goods and services to bases/installations.

(3) Efforts to combat PI will consist of local, state and national level government, military and private efforts, and will be conducted within a regional framework.

(4) Restriction of International and inter-state transportation to slow spread of the virus.

(5) Operational commitments for ongoing operations will continue at current levels.

(6) Criminals and terrorist groups will be negatively impacted at a rate similar to or greater than that of U.S. forces.

(7) Susceptibility to the pandemic influenza virus will be universal.

(8) Some exposed and infected personnel remain asymptomatic and spread the virus.

(9) A pandemic in the U.S. could result in 20-35% of the population becoming ill, 3% being hospitalized and a fatality rate of 1%.

(10) Pandemic outbreak will last 6-12 weeks and multiple pandemic waves will follow.

(11) Local communities continue cooperation activities with NDW facilities.

c. Limitations.

(1) Under the Tenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and the principle of federalism, the states have the primary authority and responsibility for the general welfare of their people. A state's primary authority for securing the general welfare of its people is its "police power." If, in the exercise of a state's police powers an incident exceeds a state's resources and capabilities, a governor can request federal assistance under the Stafford Act.

(2) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, and seizures of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogation of civilians. During PI operations the Posse Comitatus Act prohibitions are assumed to be in force; however, there are constitutional, statutory and common law exceptions to the Posse Comitatus Act that may permit Title 10 forces to engage in direct law enforcement. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked for CBRNE CM operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During PI operations Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on, and maintenance of, proffered equipment.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action

a. Planning Considerations. The CONOPS for this plan flows from guidelines in the NDW, CNIC, OPNAV, and USNORTHCOM Response to PI and the DoD Global CONPLAN to Synchronize Planning for PI. To that end, NDW will follow established PI phases. This plan retains the phase structure outlined in the USNORTHCOM CONPLAN and is driven by operational requirements, the virulence of the influenza virus, and the spread of the virus geographically. A comparison of USNORTHCOM phases with WHO phases and U.S. government stages is helpful. This phasing follows the DoD Global CONPLAN to Synchronize Planning for PI; it also integrates additional consideration of operational requirements. This plan is similar and follows a six-phased

construct: Shape, Prevent, Contain, Interdict, Stabilize, and Recover. Appendices 2 through 4 of this Appendix provide key task guidance for key personnel. The current DoD phase can be found at http://fhp.osd.mil/aiWatchboard/.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) DoD Phase 0 - Shape (Prepare). This phase occurs in an inter-pandemic period and is a continuous phase incorporating adaptive planning, routine surveillance, and engagement activities to assure and solidify collaborative relationships, shape perceptions, and influence behavior to be prepared for a new influenza viral sub-type. This phase includes education and training for the population, interagency, and community partners.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 0 to Phase 1 is when indications and warnings reflect the occurrence of human infection(s) with a new virus sub-type, yet without human-to-human spread, or at most, rare instances of human-to-human spread in close contact. When WHO declares Phase 3, higher headquarters (HHQ) will consider moving to Phase 1.

(b) This phase ends upon receipt of information of human infection(s) with a new influenza viral sub-type but no human-to-human spread, or at most rare instances of spread to a close contact.

(2) DoD Phase 1 - Prevent (Prepare). This phase begins upon receipt of information of human infection(s) with a new influenza viral sub-type but no human-to-human spread, or at most, rare instances of spread to a close contact.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 1 to Phase 2 is when indications and warnings identify small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission, but the spread is highly localized, suggesting virus is not well adapted to humans. When WHO declares Phase 4, HHQ will consider moving to Phase 2.

(b) This phase ends upon receipt of information of small clusters with limited human-to-human transmissions, but the spread is highly localized suggesting the virus is not well adapted to humans.

(3) DoD Phase 2 - Contain (Prevent/Mitigate). This phase begins upon receipt of information of small cluster(s) with limited human-to-human transmission, but the spread is highly localized suggesting the virus is not well adapted to humans. During this phase, NASPR components will take measures to protect the NASPR's population in the localized region(s) while maintaining the freedom of action to conduct assigned missions.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 2 to Phase 3 is when indications and warnings identify large cluster(s), but human-to-human spread is still localized. This suggests the highly lethal virus is becoming increasingly adaptive, but has not yet fully

achieved sustained human-to-human transmission. When WHO declares Phase 5, HHQ will consider moving to Phase 3.

(b) This phase ends when indications and warnings identify large clusters of human-to-human transmission or when the outbreak is contained with no additional cases in an (the) identified region(s).

(4) DoD Phase 3 - Interdiction (Respond). This phase begins when indications and warnings identify large clusters of human-to-human transmission in (the) affected region(s). During this phase, NDW components will take broader measures to protect the MCIEAST population while maintaining the freedom of action to conduct assigned missions.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 3 to Phase 4 is when indications and warnings identify increased and sustained transmission of the virus among the general population. When WHO declares Phase 6, HHQ will consider moving to Phase 4.

(b) This phase ends upon receipt of information that highly lethal, influenza virus is spreading efficiently from human-to-human signaling a failure of containment and interdiction actions within a region(s)--similar to WHO phase 6 conditions--or when the outbreak is contained with no additional cases in the identified region(s).

(5) DoD Phase 4 - Stabilize (Recover). This phase begins upon receipt of information the PI virus is spreading globally from human-to-human signaling a failure of containment and interdiction actions. During this phase, NDW components will protect the NDW population; maintain freedom of action to conduct assigned missions and within capabilities. Additionally, NDW will maintain efforts in mitigating the pandemic effects to ensure installations are capable of maintaining social order, maintain critical infrastructure, and minimize human suffering.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 4 to Phase 5 is when case incidence rate is declining, indications of a PI wave slowing, and conditions begin to allow reestablishment of normal functions.

(b) This phase ends upon receipt of information case incidence is decreasing, indicating conditions begin to allow reestablishment of government functions.

(6) DoD Phase 5 - Recovery (Restore). This phase begins upon receipt of information that case incidence is decreasing, indicating the slowing of the pandemic wave. During this phase, NDW conducts force reconstitution operations and, as directed, will support efforts to re-establish normal support conditions with key partners.

(a) Trigger to move from Phase 5 to Phase 0 is when conditions (e.g., no further human PI infections; no indications of a subsequent wave(s); MCIEAST support to interagency/intergovernmental partners is no longer required, and etcetera) are set to

return to the inter-pandemic phase; or HHQ moves to a lower phase (Phase 1-4) if there are indications of a subsequent wave.

(b) This phase ends when normal support relations are in place, and conditions allow return to the inter-pandemic conditions or back to a previous phase.

5. Responsibilities

a. Commanding Officer

(1) Ensure mission critical physical infrastructures are assessed to identify vulnerabilities and the risks of vulnerabilities. As required, determine if the risks are acceptable, or identify a means to prevent and / or recover from the vulnerabilities.

(2) Per guidelines, declare a public health emergency for the installation upon determining a public health emergency exists.

(3) In consultation with NDW, exercise emergency health powers during a declared public health emergency.

(4) If appropriate or necessary, approve and forward requests for delivery and transfer of Strategic National Stockpile (SNS) assets for response sustainment.

(5) Require installation leadership to plan, coordinate, and exercise PI-related plans and orders with local communities and municipalities. Ensure this plan and other biological-related planning documents align with local plans and meet local and state regulations.

(6) Ensure military and civilian personnel are adequately trained in PI response procedures and equipped to successfully defend, respond, mitigate, and recover from PI incidents. Develop mutual aid agreements with civil agencies that contain specific provisions for response to and recovery from PI incidents.

(7) Prioritize use of installation resources in conjunction with tenant organizations to continue the installation's missions and apportion those according to mission criticality.

(8) Assess intelligence indicators and operational situations to determine appropriate FPCON measures and when to implement them.

(9) Ensure units possess the contamination control and shelter management capabilities they need to meet mission requirements.

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) In preparation for a public health emergency, the installation PAO will provide updates on a regularly scheduled basis.

(2) In the event of a PI event, provide personnel with an authoritative point of contact for current, accurate information about the status of any health-related issue and the command's actions.

(3) Use available communication means as directed by the Installation Commander to provide information to the base populace prior to, during, or following PI incidents.

c. N1 Manpower

(1) Upon execution of a pandemic influenza response, N1 will ensure the proper assignment and use of personnel. Civilian employees with critical skills, who occupy key positions, will perform those functions during a crisis involving pandemic influenza.

(2) Maintain accountability for all assigned/attached/OPCON personnel and DoD civilian and contractor personnel. To document any illness or potential/actual exposure to a hazard, a comprehensive list of all personnel must be maintained for historical accounting in case long-term medical consequences result from exposure to such an illness or hazard.

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Recommend increases or decreases in the FPCON based on the acquisition and analysis of PI-related intelligence information.

(2) Coordinate notification procedures for evacuating on-base areas and coordinate off-base evacuation with local civil authorities, if warranted by a PI incident. Assist in notifying all non-essential personnel to evacuate hazardous PI-contaminated environments.

(3) Provide security or recommend security options for the medical treatment facility, isolation/quarantine facilities, morgue, casualty collection point (if used), and / or distribution points for treatment supplies as required in the aftermath of PI incidents.

(4) Include exercise inputs and scenarios designed to evaluate the effectiveness of the PI plan into the installation exercise cycle. This includes exercise coverage for operationally-significant, naturally-occurring outbreaks of disease.

(5) Assist in scheduled update and improvement of this plan.

(6) Provide mission assurance guidance during all phases of the PI-related event.

(7) With other advisors, be prepared to provide the Installation Commander recommendations regarding the transfer or sustainment of critical mission operations during all phases of a PI event.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) In the event of a PI outbreak, continue to support and / or serve as the primary providers of EMS.

(2) Continue to provide patient triage, stabilization, treatment, and transport services. Medical care may be for patients infected with pandemic influenza or other medical emergencies that will continue to occur despite the outbreak of pandemic influenza.

(3) Use universal precautions when providing treatment to all patients. This is standard practice for all patients at all times regardless of a pandemic influenza outbreak.

f. N36 Training & Readiness

(1) Test, train, and exercise “social distancing” techniques, including telecommuting, to help minimize contact with others and reduce the spread of infection.

(2) Exercise established triggers and procedures for activating and terminating the organization’s PI plan and emergency response plan in the event of a PI.

(3) Develop annual awareness briefings on PI.

(4) Test plan through Tabletop and functional.

(5) Coordinate all necessary training for crisis intervention in event of PI outbreak.

g. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Evaluate the potential biological threat/hazard to NASPR, supporting facilities, and supported mission-essential functions.

(2) Recommend appropriate and legal courses of actions to the CO in a timely and efficient manner.

(3) Activate EOC IAW FAA Annex B, as appropriate.

h. N4 Public Works

(1) Provide recommendations to the CO, and the CAT regarding suitable building candidates for isolation and quarantine facilities.

(2) Provide and maintain potable water, electrical and sanitary sewage capabilities for isolation and quarantine facilities.

(3) Maintain Heating/Ventilation/Air Conditioning (HVAC) systems. Train personnel to operate these systems so that shelter-in-place measures can be effectively implemented based on the HVAC system in specific facilities.

(4) Assist in the provision of basic human needs services (feeding, lodging, laundry / linen) for personnel directed to remain in isolation / quarantine.

i. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

j. N6 Communications & IT

(1) Request, coordinate, and validate the interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial and fixed communications systems. Develop and validate Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Critical Infrastructure Program (CIP) issues for NASPR.

(2) Enhance communications and infrastructure as required to support personnel telecommuting and remote customer access

k. N8 Financial Management

(1) Ensure NASPR establishes a line of accounting procedures for reimbursable material and services in event they were used to assist civil authorities during PI incidents.

(2) Capture expenses incurred during implementation of this plan.

l. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Provide mass care with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations. Some considerations for mass care include, but are not limited to, the following:

(a) Safe haven operations

(b) Evacuation and relocation operations

(c) Sailor/family assistance

(d) Support to extended shelter-in-place

(e) Animal care and welfare

(f) Personnel accountability

(g) Coordination with local/state shelters

(h) Sanitation supplies

(i) Food preparation

(j) Waste disposal

(k) Information Technology

(2) Provide quarantined people with food, water (if needed), and other supplies in order for families to live together in a centralized location.

(3) Provide child care services for children and dependents of those who have been placed under isolation or quarantine restrictions.

m. Command Duty Officer.

(1) Maintain liaisons to receive and disseminate medical threat intelligence, information collection and analysis. When local information indicates gaps, forward timely requests for information via appropriate intelligence/information collection and production channels.

(2) Activate EOC in the event of emergency IAW FAA Annex B, if not complete by EMO staff, as appropriate.

n. Tenant Commands

(1) Develop and implement unit specific checklists supporting this plan. Organizations will coordinate with applicable installation agencies and local civil agencies, and verify their final checklists and / or supporting documents with the MBAC to ensure procedures are synchronized with the overall installation comprehensive PI plan.

(2) Disseminate PI-related training material throughout the unit in support of this Plan.

(3) Ensure support and recovery teams tasked in this plan are adequately staffed, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned functions.

(4) As outlined in this plan, designate appropriate personnel to perform special duties in support of NASPR recovery activities such as providing security for, or collecting and disposing of contaminated waste from isolation or quarantine facilities and areas.

6. Administrative

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(1) A written negative response is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports/Alerts/COR.

(1) All commands within NASPR will coordinate with military treatment facilities for verification to ensure personnel meet CDC criteria and report to COMUSFLTFORCOM on service members with suspected, probable or confirmed Influenza A cases. NDW will make to the USFF Watch Officer via email at CATMED@FFC.NAVY.MIL.

(2) NASPR will report, to the NDW ROC, suspected, probable or confirmed cases of Influenza A for all personnel. This includes service members and civilian employees and their families.

(3) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(4) EOC SOP's outline incident notification and reporting requirements; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

(5) MD State SNS Coordinator - Kevin F. Jura, NRP, kevin.jura@maryland.gov, (410) 767-6682 or (443) 630-0753

7. CPOD Sites

a. Recommended Locations:

(1) Drill Hall (Basketball/Volleyball Court)

(2) Theatre (Lobby/ Viewing Area)

(3) Rivers Edge

(4) Lincoln Housing Community Center

(5) The potential exists to use larger commands (Hangars) as a secondary site for their personnel.

b. Space requirements:

(1) Large and open, easily located by personnel.

(2) Size should accommodate Tables, chairs, and large numbers of personnel, including those with disabilities.

c. Simplified Process:

(1) Personnel will fill out information form (can be distributed ahead of time but many will show without).

(2) Forms will need to be screened medically for contradictions.

(3) Injection will be administered or meds provided and first dose taken on site.

(4) Personnel may have to wait on station for 15 minutes for observation (medical reaction).

(5) Personnel will have to be accounted (command roster).

d. Potential Equipment List:

(1) Rectangular Tables 4-6 ft. in length.

(2) Chairs (stackable or folding).

(3) Portable screens/partitions for privacy (ropes and sheets/blankets).

e. Additional Items/Personnel:

(1) Security (crowd control/queuing).

(2) Security for transportation of medication.

(3) EMS on standby.

(4) Tenant command personnel to assist with accounting for their personnel.

(5) Additional personnel may be required to assist with administrative/dispensing duties.

8. Required Equipment

a. Crowd control equipment (barriers, cones, and etcetera)

b. Tables 4-6 feet long

c. Chairs

d. Portable screens / partitions for privacy during searches

e. N-95 respirator masks

TABS:
Tab A: N-95 order matrix

Tab A: N-95 Order Matrix

Items	Unit	Unit Cost	Amount Req. Per Person	Freq. used	Cost per Person for 30 days	Item cube ft	Item weight
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Mask Surgical, Disposable	300 ea	$66.15	1	Daily	$66.15	0.75	0.75lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
Protective Gowns	each	$1.55	1	day	$46.50	0.03	0.21lbs
Goggles	each	$4.00	1	person	$4.00	0.015	.45lbs
Face Shields	each	$3.00	1	person	$3.00	0.13	1.7lbs
Gloves	1000/box	$46.11	25	30 days	$46.11	0.38	2.75lbs
N-95 Mask	200/box	$46.00	1	day	$46.00	1.01	4.8lbs
SAR / PAPR	each	$600.00	1	person	$600.00	2	15lbs

Ensemble 1 Low Exposure Risk. General Population							
Items	**Unit**	**Unit Cost**	**Amount Req. Per Person**	**Freq. used**	**Cost per Person for 30 days**	**Item cube ft**	**Item weight**
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
				Total	**$27.60**	**1.28**	**1.15lbs**

Ensemble 2 Medium Exposure Risk. Personnel with minimal contact							
Items	**Unit**	**Unit Cost**	**Amount Req. Per Person**	**Freq. used**	**Cost per Person for 30 days**	**Item cube ft**	**Item weight**
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
Mask Surgical, Disposable	300 ea	$66.15	1	Daily	$66.15	0.75	0.75lbs
N-95 Mask	200/box	$46.00	1	day	$46.00	1.01	4.8lbs
				Total	**$139.75**	**3.04**	**5.95lbs**

Ensemble 3 High Exposure Risk. EMT, MP, Fire Personnel							
Items	**Unit**	**Unit Cost**	**Amount Req. Per Person**	**Freq. used**	**Cost per Person for 30 days**	**Item cube ft**	**Item weight**
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
N-95 Mask	200/box	$46.00	1	day	$46.00	1.01	4.8lbs
Gloves	1000/box	$46.11	25	30 days	$46.11	0.38	2.75lbs
				Total	**$119.71**	**2.67**	**8.7lbs**

Ensemble 4 Very High Exposure Risk. Medical Examiners, Labs							
Items	**Unit**	**Unit Cost**	**Amount Req. Per Person**	**Freq. used**	**Cost per Person for 30 days**	**Item cube ft**	**Item weight**
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
N-95 Mask	200/box	$46.00	1	day	$46.00	1.01	4.8lbs
Gloves	1000/box	$46.11	25	30 days	$46.11	0.38	2.75lbs
Protective Gowns	each	$1.55	1	day	$46.50	0.03	0.21lbs
Goggles	each	$4.00	1	person	$4.00	0.015	.45lbs
Face Shields	each	$3.00	1	person	$3.00	0.13	1.7lbs
				Total	**$173.21**	**2.845**	**7.86lbs**

Ensemble 5 Extremely High Exposure Risk. Healthcare personnel							
Items	**Unit**	**Unit Cost**	**Amount Req. Per Person**	**Freq. used**	**Cost per Person for 30 days**	**Item cube ft**	**Item weight**
Tissue	100/box	$0.90	1	week	$3.60	0.7	0.45lbs
Hand Sanitizer	8oz	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.03	0.58lbs
Disinfectant wipes	35/co	$3.00	1	week	$12.00	0.55	0.12lbs
N-95 Mask	200/box	$46.00	1	day	$46.00	1.01	4.8lbs
Gloves	1000/box	$46.11	25	30 days	$46.11	0.38	2.75lbs
Protective Gowns	each	$1.55	1	day	$46.50	0.03	0.21lbs
Goggles	each	$4.00	1	person	$4.00	0.015	.45lbs
Face Shields	each	$3.00	1	person	$3.00	0.13	1.7lbs
SAR / PAPR	each	$600.00	1	person	$600.00	2	15lbs
				Total	**$773.21**	**4.845**	**22.86lbs**

Sources
* Universal Data Repository April 08
* Manufacture Data from 3M
* Manufacture Data from Kimberly Clarke

Note
* Data, cost, size of packaging, and unit of measure are current as of 28 April 08; however, subject to change with the commercial economy

Appendix 5: Hazardous Materials Spill / Release

1. Purpose.

a. General. The Naval District Washington Fire & Emergency Services is responsible for responding to the spill or release of hazardous materials. The Facility Response Plan (FRP) is the primary source for response actions and this appendix does not supersede the FRP.

2. Background.

a. This hazard specific Appendix concerns of the release or spill or hazardous materials into the environment. There are a number of hazardous materials in use on NASPR, and a number of local industries utilize hazardous materials. Hazardous materials are transported in the area by barge traffic on the Potomac River and by truck on local highways.

b. This threat could cause injury or even death of installation personnel, disrupt force protection operations by threatening security personnel, disrupt Mission Essential Functions, and adversely impact the Continuity of Business for other functions at NASPR.

c. Generally, responders can assume this threat will not impact the installation's infrastructure and additional response will be provided from outside NASPR via mutual aid.

d. All hazards incident response check lists that can be used for hazardous material incidents are contained in Section V of this plan.

e. This hazard would trigger activation of the EOC if the material released posed a threat to installation personnel, or affected installation operations. Situations that would trigger EOC activation include:

(1) Presence of an airborne threat or toxic plume that could threaten personnel on the installation or in the surrounding community.

(2) Potential for an additional release that would create an airborne threat or toxic plume.

(3) A release that prevents travel through, or access to, a portion of the installation.

(4) A release that results in building evacuation.

3. Discussion.

a. HAZMAT Spills/Releases can occur at any time of the year. Such events can endanger life, cause significant personal injury, destroy or damage property and equipment, and require expenditure of funds for repair.

b. All personnel on the installation could potentially be affected by this hazard. The primary response forces for this hazard would be the installation Fire Department, augmented by the PW Environmental Division and the NASPR Security Department, with the EMO coordinating EOC activation if required. The Naval District Washington Fire Department includes a fully capable HAZMAT team, trained to Technician-level Response Capability, with the ability to effectively respond to and contain, identify, and mitigate the effects of a wide range of hazardous materials. The HAZMAT team has a full range of protective equipment, up to Level A, and a variety of test equipment. The team has the resources required to sustain critical operations during an emergency. However, due to manpower limitations, without mutual aid, the department has only limited ability to conduct offensive operations and limited ability to remove casualties from a contaminated environment. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

c. Assumptions.

(1) Communication systems may experience outages in the affected area. Some essential personnel may not be notified immediately.

(2) Injuries ranging from minor cuts and scrapes to extensive burns are likely.

(3) Depending on the level of damage, essential functions may need to be relocated to alternate sites

(4) The need for evacuation will be based on the specific threat; IC will make recommendations to the installation CO.

(5) In buildings affected, absenteeism may occur due to lack of access to work locations.

(6) The military will likely be called upon to support DSCA missions.

(7) Transportation affects will include the loss of use of certain roadways. This in turn may affect the ability of first responders to access certain areas, or people may not be able to report for duty. This can also produce delays in the “supply Chain” mechanisms for an effected location.

(8) Housing areas may be affected causing Navy families to be sheltered or relocated.

(9) Local MOA's partners may not be immediately available if they are responding to conflicting higher level response tasking within the NCR.

d. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action.

a. Planning Considerations. This Appendix is applicable for HAZMAT spills that significantly exceed local response assets, and affect numerous structures on an installation. If a fire affects a location that has hazardous materials, refer to the HAZMAT Tab for additional guidance information.

b. Responsibilities

(1) CO

(a) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property and the environment.

(b) Provide OPREP and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions.

(2) N00P Public Affairs

(a) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required.

(b) Responsible for external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The NASPR PAO media releases will be coordinated with each tenant's PAO prior to release. The NASPR PAO may request a tenant's PAO lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of events.

(c) Obtain incident information from the Incident Commander (IC).

(d) Activate and staff the installation Media Center at the identified location.

(e) Provide a representative to the EOC to coordinate all PAO related activities.

(f) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(g) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident.

(3) N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required.

(4) N3AT.

(a) Secure critical infrastructure.

(b) Ensure the safety of evacuees.

(c) Request supplemental security for installations affected by a civil disturbance.

(d) Establish lines of communications (LOC) with local authorities.

(e) Notify NCIS if deaths occurred and / or if investigation assistance is needed.

(5) N30 Emergency Services.

(a) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(b) Coordinate with mutual aide partners.

(c) Provide emergency medical response.

(d) Activate applicable MAA/MOU's for additional resources.

(6) N37 Emergency Management.

(a) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(b) Coordinate support from NDW as required.

(c) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the installation CO and continue to do so throughout the incident.

(d) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as required by the IC.

(e) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

(7) N4 Public Works (NAVFAC).

(a) Ensure all utilities are turned off to affected buildings to prevent leaks or possible injury to responders, and restore when possible.

(b) Provide recovery equipment (bobcats, forklifts. dumpsters and etcetera).

(c) Conduct debris removal and repair damage as needed.

(d) Conduct damage assessments to determine the re-occupancy status of effected buildings (structural integrity, smoke and / or water damage).

(e) Ensure building plans are available to F&ES for search and rescue operations.

(8) PAO

(a) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(b) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(c) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

(9) N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

(10) N9 Fleet and Family Services.

(a) Be prepared to set up safe havens and / or family assistance centers if a significant amount of housing structures are affected.

(b) Be prepared to coordinate mass care with NDW N9.

(11) Command Duty Officer.

(a) Make notifications per the basic plan and / or as directed by the IC.

(b) Report to the EOC and coordinate actions with the IC and obtain available facts and brief the appropriate NASPR representative.

(c) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity, brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout the incident/accident.

(d) Maintain an events log of all CDO actions during the incident/accident.

(e) Activate EOC in the event of emergency IAW FAA Annex B, if not complete by EMO staff, as appropriate.

(12) Tenant Commands.

(a) Provide EOC representation to brief and coordinate tenant actions.

(b) Recommend additional department or facility personnel to assist the ICP.

5. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) Provide a negative written reply if no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

6. Required Equipment

a. Buoys for water containment

b. Sandbags for land containment

c. Absorption pads

TABS:
Tab A: Installation Spill Event Decision Tree
Tab B: Solomons Spill Event Decision Tree
Tab C: Spill Event Notification Decision Tree

Tab A: Installation Spill Event Decision Tree



ACRONYMS

CDO: Command Duty Officer
ESDC: Emergency Service Dispatch Center
ENV: Environmental
FD: Fire Department
HM: Hazardous Materials
HS: Hazardous Substance
HW: Hazardous Waste
IC: Incident Commander
ICS: Incident Command System
IRT: Initial Response Team
NOSC: Naval On-Scene Coordinator
POL: Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
PW: Public Works
PWO: Public Works Officer
QI: Qualified Individual
RP: Responsible Party

** **Navigable Waters: All waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; Lakes, Rivers, Streams, Mudflats, Sand Flats, and Wetlands**

Tab B: Solomons Spill Event Decision Tree



ACRONYMS

CDO: Command Duty Officer
ESDC: Emergency Service Dispatch Center
ENV: Environmental
POL: Petroleum, Oil, and Lubricants
HW: Hazardous Waste
PW: Public Works

** Navigable Waters: All waters subject to the ebb and flow of the tide; Lakes, Rivers, Streams, Mudflats, Sand Flats, and Wetlands

Tab C: Sill Event Notification Decision Tree



Mandatory Notifications

National Response Center (Call within 30 minutes) (800) 424-8802 or (202) 267-2675

Maryland Department of the Environment (Call within 2 hours) (866) 633-4686

Navy On-Scene Coordinator (NOSC) (757) 341-0424 (Day) (757) 636-4378 (24 hr)

MIDLANT Regional Operations Center (If NOSC cannot be reached) (703) 767-8420

Defense Energy Support Center (Duty Officer) (757) 322-2609

Appendix 6: Transportation Accidents

1. Purpose.

a. General.

(1) Transportation accidents include aircraft, railroad, metro rail, bus, automobile, vessel, and other means of transportation. Transportation incidents can occur at any time, usually without warning. They frequently require immediate response for life saving, physical injuries and mitigation of secondary results, such as fires, hazardous materials releases and clean-up.

(2) The majority of transportation accidents will be handled by the IC using established SOP's. This Appendix provides guidance on transportation accidents that require additional on-scene support to enable the appropriate response and recovery.

b. Scope. This Appendix assigns responsibility and outlines emergency procedures for transportation accidents occurring within NASPR and its fence lines which could directly affect the lives and property of the Navy family.

2. Background.

a. Though accidents on roads and freeways happen every day, and are addressed appropriately, such incidents can involve multiple vehicles and include serious injuries and hazardous materials releases. Fog and snow storms have caused multi-vehicle pileups, releases of hazardous materials and stranded motorists.

b. These events probably will not happen on any NASPR facilities, but the local responders may be overwhelmed and request assistance and there may be an indirect effect to the installation. An accident involving an automobile, truck, bus, or motorcycle will herein be referred to as an auto accident.

3. Discussion.

a. Overview.

(1) MEFs might be affected in that staff may not be able to get to the facility.

(2) There could be a power failure or loss of other utilities, but installation facilities would be expected to remain intact.

(3) The impact of a significant event on the roadways might include loss of use of the thoroughfare, affecting local traffic patterns.

(4) The remnants of hazardous materials can pose a hazard, as well as damage the road itself, and mitigation and repair can take time.

(5) There is a possibility of mass casualties.

(6) Staff may be involved in the accident, which could result in serious injuries or death.

(7) Roadways, fences, and barriers may be damaged or destroyed

(8) There are HAZMAT transportation routes near NASPR. Accidents involving those routes could adversely affect the region or installation.

(9) Severe accidents may cause blackouts through a wide area.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Traffic may be slowed, stopped, or rerouted, causing interruptions in traffic patterns.

(2) Loss of traffic route, affecting local traffic patterns.

(3) Potential for mass casualties, fires, and HAZMAT situations.

(4) Roadways, fences, and barriers may be damaged or destroyed.

(5) Severe accidents may cause electrical blackouts over a wide area of NASPR.

(6) The accident is likely to cause public concern and media coverage.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the

federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

(5) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(6) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

4. Action.

a. Planning Considerations. Transportation accidents are possible on NASPR and occur often. The protected populace of the entire installation could be affected at any time, though it is not likely the whole region would be affected at once due to geographic distances.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) Cascading affects may require EOC activation rather than the transportation accident itself. The effects associated with transportation accidents are included:

(a) Hazardous materials release

(b) Fires

(c) Structural failure

(d) Utilities loss

(e) Search & Rescue

(f) Mass casualties

(g) Traffic pattern disruption

(2) During instances where transportation accidents are more likely due to road conditions / weather, NASPR will implement the appropriate mitigating strategies as outlined in Destructive Weather and Winter Storm Appendixes.

(3) Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives

(a) General.

1. Refer to Appendix 19:Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E), Tab C:Transportation Accident

2. If a Government Owned Vehicle, Base Safety needs to be notified.

3. Vehicle transporting AA&E involved in an accident shall be reported and safety measures followed IAW NAVSEA SW020-AG-SAF-010, NAVSEA SW020-AF-HBK-010, and NOSSAINST 8020.18B.

a. Stop the vehicle immediately.

b. Turn off the ignition.

c. Set the brake and chock the vehicle to prevent movement.

d. Post warning devices on the highway. Ensure that all turn signals are flashing simultaneously while warning devices are being posted.

e. If fire results, the driver shall follow the firefighting instructions found on the shipping papers.

f. Notify local law enforcement authorities.

g. Render first aid. Do not move badly injured unless safety is threatened.

h. Notify both shipping and receiving activities by the fastest available means.

i. Notify the Army Operations Center (AOC) at 703-697-0218 / 0219, or DSN 227-0218 / 0219 should DOD/EOD assistance be required for clean-up operations. EOD personnel or other competent DOD official(s) must be dispatched to the scene of an accident involving damaged A&E materials. See subparagraph (k) below for further instructions.

j. Provide emergency response information (bill of lading and / or DD Form 836) to law enforcement authorities and firefighting personnel. This data will provide the type of cargo, dangerous characteristics, firefighting techniques, operating distances for firefighters and equipment, and personnel evacuation distance.

k. Do not attempt to handle damaged A&E cargo or unload a disabled vehicle. Assist emergency first responders as necessary. Handling of damaged A&E cargo will begin after the damaged cargo has been declared safe to move and transport by EOD personnel or other competent on-scene DOD officials.

l. Do not sign any insurance or release documents.

m. Express no opinions as to who is to blame for the accident.

n. If an unattended vehicle is struck, make a reasonable effort to locate the missing driver, while maintaining constant surveillance over the vehicle and its AA&E cargo. If this is not possible, leave the following information for the owner of the unattended vehicle:

(1) Name

(2) Address or home station

(3) State or Federal Government license numbers

(4) Destination

(5) Any other information pertinent to the accident

(b) Warnings

1. If the vehicle is entangled with another or structure, no attempt should be made to disentangle the vehicle until the load has been removed 200 feet from vehicle or habitation.

2. Damage to A&E could cause the packing or body of ordnance related material to be exposed to the elements greatly increasing the cause of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of ammunition or explosives.

3. Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate ammunition or explosives.

5. Responsibilities.

a. CO, NASPR

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the IC.

(4) Activate and staff the media center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident.

c. N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Identify security shortfalls with response, and request additional support as needed.

(2) Protect critical mission facilities.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide Emergency Medical Response.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident / accident communication requirements.

(4) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident.

(5) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(a) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Determine the extent of the damage to facilities in conjunction with the Damage Assessment Teams.

(2) Implement priority service restoration plans.

(3) Inspect affected areas to identify hazards created by damaged utilities.

(4) Maintain communication with the EOC.

(5) Ensure debris removal and repair damage.

(6) Assist in notification of the general public regarding the situation, conservation measures, and response/recovery activities that are being taken.

h. N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

i. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Set up safe havens and / or FACs if significant number of residents are affected.

(2) Coordinate with FISC Washington for basic supplies controlled by NEX / DECA.

j. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

k. Command Duty Officer

(1) Receive information from dispatch regarding current situation, including Navy personnel involved in accident.

(2) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(3) Receive information from facility regarding utilities infrastructure loss and follow Utilities Loss Tab in the AT Plan.

(4) Determine number of locations affected.

(5) Notify regional chain of command.

(6) Notify supported commands as applicable

l. Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a command representative to the identified EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions for the IC.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed at the ICP.

6. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 7: Structural Failure / Collapse

1. Purpose.

a. General. Structural failure refers to loss of the load-carrying capacity of a component or member within a structure or of the structure itself. Structural failure is initiated when the material is stressed to its strength limit, thus causing fracture or excessive deformations. The following are hazards that are common to structural failure:

(1) Severe winds / flooding

(2) Tropical storms

(3) Tornadoes

(4) Major structural fire

(5) Wildfires

(6) Transportation accident (i.e. a plane crashes into building)

(7) Earthquake

(8) Explosive incident

b. Scope. This Appendix assigns responsibility and outlines emergency procedures for structural failure occurring within or around NASPR and its fence lines which could directly affect personnel safety and infrastructure. The structures that can be affected by structural failure include but are not limited to:

(1) Buildings – Residential / Business

(2) Barracks

(3) Bridges

(4) Hangars

(5) Parking structures

2. Background.

a. This threat could cause mass casualties, disrupt Mission Essential Functions (MEF's), damage Critical Mission Facilities (CMF's), and impact the Continuity of Business for other functions and facilities.

b. Responders must assume that this threat is possible. While the probability of structural failure or collapse at NASPR is low, the chance of an incident cannot be ruled out. There are a number of older buildings on the installation, and many buildings are of brick and wood construction that is susceptible to the effects of seismic anomalies. Also, a major structural fire could bring about a collapse. Responders must also assume that there will be secondary impacts, such as damage to utilities and communications systems, and temporary blockage of surrounding roads. On base capabilities could easily be overwhelmed in a major building collapse.

3. Discussion.

a. Overview.

(1) MEFs might be affected in that staff may not be able to get to the facility.

(2) There could be a power failure or loss of other utilities, but Installation facilities would be expected to remain intact.

(3) The impact of a significant event on the roadways might include loss of use of the thoroughfare, affecting local traffic patterns.

(4) The remnants of hazardous materials can pose a hazard, as well as damage the road itself, and mitigation and repair can take time.

(5) There is a possibility of mass casualties.

(6) Staff may be involved in the accident, which could result in serious injuries or death.

(7) Roadways, fences, and barriers may be damaged or destroyed, especially if hazardous materials are involved.

(8) There are hazardous materials transportation routes that near NASPR. Accidents involving those routes could adversely affect the region or installation if there were an accident involving them.

(9) Severe accidents may cause blackouts through a wide area.

(10) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(11) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Traffic may be slowed, stopped, or rerouted; causing interruptions in traffic patterns.

(2) There is a possibility of mass casualties.

(3) Roadways, fences, and barriers may be damaged or destroyed.

(4) Structural failure causing electrical blackouts over a wide area of NASPR.

(5) An aircraft crash is likely to result in structural failure.

(6) A structure failure is likely to cause public concern and media coverage.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action.

a. Planning Considerations. Structural failures are possible on NASPR. The protected populace of the entire installation could be affected at any time, though it is not likely the whole region would be affected at once due to geographic distances.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) The effects associated with structural failures are included in this plan, and shall be used as required to manage a structural failure:

(a) Hazardous materials release

(b) Fire hazards

(c) Transportation accidents

(d) Utilities loss

(e) Search & Rescue

(f) Mass casualties

(2) Structural Failures may close evacuation routes and avenues of approach.

(a) Execute an alternate traffic flow SOP

(b) First responders will automatically execute the alternate traffic direction / mitigation procedures.

(3) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

5. Responsibilities.

a. CO

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the IC.

(4) Activate and staff the media center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident

c. N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Identify security shortfalls with response, and request additional support as needed.

(2) Protect critical mission facilities.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide Emergency Medical Response.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident / accident communication requirements.

(4) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident.

(5) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(6) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Determine the extent of the damage to facilities in conjunction with the Damage Assessment Teams.

(2) Implement priority service restoration plans.

(3) Inspect affected areas to identify hazards created by damaged utilities.

(4) Maintain communication with the EOC.

(5) Ensure debris removal and repair damage.

(6) Assist in notification of the general public regarding the situation, conservation measures, and response/recovery activities that are being taken

h. N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

i. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Set up safe havens and / or FACs if a number of residents are affected

(2) Coordinate with FISC Washington for basic supplies controlled by NEX / DECA.

j. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

k. Command Duty Officer

(1) Receive information from dispatch regarding current situation, including Navy personnel involved in accident.

(2) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(3) Receive information from facility regarding utilities infrastructure loss and report to the CO, as necessary.

(4) Determine number of locations affected.

(5) Notify regional chain of command.

(6) Notify tenant commands as applicable

l. Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a command representative to the EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed at the ICP.

6. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

7. Required Resources

b. Debris removal trucks

c. Heavy equipment, including cranes

Appendix 8: Infrastructure or Utility Loss

1. Purpose.

a. General. Utility interruptions and failures may involve electrical power, fuel, water, and communications systems. Utility systems exist everywhere and are subject to damage from digging, fire, traffic accidents, and severe weather, including flooding and other day-to-day events. Generally, utility outages result from failures in the distribution system as opposed to shortages of supply. Distribution components are most susceptible to failure during extreme hot and cold temperatures as well as during violent weather conditions. Regional failures can threaten human life, particularly when outages affect hospitals, nursing homes, or other healthcare facilities.

b. Scope. This Appendix assigns responsibility and outlines emergency procedures for infrastructure or utility loss occurring within or around NASPR and its fence lines which could directly affect the lives and property of the Navy family, such as:

(1) Buildings - office, support, barracks, hangars

(2) Bridges

(3) Parking Structures

(4) Transformers

(5) Light poles

(6) Water treatment plant

2. Background.

a. Power Loss. A major electricity loss can cause a breakdown in infrastructure affecting communication, security, transportation, Information Technology (IT), Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and Continuity of Business. During or after an emergency situation, there may be a disruption of service in electrical power. The loss of utility services could adversely affect the capability of local personnel to respond to and recover from the emergency situation. Extended electrical outages can also directly impact other utility systems, particularly water and wastewater systems.

b. Water Loss. A major water loss can cause problems with basic nutrition and hygiene. This may cause persons in the Navy Family to worry about their own health and hygiene, and that of their family; causing, persons in the Navy Family to relocate if the expected time without water is to be substantial. A major water loss may impact daily operations because persons will be unable to use restrooms, wash hands, and severely limit the capability of food services.

c. Communications Loss. A major communication loss can cause a breakdown in infrastructure affecting communication, security, transportation, IT, Mission Essential Functions / Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and Continuity of Business. The loss of utility services could adversely affect the capability of local personnel to respond to and recover from the emergency situation that caused the disruption of utility service and create additional health and safety risks for the Navy Family.

3. Discussion.

a. Overview.

(1) Major utilities losses interruption threshold; the time in which the loss of the utility becomes dangerous to life sustainment.

Utility	Outside Temperatures		
	>50°F	50 - 85°F	>85°F
Electricity	2 hours	4 hours	2 hours
Water	6 hours	12 hours	6 hours
Waste Water	24 hours	24 hours	24 hours
Land-line Communications	2 hours	12 hours	2 hours
Natural Gas / Fuel	2 hours	24 hours	12 hours

(2) Operations that should be considered during a major utility loss emergency.

(a) Mass Care

(b) Evacuation

(c) Safe Haven Operations

(d) Shelter in Place Procedures

b. Assumptions.

(1) A major disaster or a disaster affecting a wide area may require extensive repairs and reconstruction of portions of utility systems that may take a considerable time to complete.

(2) Damage to electrical distribution systems may create secondary hazards such as an increased risk of fire and / or public health concerns.

(3) Traffic lights and signals may not work, which may cause interruptions in traffic patterns and transportation.

(4) Some generators may be used, but will not be sufficient to power all items that the Navy Family uses on a daily basis, so energy conservation attempts will need to be made for items that do not pertain to MEFs/CMFs.

(5) Some forms of Mass Warning and Notification may be disrupted, including notification via radio, reverse 911, television, emails, and internet postings.

(6) Persons on base with special needs requiring electricity for medical purposes.

(7) Persons attempt to locate other available water sources, if service is interrupted.

(8) Water may be unavailable due to a severe drought, a contaminated water supply, or a power outage which lends water pumps to be inoperable. Some generators may be used, but will not be sufficient to send water throughout the entire installation.

(9) Persons who have not stocked water may become dehydrated and / or have other adverse health effects.

(10) Persons may take personal days from work in order to temporarily relocate with their family, which may cause disruptions at work.

(11) If landlines are not operable, there will be an overload of cell phone use, which may prohibit some calls from being made, and slow communication.

(12) Disruption of some forms of Mass Warning and Notification, including reverse 911.

(13) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(14) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for

federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

4. Action.

a. Planning Considerations. Major utility failures are possible on NASPR. The protected populace of the entire installation could be affected at any time, though it is not likely the whole region would be affected at once due to geographic distances.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) The loss of utilities may cause cascading affects leading to:

(a) Life safety

(b) Hazardous materials release

(c) Fires

(d) Transportation accidents

(e) Structural or other critical infrastructure failure

(f) Communication disruption

(2) Consider evacuation plan for aircraft, if appropriate

(3) Implement COOP functions in order to continue missions

(4) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

5. Responsibilities.

a. Commanding Officer

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) Distribute EPI as required

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the IC.

(4) Activate and staff the media center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a PAO representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident

c. N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of personnel as required

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Identify all facility security shortfalls with response, and request additional support as needed.

(2) Protect critical mission facilities.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide Emergency Medical Response.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Collect all incident-related data, at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident.

(4) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(5) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Implement priority service restoration plans.

(2) Inspect affected areas to identify hazards created by damaged utilities.

(3) Maintain communication with the EOC.

(4) Ensure debris removal and repair damage.

(5) Assist in notification of the general public regarding the situation, conservation measures, and response/recovery activities that are being taken

h. N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

i. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Set up safe havens and / or FACs if a number of residents are affected.

(2) Coordinate with FISC Washington for basic supplies controlled by NEX / DECA.

j. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

k. Command Duty Officer

(1) Receive information from dispatch regarding current situation, including Navy personnel involved in accident.

(2) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(3) Receive information from facility regarding utilities infrastructure loss and report to CO as necessary.

(4) Determine number of locations affected.

(5) Notify regional chain of command.

(6) Notify tenant commands as applicable.

l. Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a command representative to the identified EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions for the IC.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed at the ICP.

6. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 9: Financial System Interruption or Collapse

1. Purpose.

a. General.

(1) This hazard consists of situations where electronic, communication, or financial issues cause an interruption to the domestic financial system.

(2) There are no checklists in this plan for these situations. The installation would be highly dependent on guidance from higher authority.

b. Scope. This threat would have an impact on the entire installation.

2. Discussion.

a. Assumptions.

(1) Potential for personnel hardships leading to labor unrest and contracting problems; adversely impacting Mission Essential Functions (MEFs) and Continuity of Business.

(2) NDW provides support and guidance to coordinate response and financial services.

(3) Financial disruptions impacts essential missions, widespread logistics problems, or civil disturbances; resulting in, EOC activation.

(4) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(5) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for

federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

(5) Unless specially trained, certified, and equipped CNIC approved Evidence Collection & Recovery Teams (ECRT) established by NDW.

3. Action.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) NAWSPR N1 and N8 coordinate with NDW staff for assistance with personnel and financial incidents.

(2) NDW provides NASPR N8 with an Emergency Line Of Accounting (ELOA).

(3) Key directorates with Government Purchase Cards (GPC) request credit line increases to cover potential increase of expenditures.

(4) Legal provides guidance on all new purchases conducted through ELOAs or GPCs.

4. Responsibilities.

a. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

b. N37/CDO

(1) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

5. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

6. Required Resource. Emergency Line of Accounting

Appendix 10: Environmental Pollution and Contamination

1. Purpose.

a. General. Environmental pollution/contamination refers to all the ways that human activity harms the natural environment. Environmental pollution may be in the form of an open garbage dump or an automobile pouring out black smoke. However, pollution can also be invisible, odorless, and tasteless. Some kinds of pollution do not actually dirty the land, air, or water, but they reduce the quality of life for people and other living things. For example, badly polluted air can harm crops and cause life-threatening illnesses.

b. Scope. Address pollution / contamination from incidents occurring on NASPR and supports the FRP.

2. Background.

a. NASPR is a Superfund site.

b. There were dumps and / or transfer stations on NASPR.

c. Environmental pollution / contamination may cause the following:

(1) Threat to human safety and welfare.

(2) Poisoning of water or food sources and / or supply.

(3) Presence of toxic fumes or explosive conditions.

(4) Damage to personal property.

(5) Need for the evacuation of people.

(6) Interference with public or commercial transportation.

d. Threat to the environment. Injury or loss of animals, plants, or habitats that are of economic or ecological importance such as:

(1) Commercial, recreation, or subsistence fisheries or livestock.

(2) Seal haul outs.

(3) Marine bird rookeries.

(4) Public beaches.

(5) Ecological reserves, forests, parks, archaeological and cultural sites.

3. Discussion.

a. Assumptions.

(1) The type and severity of an environmental incident influences the size, scope, and command and control in response. CBRNE incident responses involve crisis circumstances making it necessary to take immediate response actions without preparing the normal environmental planning documents. Refer to Appendix 13:Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Plan as required.

(2) In responding to an incident, provisions in the Stafford Act or Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations exempt certain activities from the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) or allow alternative means for complying with CEQ's regulatory provisions. Certain response actions specifically excluded from NEPA by the Stafford Act include:

(a) The provision of certain federal resources or assistance essential to meeting threats to life and property resulting from a major disaster.

(b) The repair, restorations, and replacement to pre-disaster condition, of public facilities or certain private nonprofit facilities, damaged or destroyed by a major disaster.

(c) Debris removal from public or private land after a major disaster.

(3) Homeland Defense actions may transition from DoD as the primary or coordinating agency to another agency.

(4) DoD forces are prepared to act in support of civil authorities in a CBRNE incident. Environmental actions are conducted through the NRF primary or coordinating agency designated representative.

(5) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(6) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Limitations.

(1) NASPR personnel do not have the capability to contain large dispersions of hazardous materials or decontaminate large areas.

(2) Unit assets may not be available for transporting hazardous waste to permitted treatment, storage, and disposal facilities.

(3) Contractor support may not be available during the early stages of the operation.

(4) To the extent allowed by crisis circumstances and mission, NASPR personnel must comply with applicable federal, state, tribal and local environmental regulations.

4. Action.

a. Planning Considerations. Environmental contamination is possible on NASPR. The protected populace of the entire installation could be affected at any time, though it is not likely the whole region would be affected at once due to geographic distances.

b. Concept Of Operations

(1) This plan includes the effects associated with environmental contamination and utilized as required to manage environmental contamination:

(a) Hazardous materials release

(b) Fire hazards

(c) Transportation and operational accidents

(2) Environmental contamination may close parts of the installation due to clean-up or likely hazardous material exposure.

(a) Implement alternate traffic patterns

(b) Evacuate personnel and animals from the contaminated area.

(3) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

(4) The Qualified Individual assists the IC with scene management and PW Environmental Officer provides guidance to the EOC.

5. Responsibilities.

a. CO

(1) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives and the environment.

(2) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions

b. N00P Public Affairs

(1) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required

(2) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. .The PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(3) Obtain incident information from the environmental office.

(4) Activate and staff the media center at the identified location.

(5) Provide a PAO representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities, as necessary.

(6) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(7) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident

c. N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability of personnel as required

d. N3AT Force Protection

(1) Identify security shortfalls with response and request additional support as needed.

(2) Protect critical mission facilities or environmental cleanup sites.

e. N30 Emergency Services

(1) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(2) Coordinate with mutual aid partners.

(3) Provide Emergency Medical Response.

f. N37 Emergency Management

(1) Coordinate DSCA efforts with NDW and local authorities.

(2) Coordinate support from NDW if required.

(3) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident/accident communication requirements.

(4) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO, and continue to do so throughout incident in conjunction with environmental representatives.

(5) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as requested by the IC.

(6) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

g. N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(1) Determine the extent of the damage to facilities in conjunction with the Damage Assessment Teams.

(2) Implement priority service restoration plans.

(3) Inspect affected areas to identify hazards created by damaged utilities.

(4) Maintain communication with the EOC.

(5) Ensure debris removal and repair damage.

(6) Assist in notification of the general public regarding the situation, conservation measures, and response/recovery activities that are being taken

h. N8 Financial Management. Maintain cost accountability, cost recovery, and accounting efforts related to the incident.

i. N9 Fleet & Family Services

(1) Set up safe havens and / or FACs if a number of residents are affected.

(2) Coordinate with FISC Washington for basic supplies that are controlled by NEX/DECA, as necessary.

j. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

k. Command Duty Officer

(1) Receive information from dispatch regarding current situation, including Navy personnel involved in accident.

(2) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(3) Receive information from facility regarding utilities infrastructure loss and maintain a common operational picture for the CO.

(4) Determine the amount of base populace and areas affected..

(5) Notify regional chain of command.

(6) Notify tenant commands as applicable

l. Tenant Commands

(1) Provide a command representative to the identified EOC to brief and coordinate tenant actions for the IC.

(2) Recommend any additional department or facility personnel needed at the ICP.

6. Administrative

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

7. Required resource. Traffic control devices (barriers, cones, and etcetera)

Appendix 11: Agricultural Incident / Food Quarantine

1. Purpose. Provide guidance on agricultural or food related incidents impacting NASPR.

2. Background.

a. Agricultural incidents producing severe or catastrophic results are rare within the US. Food contamination incidents occur frequently; however, the affected population remains minimal. NASPR has no history of a significant agricultural or food contamination incident.

3. Discussion

a. Overview

(1) NASPR controls land utilized by private crop farmers and may pose a risk to public health due to pest or biological bacteria and toxins associated with the crops. Due to prevailing and potential for strong winds the potential exists for biological cross contamination from crops inside and outside the fence line. A Pest Management Plan minimizes the impact of insects on public health with cascading benefits to crops, plants, trees, and water located on NASPR, WOLF, and Solomon Recreation Center.

(2) Contracted food venders monitor and test food products sold on the installation. The contractor follows their protocols and policies and government regulations if a positive result indicating contamination occurs.

b. Assumptions

(1) Current plans, policies, and procedures effectively prevent and respond to agricultural or food related incident

(2) External agencies and organizations remain capable to support an incident on NASPR

(3) A food contamination incident affects a number of individuals within a short period of time

(4) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(5) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

c. Limitations

(1) Contractual constraints may prevent specific actions by food service providers

(2) Authority to destroy infected crops on NASPR

4. Action

a. Concept of Operations

(1) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

(2) EMO coordinates with the clinic / BUMED, Maryland Department of Agriculture (MDA), and County and State Health Departments.

(3) BUMED provides guidance to the clinic and coordinates with Centers for Disease Control and Prevention

b. Responsibility

(1) Commanding Officer

(a) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives and the environment.

(b) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions

(2) Public Affairs

(a) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required

(b) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. The PAO media releases will be coordinated with each supported command's PAO prior to release. The PAO may request a supported command's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(c) Obtain incident information from the EOC or CDO.

(d) Activate and staff the media center at the identified location.

(e) Provide a PAO representative to the EOC to coordinate all public affairs-related activities, as necessary.

(f) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(g) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

(3) Emergency Manager

(a) Coordinate with NEPLO and DSCA efforts with local authorities, as necessary.

(b) Collect all incident related information and keep the CO and NDW ROC updated.

(c) Coordinate external response efforts.

(d) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

(4) Public Works

(a) Implement corresponding plans and contracts.

(b) Determine the extent and capability of the hazard.

(c) Coordinate with clinic personnel, as necessary.

(d) Prepare to assist with crop destruction, as necessary.

(5) Fleet & Family Services (F&FS).

(a) Determine contractor requirements to address the incident.

(b) Establish FACs as necessary.

(6) Clinic

(a) Provide specific biological guidance to the EOC.

(b) Coordinate with PW and F&FS.

(c) Conduct medical surveillance, as necessary.

(d) Coordinate with BUMED, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, and Maryland and US Department of Agriculture, as necessary

5. Administrative

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Conduct an After Action Review within two weeks after normal operations resume.

(2) Provide interim lessons learned throughout the incident, as appropriate if the information potentially assists other installations affected by a similar incident.

(3) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports/Alerts/COR

(1) Provide initial report to NDW via C4I with follow-on formal report.

(2) Provide community awareness to the NASPR population.

(3) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(4) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 12: Terrorism Incidents

1. Purpose.

a. General. NASPR Antiterrorism (AT) programs are designed to protect installation and tenant commands, their facilities, infrastructure, material resources, personnel and families from terrorist acts. The installation AT Plan sets forth overarching policies, procedures, guidance and responsibilities for NASPR and tenant commands to detect, deter, defend against, and mitigate acts of terrorism. The installation Emergency Response Plan goals are to respond, recover, and restore from successful terrorism incidents and compliment the AT program prevention and mitigation roles and responsibilities. This EM plan has a much broader distribution than the AT plan, and because of the sensitivity of AT measures, does not repeat information in that plan. Instead, it focuses on those areas where the EM program supports the AT program and force protection efforts.

b. Scope. This Appendix describes and provides guidance for NASPR's preparation and response to a terrorist incident; outlining responsibility and emergency procedures for responding to a terrorist incident.

2. Background.

a. Terrorism includes physical acts such as arson, hostage taking, kidnapping, hijacking, sabotage, information warfare, assassinations, small arms weapons attacks, and cyber attacks. The most significant terrorist attacks to NASPR are those causing large scale destruction, interfere with mission capability, and cause the death or injury to personnel by employing Chemical, Biological Radiological, Nuclear, or High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) devices.

b. High-risk targets for acts of terrorism include military and civilian government facilities, international airports, large cities, and high-profile landmarks. Any installation in NASPR AOR could potentially be affected by a terrorist attack and are at risk for acts of terrorism.

3. Discussion.

a. Overview.

(1) Terrorism can have significant impact on U.S. interests and policy. Terrorists have advantages such as choosing the target, the time and scale of destruction. Military personnel, facilities and material, are identifiable symbols of the U.S. Government and make good targets for terrorists seeking to change U.S. government policies at home or overseas.

(2) Terrorist groups set both immediate and long range goals designed to accomplish a specific result as part of their overall strategy. Short term goals include terrorist attacks.

(3) This Appendix enhances and supports the NASPR AT Plan.
(4) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.
(5) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Assumptions.

(1) Attacks will occur with little or no warning.

(2) The installation will be overwhelmed during a terrorist attack.

(3) The installation adheres to the guidance and tasks set forth in NASPRINST 5530.1 Installation AT Plan.

(4) Mission essential personnel may not be able to respond quickly due to transportation and infrastructure damage, mass panic, building/structure failures, road closures, hazardous materials exposure, and security barricades.

(5) Cellular telephone towers and internet capabilities may be impacted depending on the nature of the event. This could hinder communications to Category 1 and 5 personnel as well as delay warning time to Category 2-4 personnel.

(6) There could be significant numbers of casualties.

(7) Health and mental health resources in the affected communities can be strained to the limits and overwhelmed.

(8) Workplaces and schools may be closed, and there may be restrictions on travel.

(9) Restoring NASPR to fully mission capable may take an extended amount of time.

(10) Public fear may continue for a prolonged period.

(11) Additional coordination required due to local and federal agencies involvement.

c. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include

searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) NSF operations are not authorized within a civilian designated hot zone.

(4) Limited NSF operations within the warm zone to support casualty decontamination corridor. No decontamination of equipment is authorized, with the exception of emergency equipment required to support additional, physically-separated incident sites.

(5) Unless specially trained, certified, and equipped CNIC approved Evidence Collection & Recovery Teams (ECRT) established by NDW.

4. Action.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) The guidance and procedures contained in this instruction are applicable to all Naval commands and activities in the NASPR AOR.

(2) The installation CO can execute any part of this plan when local conditions make action prudent.

(3) Tennant commands will coordinate the setting/securing of FPCON levels within their assigned area, and will provide guidance and procedures for their assigned AOR similar to those contained in this instruction. NASPR CO approves all message traffic concerning FPCON attainment. Tenant commands notify the EOC of FPCON attainment and the EOC updates C4I.

(4) The decision to implement a particular FPCON is a command decision. It is based on an assessment of the force protection, vulnerability of personnel or facilities, criticality of personnel or facilities, availability of security resources, impact on operations and morale, damage control considerations, international relations and the

potential for U.S. government actions to trigger a terrorist response. Refer to the NASPR AT Plan for specifics on FPCON Measures.

(5) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

b. Responsibility.

(1) CO

(a) Provide immediate notification to NDW ROC upon initial reports of a possible terrorist attack.

(b) Support the Incident Commander in prioritizing response and recovery with Critical Mission Facilities (CMF) being considered the highest priority.

(c) Increase Force Protection Conditions (FPCON).

(d) Ensure there are means for first responders to expedite entering and departing the installation during increased FPCON.

(e) Provide NASPR Security Personnel to immediately support the Incident Command post (ICP), CMFs and medical clinics requiring additional security.

(f) Provide additional support as required.

(2) N00P Public Affairs.

(a) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required.

(b) Obtain incident information from the Incident Commander (IC).

(c) Activate and staff the installation Media Center at the identified location.

(d) Provide a representative to the EOC to coordinate all PAO related activities.

(e) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(f) Use available communication means as directed by the installation commander to provide information to the base populace prior to, during, or following a terrorist incident.

(3) N1 Manpower. Maintain accountability for all assigned/attached/OPCON personnel and DoD civilian and contractor personnel.

(4) N30 Fire & Emergency Services.

(a) Conduct search and rescue if necessary.

(b) Coordinate with mutual aide partners.

(c) Provide emergency medical response.

(d) Conduct Hazmat operations if necessary.

(e) Activate applicable MOA/MOU's for additional resources.

(5) N3AT Force Protection.

(a) Identify potential capability requirements that may be needed to augment AT/FP, physical security, and law enforcement missions. Planning must ensure compliance with local, state and Federal laws, and appropriate DoD policies, goals, and objectives.

(b) Maintain roster of active duty security personnel to provide immediate response requests for security support.

(c) Use process of deliberate risk management in security planning and when determining security requirements during a terrorism event.

(d) Mitigate security vulnerabilities and shortfalls.

(e) Identify additional Naval Security Force capabilities needed to protect either Navy assets or preserve mission-related activities.

(f) Determine the need for either added security patrols, hourly checks or added security posting if utility service is disrupted to CMF's, and MEF's.

(g) Initiate Threat Working Group if needed.

(h) Provide update to Regional Operations Center (ROC) as needed.

(i) Increase FPCON, as needed.

(j) For further guidance reference Naval Air Station Patuxent River Instruction 5530.1 Series, Antiterrorism Plan

(6) N37 Emergency Management.

(a) Activate the EOC and provide situational reporting and updates to the ROC IAW FAA Annex B.

(b) Develop Installation guidance for notification, evacuation and sheltering-in-place (SIP) for all Navy personnel, Government Employees, contractors and dependents.

(c) Assist tenant commands in developing notification systems for evacuation or sheltering-in-place of military, civilian, contractor, visitor, and dependent personnel.

(d) Request activation of MOUs/MOAs and ISSAs through NDW Regional Operations Center (ROC), when required, in order to save lives.

(e) Request Federal Assistance through NDW ROC when appropriate.

(f) Implement actions from the ROC in coordinating DSCA requests.

(g) Ensure that the EOC-IMT Finance /Admin section accounts for all costs for terrorism attack mitigation, response and recovery.

(h) Work closely with the ROC and Threat Working Group (TWG) to determine what additional EM related plans warrant activation.

(i) Maintain the CNIC Portal C4I with current information and data providing situational awareness for CNIC when responding to terrorist or suspect terrorist attacks.

(j) Assign Building Managers for all office spaces occupied during normal working hours. Building Managers will ensure their assigned buildings are trained in evacuation and shelter-in-place procedures. The Building Manager is also the key person for First Responders arriving on scene to contact. Provide a current list of the assigned Building Managers and their contact information to the ROC.

(k) Request assistance from other DoD components or Federal and State agencies through the ROC.

(7) N4 Public Works.

(a) Coordinate the logistical issues of SIP, including building systems that can be automatically shut down.

(b) Provide status of systems to the EMO for inclusion in the EOC books.

(8) N6 Communications and IT.

(a) Support communications and information technology requirements of first responders and sheltered personnel.

(b) Request, coordinate, and validate the interfaces (protocols, standards, etc.) between commercial and fixed communications systems. Develop and validate C4 Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) issues for NASPR.

(c) Enhance communications and infrastructure as required to support personnel remote customer access.

(d) Supports IT requirements for telework allowing personnel to work from home or remote location away from hazard area.

(9) N8 Financial Management.

(a) Ensure NASPR establishes line of accounting procedures for reimbursable materials and services in the event they were used to assist civil authorities during a PI incident.

(b) Capture expenses incurred during the implementation of this plan.

(10) PAO

(a) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(b) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(c) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

(11) Command Duty Officer.

(a) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(b) Make notifications as indicated in the basic plan and / or as directed by the IC.

(c) Report to the ICP and coordinate actions with the IC and obtain available facts and briefs the EOC.

(d) Maintain an events log of all CDO actions during the incident/accident.

(12) Tenant commands.

(a) Develop and implement unit specific checklists supporting this plan. Organizations will coordinate with applicable installation agencies and local civil agencies, and verify their checklists and / or supporting documents with the EMO to ensure procedures are synchronized with the overall installation comprehensive plan.

(b) Disseminate terrorist incident-related training materials throughout the unit in support of this plan.

(c) Ensure support and recovery teams tasked in this plan are adequately staffed, trained, and equipped to accomplish their assigned functions.

5. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

TABS
Appendix 1: Active Shooter
Appendix 2: Hostage Situation

Tab A: Active Shooter

LEAD DEPARTMENT: NAS Security
SUPPORTING DEPARTMENTS: All Hands

1. General Information. "Active shooter" is a phrase coined by law enforcement, "an armed person who has used deadly force on other persons and continues to do so while having unrestricted access to additional victims." This definition includes snipers and those with melee weapons, but not suicide bombers. Refer to the Active Shooter Pre-planned response in the AT Plan as required.

a. The impacts of an active shooter attack might include, though are not limited to the following:

(1) A delay before authorities are notified of an active shooter

(2) Affects to Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities

(3) Shelter in place concerns

(4) Mass casualties overwhelming local medical facilities

(5) Significant psychological impacts, especially for first responders and those in close proximity to the attack.

(6) Responders may be incapacitated by the incident and delayed or prevented from responding.

(7) Normal mass warning and notification systems will be used.

(8) There may be a delay in restoring essential services

(9) Worst case scenario for this hazard would be a major act of violence involving multiple shooters or the use of large improvised explosive devices. A significant percentage of the full daytime population of 10,000 could be affected, with lockdown and sheltering being strategies to mitigate impacts.

b. The EOC plays a large role in managing the response to an Active Shooter. Generally, an Active Shooter would trigger a full recall of the EOC staff. While the incident commander on scene (either a fire or security official, depending on the incident) would manage the immediate impact of an act of terrorism, there are many

secondary impacts that will be managed by the EOC. These include, but are not limited to, coordinating personnel protective measures such as sheltering in place or evacuation, managing overall perimeter security, identifying access control measures, and supporting the first responder personnel on scene.

c. This hazard consists of a terrorist attack on the installation or an attack in the local area that impacts on the operation of the installation.

d. An attack would impact the infrastructure, security posture, Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and the continuity of operations of NAS Patuxent River and its tenants.

e. Responders can assume that full activation of response forces, security personnel, and the EOC staff will take place.

f. Active shooter, small boat gunfire or standoff gunfire attack could result in dozens of casualties, short term curtailment of operations (e.g., increased FPCON, lockdown, investigation support, etc.) and greater than a million dollars in damage

2. Applicability. The entire installation would be affected by this hazard, and the CO and DCO, supported by all departments, and primarily the Security Department, would organize the response effort.

3. Required Notifications. Notifications for life safety issues always start with the NDW RDC via telephone at (202) 433-4201, or by dialing (301) 342-3911 on base or 911 off base. The CDO will make voice and CCIR reports NDW via e-mail, C4i and voice reports to the NDW Emergency Manager and NDW Region Watch Officer at the Region Operations Center (can be reached by telephone at 202-433-5180, and by e-mail at NDW_ROC.fcm@navy.mil).

4. Response of Concept of Operations.

a. Lockdown (a variation of shelter-in-place) would be ordered. Additional guidance to utilize the individual “Run-Hide-Fight” tactic would also be broadcast. Installation leadership to include the EOC or IC may order following initial notification.

(1) Evacuation and Assembly Areas. Areas and buildings which are evacuated by the incident commander or personnel who self-evacuate based on “Run-Hide-Fight” will be directed to a safe haven/assembly area well outside the danger zone for safety, to support potential mass care operations and to facilitate needed witness statement collection.

(2) Mass Care Operations. For evacuated personnel consideration must be given to designate a safe haven in the event the incident lasts a considerable time in order to get personnel out of the weather, facilitate any necessary follow-on personnel accountability and support the identification of personnel required to provide statements for any criminal investigation. In a long term event that may include the loss (actual or as a result of the set response perimeter or as part of a criminal investigation) of individual vehicles thus a plan for transportation and family reunification may need to be developed. Activation of the Emergency Family Assistance Center

(3) (EFAC) to provide information and support to the effected Navy Family is a likely action. See the Mass Care Functional Area Annex R for additional details.

b. General/common actions. Security following notification will place all forces on alert, secure ECPs, flow forces to the scene to neutralize the threat, assume incident command (to include incident command post establishment and staging area designation), set a perimeter to assist with containing the incident and protecting personnel, man additional positions (e.g., waterfront), maintain or increase surveillance and request mutual aid as needed.

c. Response.

(1) For active shooters Security first responders will make entry to neutralize the threat as soon as possible. The incident commander will request EMS/medical to enter as soon as the scene can be made safe, make casualty reports and establish a safe haven for evacuated personnel. A military working dog team will be requested to assist with sweeps of the affected buildings and nearby parking lots. EOD will be notified as needed.

(2) EMS. Following neutralization of the threat the Fire Department will perform standard emergency medical services to include triage and transport of any injured personnel as described in Functional Area Annex 9, EMS and Support Annex 23, Mass Casualties. Extensive mutual aid may be required to assist with triage and especially transportation to local area hospitals. In the event of fatalities consult Functional Area Annex U, for process details.

(3) Immediately following threat neutralization Security will secure the crime scene and liaison with NCIS and FBI regarding the investigation, to include witness statements. Until the incident is declared a non-terrorist event anticipate that the FBI will also liaison with the EOC and assume unified command at the ICP or with the commanding officer in the EOC. See Functional Area Annex J, Naval Security Force, for additional details.

5. Public Protection Strategies. Lockdown and Shelter-in-place would be ordered to protect personnel.

6. Emergency Public Information. The CDO will lead efforts to notify all personnel on the latest news, situation, recommended actions and available supporting resources to all personnel on board NAS Patuxent River via multiple emergency public information (EPI) channels. The PAO will lead efforts to notify the public at large, deal with media inquiries, setting up press conferences or interviews and the possible activation and operation of a Joint Information Center (JIC.) EPI methods will include, but not be limited to: press releases, broadcast emails from the PAO, CO, DCO, Operations Officer(N3), use of the Computer Desktop Notification System (CDNS/AtHoc), Giant Voice, the installation information line, installation web page, reliance on social media such as the installation Facebook and Twitter pages. Every effort will be made to keep NAS Patuxent River personnel ad family informed in a timely manner with known, solid information as it is available. See the Public Affairs Functional Area Annex Q for additional details.

7. Personnel Accountability. Personnel Sheltered-In-Place/Lockdown if Evacuated will muster with their supervisor and then report the results to the senior person present when the All Clear is given. The IC will be notified of any known missing personnel. Accountability will be performed with the procedures in Support Annex G.

8. Applicable Sections of EM and Other plan.

a. Applicable Functional Area Annexes.

(1) FAA A Regional Operation Center

(2) FAA B Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

(3) FAA C Emergency Operations Center Incident Management Teams (EOC-IMT)

(4) FAA D Regional/Local Dispatch Center

(5) FAA E Communications Systems and Mass Warning and Notification

(6) FAA F Personnel Categorization

(7) FAA G Emergency Management

(8) FAA H Fire and Emergency Services (F&ES)

(9) FAA I Emergency Medical Services (EMS)

(10) FAA J Naval Security Forces (NSF)

(11) FAA L Health Service Support

(12) FAA M Industrial Hygiene Support

(13) FAA N Occupational Safety and Health

(14) FAA O Public Works and Engineering

(15) FAA P Finance and Emergency Accounting

(16) FAA Q Public Affairs

(17) FAA R Mass Care

(18) FAA U Fatality Management

(19) FAA V Supply and Logistics

(20) FAA W Search and Rescue (SAR)

(21) FAA Z Shelter-in-Place Management Teams

b. Applicable Support Annexes.

(1) SA A: Mutual Aid Agreements

(2) SA B: Memoranda of Understanding/Agreement

(3) SA G: Personnel Accountability

(4) SA I: Shelter-in-Place Procedures

(5) SA J: Lockdown

(6) SA U: Public Awareness Program

(7) SA V: Mass Warning and Notification Procedures

(8) SA W: Recovery Operations

(9) SA X: Mass Casualty Procedures

(10) SA DD: Emergency Management Contact Information

c. Other Hazard Specific Appendices.

(1) HSA 3: Fire Hazards

(2) HSA 6: Transportation Accidents

(3) HSA 7: Structural Failure/Collapse

(4) HSA 9: Financial System Interruption or Collapse

(5) HSA 10: Terrorism Incidents

(6) HSA 16: Civil Disturbance (Riot, Strikes, Protests, or Mass Panic)

(7) HSA 17: Commercial Nuclear Reactor Accident/Incident (Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Units)

d. Other Supporting plan that relate to this threat.

(1) St. Mary's County Emergency Operations Plan.

(2) NAVFAC NAS Patuxent River Integrated Contingency Plan.

(3) NAVFACWASHINST 3440.1.

(4) NAS Patuxent River Anti-terrorism Plan

9. Initial EOC/Departmental Operation Centers Task. The EOC will be fully activated in the Event of an Active Shooter. Activation of the EOC will be performed by the EMO or NAS CDO following the procedures as outlined in Functional Area Annex B.

a. Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, and property

(1) Gain SA

(2) Order Public Protection Strategy (Shelter-in-Place or Evacuation)

(3) Immediate Notifications (HHQ)

(4) Support the Incident Commander (IC)

(5) Evaluate impact on MEFs

b. Follow-on actions.

(1) Prioritize Life-Safety efforts (Ops Section)

(2) Contain the incident (Ops Section – Isolate/neutralize the threat/shooter. Set perimeter; be mindful of secondary threats.)

(3) Identify Big Picture impact to the Installation (analysis)

(4) Develop initial Common Operating Picture (Plans Section)

(5) Establish initial Battle Rhythm

(6) Complete activation of the EOC

(7) Establish and maintain communications (HHQ/ROC, Tenants, local jurisdictions, public/media)

(8) Interface with responding exterior agency

(9) Develop Incident Action Plan (IAP – 3-4 hours for the initial)

(10) Revisit and adjust as necessary; Start thinking long term.

10. Executable Checklists. All Hazards Checklist is contained is Section VI Additional Checklists can be found in:

a. FAA B: Installation Emergency Operations Center (EOC)

b. FAA E: Communications Systems and Mass Warning and Notification

c. FAA R: Mass Care

d. SA V: Mass Warning and Notification Procedures

e. SA I: Shelter-in-Place Procedures

f. SA J : Lockdown

g. HSA 3: Fire Hazards

h. Tenant Command Emergency Action Plans

11. Recovery Operations. Due to the unpredictable and often complex nature of recovery operations involved with Active Shooter/Work Place Violence detailed planning is difficult. However, to expedite lifesaving and restoration of operations, NASPR utilizes the Incident Command System organizational structure; providing a modular and scalable recovery methodology that can be modified on the scope and magnitude of the event. Recovery Operations are contained in Support Annex W.

12. Supporting Materials/Technical Data.

a. Department of Homeland Security – www.dhs.gov

b. Department of Transportation – www.dot.gov

c. National Response Center (NRC) – www.nrc.uscg.mil

d. Occupational Health and Safety Administration – www.osha.gov

e. NAS Patuxent River has approximately total of 11,000 personnel for the Installation and all Tenant Commands. Approximately, 1300 Active Duty Personnel, 4400 MidShipmen, 3,950 DoD Civilian and Contractor personnel, 650 dependents residing in base housing and 844 Navy family members or retirees in the local community. The estimated NAS Patuxent River workday population is around 10,000 personnel.

Tab B: Hostage Situation

1. General Information. In modern times a hostage means someone who is seized by a criminal abductor in order to compel another party such as a relative, employer or government to act, or refrain from acting, in a particular way, often under threat of serious physical harm to the hostage(s) after expiration of an ultimatum. The situation may range from a simple domestic or isolated criminal act to an attempt to impose will on a national or international scale to intimidate or coerce a government to further a political, social, or religious objective.

a. Situation. The impacts of a Hostage Situation might include, though are not limited to the following:

(1) A delay before authorities are notified of an active shooter.

(2) Infrastructure damage.

(3) Affects to Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities.

(4) Shelter in place concerns.

(5) Mass casualties.

(6) Significant psychological impacts, especially for first responders and first receivers.

(7) Responders may be incapacitated by the incident and delayed or prevented from responding due to infrastructure damage.

(8) Normal mass warning and notification systems may be impacted.

(9) There may be a delay in restoring essential services.

(10) Essential services may be delayed in being restored.

b. Assumptions

(1) A hostage situation on a Navy Installation may be part of the Navy family.

(2) Casualties from a hostage situation incident may include Navy personnel, government civilians, contractors, or family members.

(3) After a hostage situation incident, mental health and counseling services should be available to affected Navy personnel.

2. Required Notifications.

a. The Installation CDO should notify/activate the EOC and notify the ROC. Ensure that the Regional Dispatch Center (RDC) has been notified. The RDC must disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to Category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of event based on either initial on-scene reports or Category 5 personnel assessment of the hazard.

b. Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined the ROC SOPs. This includes required notifications for the ROC Battle Watch Team. The ROC has the current list of names and phone numbers for required notifications.

3. Response Actions.

a. Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, the environment and property.

b. Activate EOC.

c. Make required notifications.

d. Relocate MEFs/CMFs if necessary.

e. Coordinate DSCA missions.

4. Supporting Materials.

a. Department of Homeland Security – http://www.dhs.gov

b. Department of Transportation – http://www.dot.gov

c. Environmental Protection Agency – http://www.epa.gov

d. Federal Emergency Management Agency – http://www.fema.gov

e. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration – http://www.noaa.gov

f. National Response Center (NRC) – http://www.nrc.uscg.mil

g. Occupational Health and Safety Administration – http://www.osha.gov

Appendix 13: Chemical Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Response Plan

1. Purpose

a. General. This document provides installation military, family members, DOD civilian, DOD contractors and tenant's information, guidance, and resources to effectively respond to and recover from a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) incident on or near NASPR. The most recent NDW hazard assessment has identified a CBRN incident as a "significant" hazard based on the probability of an incident occurring.

(1) Terrorist groups may target NASPR or nearby communities. Responders need to be alert to the possibility that the most probable CBRN threats may be the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) or toxic industrial materials (TIMs) rather than the classic threats such as nerve agents or anthrax. This is because IEDs and TIMs can be manufactured or acquired much more easily by terrorists.

(2) A CBRN incident is any occurrence, resulting from the use of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear weapons and devices; the emergence of secondary hazards arising from counterforce targeting; or the release of toxic industrial materials into the environment, involving the emergence of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear hazards.

b. Threat. Traditionally terrorists have used explosives as their primary means of attack, however, due to improvements in standoff security at military installations and government facilities, terrorists are seeking new methods of delivery. These methods may include, but are not limited to, the use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), improvised explosive devices, and employment of commercially available toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) and / or TIMs.

2. Discussion

a. General. The entire population of NASPR could be impacted by this threat, although the area directly impacted would generally be limited to a single building or area. The Fire Department, which has the installation's primary firefighting response capabilities, has the lead in CBRNE response, and security forces, EOD, Navy medical, EM, environmental and others, support this response. All Navy activities within the NASPR AOR shall prepare local guidance that supports this plan, assign and train personnel to CBRNE response roles, make appropriate CBRNE preparations, and take action during emergencies as specified in this plan. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

b. Intelligence. The CNO N2 Offices collect and disseminate intelligence information regarding terrorist use of CBRN from all available intelligence sources including: Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and NCIS threat statements, information from the local MI

Group, local FBI office and other civilian law enforcement agencies. The local NCIS agent provides information and criminal activity collected from law enforcement agencies and ensures that all supported organic, tenant and supported Reserve Component (RC) units are considered and receive copies. National Weather Service (NWS) provides weather reports and "down-wind" projections. Any unit which receives information concerning a possible terrorist threat will immediately report it through command channels to the installation security department.

c. Assumptions.

(1) CBRN attacks can produce major consequences that can overwhelm capabilities.

(2) Initial response activities will begin without the benefit of a detailed or complete situational and critical needs assessment as it will be difficult to achieve a detailed and credible common operating picture for a significant period of time following a CBRN incident.

(3) The combined expertise and capabilities of government at all levels, the private sector, and non-governmental organizations will be required to prevent, prepare, mitigate, respond, and recover from a CBRN incident.

(4) A CBRN incident occurs with little or no warning and degrades the installation's ability to execute its mission.

(5) Accelerated/increased defense postures will be implemented when the possibility/probability of attack increases.

(6) Attacks (such as biological) may not be initially recognizable.

(7) Local resources are critical for response to a CBRN incident. A conventional explosion or chemical agent dispersal would require immediate response following an incident.

(8) Response functions may overlap to some degree; therefore, proper planning, coordination and exercising are necessary.

(9) If protective equipment is not available responders will not put their own lives at risk.

(10) NASPR may be unable to respond to requests from civil authorities for support as resources will be focused inside the fence line to restore mission essential functions (MEFs).

(11) Other military or federal response agencies and / or civil authorities will respond to the installation's request for assistance.

(12) Planning will be based on current intelligence regarding terrorist's intentions and capabilities, NASPR should be prepared to respond to emerging threats.

d. Limitations.

(1) Installation F&ES may not be certified in specific areas of the required response, and will have to draw local or regional assets to provide the appropriate response.

(2) Any additional local and regional resources and recalled off duty personnel may take additional time to arrive at the incident, depending on time of day, weather, and traffic conditions.

(3) Limited F&ES personnel and equipment to handle a large CBRN incident.

(4) Installation F&ES may not be able to respond effectively to control the event or be able to advise the general public in a rapid manner.

(5) Insufficient manning, Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), or insufficient communications and training to effectively respond to a catastrophic incident.

3. Action

a. Planning Considerations. NASPR may work with NDW N8 to establish MOU, MOA and ISSA to ensure compatibility of PPE during a response. Local civil support equipment/resources that cannot be supported by NASPR shall be identified prior to a CBRN incident.

(1) In the event of a CBRN incident, NASPR has agreements in place with Saint Mary's County Fire and Emergency Services.

(2) If available, the following resources may also be utilized during a CBRN response:

(a) Chemical Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF)

(b) National Guard Civil Support Team

(c) CBRNE Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFP)

(3) Naval Hospital Bethesda is staffed with Industrial Hygienists (IHs) who may support and advise the ICP and EOC on safety and health issues. The IH's are a resource for the proper management of incidents involving CBRN agents and materials. The Bethesda IH Department provides information on protective equipment and controls to protect personnel involved with the cleanup and potential exposure to chemical contaminants.

(4) Decontamination. Decontamination operations will be conducted in accordance with Support Annex N Personnel Decontamination and NDW N30 CBRNE Response Standard Operating Guidelines.

b. Concept Of Operations.

(1) Prepare. The prepare phase consists of continuous situational awareness and preparation. Actions in this phase include AT awareness training, interagency coordination (with local, state and federal agencies), exercises, and public affairs outreach. The prepare phase ends when the terrorist event has occurred or a threat has been reported to dispatch.

(2) Respond. The response phase begins when a WMD, CBRN or terrorist incident has occurred or an incident/threat has been reported to dispatch. NASPR will coordinate with local law enforcement and emergency services through existing MOU/MOA's. Regional assistance will be coordinated by the installation through the ROC. NDW will send requested or anticipated capabilities to support the response effort. NASPR will report the status of all personnel, and maintain accountability of all response forces. Response phase ends when the initial damage assessment is complete and there is accountability of all personnel.

(3) Recovery. The recovery phase begins when initial damage assessments are complete and there is accountability of all personnel. The installation will coordinate with NDW and external agencies for additional support. Additional capabilities and / or support contracts may be required for cleanup. This phase ends when all damage assessments are complete, operational capability is restored or addressed in a long-term plan, all needs of the Navy family are identified, and all facilities are restored to a pre-incident condition or addressed in a long-term plan.

(4) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

c. Responsibilities

(1) CO

(a) Ensure CBRN plans are developed, individual and collective training and annual exercises are accomplished, associated resource requirements are identified, and individual protective equipment is issued to personnel.

(b) Exercise command and control throughout the incident.

(c) Request regional assistance as needed.

(d) Increase Force Protection Condition (FPCON) for installation to Charlie at a minimum.

(e) Ensure that communications are established with higher headquarters for incident reporting.

(f) Coordinate with NCIS and other services to request military, federal or civilian support agencies.

(g) Determine installation recovery priorities.

(2) N00P Public Affairs

(a) Distribute Emergency Public Information (EPI) as required.

(b) Be responsible for formal external media reporting when more than one tenant's resources are involved in the event. Media releases will be coordinated with each tenant's PAO prior to release. The NASPR PAO may request a tenant's PAO to lead the media coordination efforts based upon their expertise/knowledge of the events.

(c) Obtain incident information from the Incident Commander (IC).

(d) Activate and staff the installation Media Center at the identified location.

(e) Provide a representative to the EOC to coordinate all PAO related activities.

(f) Obtain available facts about the incident at the earliest possible opportunity and provide initial and follow-up briefings to NDW PAO.

(g) Maintain an event log of all PAO actions during the accident/incident.

(3) N1 Manpower

(a) Account for CAT 1-5 personnel during response and recovery phases.

(b) Coordinate accountability and status of contaminated and injured personnel.

(c) Maintain accountability of evacuated personnel as required.

(4) N30 Emergency Services

(a) Coordinate CBRN operations with the Incident Commander.

(b) Establish hot, warm, and cold control zones as appropriate.

(c) Conduct CBRN operations, triage and decontamination in accordance with NDW N30 CBRNE Response Standard Operating Guidelines.

(5) N34

(a) Coordinate CBRN operations with the Incident Commander.

(b) Establish security at the scene; establish checkpoints to maintain a perimeter in the cold zone.

(c) Identify, protect, and recover evidence from the scene and victims.

(d) Conduct crowd and traffic control with assistance from public works.

(6) N37 Emergency Management

(a) Serves as the EOC manager responsible for incident management and ensuring local, state and federal agencies are notified when an incident occurs and the EOC is activated IAW FAA Annex B.

(b) Ensure shelter-in-place or evacuation operations are implemented.

(c) Provide situational awareness briefings to the CO and CAT regarding current operations and needs.

(d) Initiate the installation-wide mass notification process.

(e) Assess the health risk to people and recommend protective action.

(f) Ensure EOC personnel have the necessary resources and contacts to operate successfully.

(g) Coordinate CBRN incident and post-incident recovery operations.

(7) N4 Public Works (NAVFAC)

(a) Coordinate and provide logistics support for response and recovery efforts.

(b) Assist with traffic management, establish road closures and detours, and assist with evacuations.

(c) Deploy damage assessment team once contamination has reached safe levels

(8) PAO

(a) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(b) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(c) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

(9) Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

(a) Lead Federal Agency (LFA) to coordinate the operational response.

(b) Provide coordination between federal and state agencies, as required.

d. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Priority of actions for CBRN incident responders:

(a) Control/containment of incident site and surrounding areas.

(b) Perform rescue operations for survivors.

(c) Decontaminate injured.

(d) Triage and evacuate injured.

(e) Collect and preserve evidence.

(f) Collect and identify the deceased.

(g) Conduct site cleanup and HAZMAT disposal.

(h) Return incident site to normal operations.

(2) All victims of a CBRN agent attack will be decontaminated before evacuation to a medical facility. Installation and local fire and emergency services, as well as, the Clinic and area hospitals have decontamination capabilities and equipment. The decontamination tasks performed may vary depending on the nature of the event and available equipment.

(3) Identification/classification of chemical, biological, and nuclear materials will be obtained by using various detection devices.

(4) Direct coordination between the EOC, medical treatment facilities, tenant commands, and local, state and federal authorities is authorized.

(5) All agencies responsible for CBRN response must be familiar with their roles within the installation emergency management plan as well as the installation Antiterrorism Plan.

(6) The EOC will communicate with higher headquarters for guidance and assistance.

4. Administration and Logistics. See Basic Plan and Functional Area Annex V Supply and Logistics.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

5. Command and Signal**.** See Basic Plan.

Appendix 14: Explosive or Incendiary Terrorism

1. Purpose.

a. General. An explosion is an extremely rapid release of energy in the form of light, heat, sound, and a shock wave. The shock wave consists of highly compressed air that can travel outward from the source at up to supersonic velocities. As the shock wave expands the over-pressures decrease. When it encounters a surface that is in line-of-sight of the explosion, the wave is reflected, resulting in a tremendous amplification of pressure. The magnitude of the reflection factor is a function of the proximity of the explosion and the angle of incidence of the shock wave on the surface.

b. Scope. This hazard consists of terrorism using high-yield explosive or incendiary devices. Refer to the Antiterrorism Plan for further guidance on bomb threats.

2. Background.

a. The impacts of this threat will vary widely, based on the nature and quantities of the agent used. At its worst, this threat could have catastrophic impacts on infrastructure, security posture, Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and on the Continuity of Business for other functions and facilities.

b. Responders can assume that this threat could require additional measures to protect response personnel, and could adversely impact the ability of responders and other personnel to travel around the activity and in the local community. This threat could also impact on the support infrastructure of the installation, cause disruptions in communications and utilities, and possibly even require relocation of the EOC or other coordination efforts. The time available to respond and warn the installation population will be limited, immediate action will be essential.

3. Discussion. The Fire Department, which has the installation's primary firefighting response capabilities, has the lead in explosive and incendiary device response, and security forces, EOD, Navy medical, EM, environmental and others, support this response. All Navy activities within the NASPR AOR shall prepare local guidance that supports this plan, assign and train personnel to CBRNE response roles, make appropriate preparations, and take action during emergencies as specified in this plan. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

4. Responsibilities.

a. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

b. N37/CDO

(1) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

5. Action. Concept of Operations.

a. Individual. If suspicious activity is taking place, or believed to have taken place, stop work and notify NSF immediately. Secure the scene if possible to prevent others from entering the area; however, do not endanger yourself or other in doing so.

b. Terrorism Response Concept. Responding to an explosion or incendiary incident requires first responders and incident commanders to consider a number of special requirements, some of which compete or conflict with each other. These include the specific type of incident, properties of the agent being used, extent of contamination, limitations of protective equipment (especially structural firefighting gear and respiratory protection), potential risks to responders, viability of injured victims, urgency of symptoms, perimeter security requirements, the potential to reduce additional damage and cascading effects, and many other requirements. Each of these factors must be carefully weighed, and responders should never be exposed to unnecessary risk during a response operation.

c. Guide Overview. Every emergency incident generates specific demands that must be addressed by emergency responders in order to minimize the adverse effects of the event. Many of these response demands are predictable and can be planned for by response personnel in advance of the actual emergency. Specific actions must be taken by emergency responders to address each response demand. These response actions make up the total operational activity of an emergency scene. This response action guide is intended to provide useful information to emergency service personnel responding to and operating on the scene of a radiological incident.

d. Incident Command and Control. Incident response activities will adhere to the National Incident Management System and other applicable and relevant guidance.

6. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports/Alerts/COR.

(1) Notifications

(a) NDW RDC (202) 433-4201, to ensure dispatch of appropriate first responders for life safety response.

(b) Notify CDO at (301) 342-1095.

(c) CDO consults with the XO and / or CO.

(d) If sheltering-in-place is required, the CDO coordinates Giant Voice announcements per Support Annex T.

(e) CDO makes voice reports to the ROC at (202) 433-5180 and via e-mail at roc.ndw.fct@navy.mil as appropriate.

(f) Report severe incidents per OPNAVINST 3100.6J, Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-3 Pinnacle, OPREP-3 Navy Blue, and OPREP-3 Navy Unit Sitrep) Procedures, 22 December 2009.

(g) EMO will be notified for any incidents where EOC activation is required at (301) 247-9395. The EMO activates the EOC staff.

(h) Other notifications, such as DON, DOD, DOE, and Federal, State, and local departments, as appropriate.

(2) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(3) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

(3) Maintain accountability of personnel as required/

Appendix 15: Electromagnetic or Cyber Terrorism

1. Purpose.

a. General. Electromagnetic interference and compromise of information technology systems (cyberterrorism) can severely hamper the operations of any modern organization. Personnel should be on guard for any e-mails from unknown or suspicious addresses, especially those with attachments. Personnel should also be wary of messages that seem legitimate, but instead attempt to draw out personal information or passwords.

b. Scope. This hazard consists of threats that compromise data and communications systems.

2. Background.

a. This threat would not have a direct adverse impact on personnel safety or the infrastructure, but by compromising command, control and communications, could degrade the installation security posture, hamper the accomplishment of Mission Essential Functions (MEFs), and degrade the Continuity of Business for other functions and facilities.

b. In events of electromagnetic interference, installation communications will be accomplished by landline, or by use of runners and messengers. In the event that computer systems at NASPR are compromised, communications will rely on radio and telephone communications. NASPR has a satellite telephone which is for emergency use, and also has HF communications systems that which are robust. The EOC has both NMCI and stand-alone computers, and will stock a supply of paper ICS forms that can be used for incident management in situations where automated equipment is not available.

3. Discussion. The entire population of NASPR could be impacted by this threat. The Fire Department, which has the installation's primary firefighting response capabilities, has the lead in CBRNE response, and security forces, EOD, Navy medical, EM, environmental and others, support this response. All Navy activities within the NASPR AOR shall prepare local guidance that supports this plan, assign and train personnel to CBRNE response roles, make appropriate CBRNE preparations, and take action during emergencies as specified in this plan. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

4. Responsibilities.

a. PAO

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

b. N37/CDO

(1) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

5. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports/Alerts/COR.

(1) Notifications

(a) NDW RDC (202) 433-4201, to ensure dispatch of appropriate first responders for life safety response.

(b) Notify CDO at (301) 342-1095.

(c) CDO consults with the XO and / or CO.

(d) If sheltering-in-place is required, the CDO coordinates Giant Voice announcements per Support Annex T.

(e) CDO makes voice reports to the ROC at (202) 433-5180 and via e-mail at roc.ndw.fct@navy.mil as appropriate.

(f) Report severe incidents per OPNAVINST 3100.6J, Special Incident Reporting (OPREP-3 Pinnacle, OPREP-3 Navy Blue, and OPREP-3 Navy Unit Sitrep) Procedures, 22 December 2009.

(g) Notify EMO for any incident where EOC activation is required at (301) 247-9395. The EMO activates the EOC staff.

(h) Other notifications, such as DON, DOD, DOE, and Federal, State, and local departments, as appropriate.

(2) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(3) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 16: Civil Disturbance (Riot, Strikes, Protests, or Mass Panic)

1. Purpose.

a. General.

(1) Civil unrest, public disorder, and riots in the NASPR area may require action to be taken by the installation. Civil disturbances have the potential to occur without warning during demonstrations.

(2) In or around the NASPR areas, individuals or groups within an organized demonstration may have the intent to cause disruption, incite violence, destroy property, and provoke authorities. The tactical situation and actions of the crowd should dictate control and enforcement options. Agitators and criminal infiltrators within the crowd can lead to the eruption of violence.

(3) Terrorist organizations may infiltrate groups within a demonstrating crowd. These terrorist groups may intend to embarrass their government or other governments. Terrorist infiltrators can be used to provoke crowds as a diversion, as part of a demonstration, or as cover for terrorist acts.

2. Discussion.

a. Civil disturbances, civil unrest, public disorder, and riots happen for a number of reasons. Some of these reasons are economic hardships, social injustices, ethnic or cultural differences, objections to specific organizations, political grievances, or terrorist acts. An event can be triggered by a single cause or a combination of causes.

b. Many civil disturbances begin as demonstrations, and can range from simple, nonviolent protests that address specific issues, to events that turn into full scale riots. Gatherings in protest are recognized rights of any person or group, and are protected under the Constitution of the U.S. Most protesters are law-abiding citizens who intend their protests to be nonviolent, but some protest planners insist that the event involve some kind of violence, since they can often gain public and media sympathy for their cause by prompting authorities to take physical action against them. Commanders must also be aware of the possibility that terrorist organizations may infiltrate groups within a demonstrating crowd in an attempt to further their cause and embarrass the government or civil authorities by provoking a confrontation, or as a possible diversion for other terrorist acts.

c. Assumptions.

(1) Civil disturbance is possible anywhere in or around NASPR installations.

(2) In the case of civil disturbance on a Navy Installation, there will be well trained NSF Personnel to control the situation.

(3) Civil disturbance participants on a Navy installation may be part of the Navy family.

(4) Casualties from a civil disturbance incident may include any person in the Navy family. This may lead to absenteeism for a variety of reasons.

(5) After a civil disturbance incident, mental health and counseling services should be available to affected Navy families.

(6) Initial evacuation routes may be blocked; there should be alternative routes in place.

(7) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(8) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

d. Limitations.

(1) The Posse Comitatus Act generally prohibits Title 10 forces from engaging in direct law enforcement activities. Examples of direct enforcement activities include searches for, seizure of, evidence for use in criminal proceedings, seizing suspected criminals, interdiction of vehicles, vessels or aircraft, and pursuit, investigation or interrogating civilians. If any exception to the Posse Comitatus Act is invoked consequence management operations, amplifying guidance will be provided. During consequence management operations, Title 10 forces may provide indirect support to law enforcement activities, such as the use of military facilities or equipment by law enforcement officials, and training on and maintenance of offered equipment.

(2) The primary statutory authority under which the federal government responds to disasters and emergencies is the Robert T Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act. The Stafford Act sets forth the process by which governors ask for federal assistance, the mechanism for reimbursement of federal agencies for assistance rendered, establishes sovereign immunity for discretionary acts undertaken by the federal government pursuant to the Act, and sets forth the limited circumstances in which the President may utilize DoD for emergency work.

(3) Providing military assistance to state and local governments to assist them in quelling a civil disturbance or riot requires close coordination through a host of state and federal agencies. It requires a thorough briefing of soldiers at all levels on what they can and cannot do with respect to law enforcement. Civil authorities must be briefed on the restrictions placed on federal forces by the Constitution of the United States and federal statutes and laws. The National Guard (NG), when not in a federal status, operates under the control of the state governor and the adjutant general (AG). The NG has historically been the first military responder during emergencies.

(4) The Secretary of Defense retains approval for federal support to civil authorities involving the use of DOD forces, personnel, and equipment. Approval may also involve DOD support that will result in a planned event with the potential for confrontation with specifically identified individuals and groups or will result in the use of lethal force.

(5) Strict limits are placed on collecting information related to a civil disturbance in order to protect the civil rights of people and organizations not affiliated with the DOD. Civil disturbance plans and materials must not include lists of groups or people not affiliated with the DOD. Conditions for collecting information include the existence of threats against Navy personnel, functions, or property. Civil disturbance information (available in public documents) or open-source information may be collected. However, specific rules regarding its storage must be followed.

(6) A civil disturbance could quickly overwhelm the installation police resources and require the activation of existing MOA's and MOU's with local authorities.

(7) Any assistance could be delayed because of primary traffic patterns being blocked by the civil disturbance or if there are multiple disturbances within the capitol region. Local law enforcement's primary duty is to the local community.

3. Action.

a. Concept of Operations.

(1) Prepare. This phase of planning begins before the incident and is initiated at the operational level with guidance from the strategic level. The planning includes guidance on crowd control and addresses responsibilities, training, organization, operating procedures, use of force and / or rules of engagement. The most difficult and productive decisions are those made in the pre-incident planning process.

(2) Prevent/Mitigate. Establish a Graduated Response Matrix (GRM) development team with a broad range of skills, knowledge, and professionalism. Design the GRM to give graduated options for dealing with both hostile and non-hostile threats to the mission. The planning team composition allows for target selection, application of the ROE, and attack methods using both non-lethal (NL) and lethal means.

(3) Respond. Crowd control options are often combined. COs choose their options based on an evaluation of the particular crowd. COs select any combination of control techniques and force options they think will influence the particular situation (METT-TC). COs must always try to choose the response that can be expected to reduce the intensity of the situation.

(4) Recover. Identify and initiate detailed damage assessments and report damage to the installation N4 through the Public Works Damage Control Center.

Update any casualty information to the Casualty Assistance Office. Secure/cordon damage or dangerous areas that were affected during the civil disturbance. Determine the status of all communications systems. Activate Support/Recovery Teams to provide emergency communications as required. Monitor damaged facilities/housing area to prevent looting. Be prepared to support any DSCA mission assignments to the surrounding community.

(5) Restore. All damage assessments are complete and the Navy Family needs are identified. All supporting forces are secured from DSCA mission assignments. The Restore phase is complete when the Installation returns to pre-incident operational capability and all facilities are returned to pre-incident condition.

(6) During instances where utility loss is likely due to conditions/weather, implement the appropriate mitigating strategies outlined in the corresponding HSA.

b. Responsibilities.

(1) CO

(a) Take immediate actions necessary to save lives, property, and the environment.

(b) Determine number of locations affected.

(c) Notify Regional Chain of Command.

(d) Determine if EOC should be activated.

(e) Notify Tenant Commands / Storefronts as applicable.

(f) Ensure the development of SOPs to respond to a civil disturbance.

(g) Provide real time reporting to NDW via the ROC.

(h) Activate applicable MAAs / MOUs / Support Contracts for additional resources.

(i) Request resources from the ROC if necessary.

(j) Provide OPREPs and SITREPs as mandated by Navy instructions.

(k) Be prepared to set up Safe Havens and / or Family Assistance Centers if a significant amount of housing structures are affected.

(2) N00P Public Affairs

(a) Establish information release protocol.

(b) Ensure CAT 1 and 5 Personnel understand information release protocol.

(c) Coordinate with N3 to ensure there are appropriate public messages and that media information is consistent. The success of the response to this event will depend heavily on the media and preventing confusion caused by mixed messages.

(d) Provide information to the Joint Information Center (JIC) for release to the public IAW FAA Annex Q.

(3) N1 Manpower

(a) Ensure personnel accountability databases are maintained and current.

(b) Account for CAT 1-5 personnel during Response and Recovery phases.

(c) Maintain accountability of all personnel participating in installation recovery programs.

(4) N30 Emergency Services

(a) Coordinate emergency medical response.

(b) Monitor the situation to ensure fires not allowed to spread.

(c) Conduct hazmat operations if necessary.

(5) Force Protection

(a) Protect critical infrastructure.

(b) Ensure the safety of evacuees.

(c) Coordinate organic supplemental security for installations affected by a civil disturbance.

(d) Establish Lines of Communication (LOCs) with local authorities.

(e) Ensure security of traffic routes utilized by Emergency Services responders.

(f) If power is interrupted determine the need for added security for CMF (such as added police or hourly phone checks, and etcetera).

(g) Recall additional officers if needed.

(h) Based on the situation determine if a need to the need to increase Force Protection Condition.

(6) N37 Emergency Management

(a) Ensure that the Emergency Services Dispatcher (ESD) have personnel to support incident/accident communication requirements.

(b) Collect all incident-related data and at the earliest possible opportunity brief the CO and continue to do so throughout the incident.

(c) Coordinate logistical support or provide assistance as required by the IC.

(d) Maintain an events log of all EOC actions during the incident/accident including but not limited to EOC activation IAW FAA Annex B.

(7) N4 Public Works

(a) Coordinate damage assessments as necessary.

(b) Assess and mitigate environmental damage.

(c) Perform debris clearance and hazard removal for road access.

(d) Coordinate with local authorities for any environmental cleanup if needed.

(8) N6 Communications IT

(a) Assist installations in the development of an alternate communications plan.

(b) Enact contingency communications contracts to support installation response.

(9) N8 Financial Management. Account for all costs for response and recovery efforts.

(10) N9 Fleet and Family Services

(a) Provide temporary shelter for displaced personnel.

(b) Arrange for long-term shelter to be provided as necessary.

(c) Provide accommodations for animal & pet care.

(d) Provide food/water/hygiene to affected Navy family.

(e) Provide fuel/power to affected facilities.

c. Coordinating Instructions. The Department of Justice is the lead federal agency for civil disturbance operations. The Attorney General's on-scene representative is the Senior Representative of the Attorney General (SCRAG). The DOD has designated the Department of the Army as their executive agent for Military Assistance for Civil Disturbance (MACDIS).

d. Planning Considerations.

(1) Legal Considerations and Constraints. The Constitution of the United States, laws, regulations, policies, and other legal issues limit the use of federal military personnel in domestic support operations. Any Navy involvement in civil disturbance operations involves many legal issues requiring comprehensive legal reviews.

(2) Information Operations. Information superiority helps forces anticipate problems and requirements. It allows commanders to control situations earlier and with less force, creating the conditions necessary to achieve the end state. Information is available from a multitude of sources, the primary being open sources, law enforcement, and the military. A diversity of sources is the best approach because it prevents biased behavior. Sources include, but are not limited to the following:

(a) Libraries.

(b) Newspapers and news periodicals.

(c) Radio and television.

(d) Local law enforcement agencies.

(e) National law enforcement agencies.

(f) DOD intelligence community (most restrictive source).

(3) Inciting a crowd to violence or a greater intensity of violence through the use of brutish enforcement tactics should be avoided. Publicity can be detrimental to authorities and beneficial to crowds because it can further their causes.

(4) Dispersal Process of a Gathering. Dispersal involves the movement of people from the common location where they assembled to one or more alternate locations. The dispersal process ends the gathering of a crowd or at least begins its decline. The dispersal can occur on a routine, emergency, or coerced basis.

(a) Routine Dispersal. The routine dispersal may be specified in advance. It can also be included in the assembly instructions given by the organizers of an event.

(b) Emergency Dispersal. An emergency dispersal occurs when people evacuate an area in result of an unexpected crisis, such as a fire, explosion, bomb threat, or terrorist act. Individuals in such an emergency quickly recover from the initial shock.

(c) Coercion Dispersal. Coercion dispersal is caused by the use of force at some level. This is not necessarily the best way to force the dispersal of a crowd. The negotiated management of crowds is the preferred method and has proven to be highly successful in getting crowd organizers to police themselves, especially if the demonstration and / or protest leaders are available and willing to participate.

(5) Protect Civilian Property and Functions. A sudden and unexpected civil disturbance, disaster, or calamity may seriously endanger life and property and disrupt normal governmental functions to such an extent that local authorities cannot control the situation. At such times, the federal government may use military force to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property and to restore government functions and public order. This exception has rarely been used.

(6) Protect Federal Property and Functions. The federal government may use military force to protect federal property and federal government functions when local authorities cannot or decline to provide adequate protection.

4. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

Appendix 17: Commercial Nuclear Reactor Accident / Incidents

1. Purpose. To define radiological emergencies associated with Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant (CCNPP), establish emergency classifications, delegate responsibility, assign tasks, and prescribe procedures to minimize exposure to personnel, and contamination of property in the event of an accident involving a major radiological release from CCNPP.

2. Background. The CCNPP Emergency Response Plan covers a spectrum of situations and accident conditions. The most severe, and least probable of which, would involve melting of the nuclear fuel rods accompanied by a release of radioactivity to the atmosphere. If such an accident were to occur it could expose downwind areas to radiation and contamination. A release of this magnitude from CCNPP generally would occur with some warning whereas lesser magnitude events, that would probably not affect NASPR, may occur with little or no warning. Winds in the CCNPP area usually come from out of the south/southwest direction, thus blowing a release away from NASPR. If however the wind was out of the north or northeast, the north eastern section of NASPR may be affected since it falls within the l0-mile radius Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) for CCNPP.

3. Discussion. Procedures for the CDO and EOC in the event of an emergency are contained in Tabs A and B. In the event of an emergency at CCNPP, people within the 10-mile radius will be alerted by sirens installed throughout the area. When on base, personnel will be directed to immediately shelter in place, and await further instructions. This notification will be via Giant Voice and At Hoc. If released from work, or if outside the installation when the emergency occurs, personnel will follow the summary of required personnel actions and evacuation routes contained in Tab C. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

a. This hazard consists of an incident or problem at CCNPP. There are two federal agencies that oversee the safety of nuclear emergency preparedness. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is responsible for overseeing on-site nuclear power plant operations and the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) approves the off-site plans and procedures at the state and local level. FEMA also evaluates the demonstration of plan performance during federally required exercises. Officials from the state and local communities, along with utility personnel, participate in these daylong exercises. Through an elaborately developed accident scenario, these exercises test the ability of station personnel to assess an emergency situation and bring it under control in a manner that protects the public. The station is tested on their ability to alert federal, state and local officials within 15 minutes of an incident classification. During these exercises state and local officials perform notification procedures, assess the station’s data and make appropriate decisions on public protective actions. These protective actions include "evacuation" and "take shelter", activation of the state media center and conducting media briefings to keep the public informed, and dispatching highly trained state field team members to sample the air,

water and vegetation. At the first indication that there may be a concern at the power plant, the Department of Environmental Protection's Division of Radiation immediately sends a representative to the plant's emergency operations facility to monitor the utility

data and forward it to the State Emergency Operations Center decision makers.

NAS Patuxent River: Nuclear Facilities

Near-by Nuclear Facilities with 10, 25, and 50 mile buffers



b. The impacts of this threat will vary widely, based on the nature of the accident or incident. At its worst, this threat could have catastrophic impacts on infrastructure, security posture, Mission Essential Functions/Critical Mission Facilities (MEFs/CMFs), and on the Continuity of Business for other functions and facilities.

c. Responders can assume that this threat will require additional measures to protect response personnel, and could adversely impact the ability of responders and other personnel to travel around the activity and in the local community. The time available to respond and warn the installation population will be truncated and immediate action will be essential.

d. This hazard triggers EOC activation when sheltering-in-place or evacuation is required.

e. See Tabs A and B for checklists and guides for response.

4. Responsiblities.

a. PAO.

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

b. N37/CDO

(1) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

5. Action.

a. The entire population of NASPR could be impacted by this threat. The EMO and EOC have the lead for coordinating the response to this hazard; largely consisting of sheltering-in-place or evacuation. All Navy activities within the installation AOR shall prepare guidance that supports this plan, assign and train personnel to response roles, ensure all personnel are aware of this hazard, and take action during emergencies as specified in this plan. Activation of the EOC will be performed by the CDO following the procedures contained in Functional Area Appendix B Tab 1. The EOC staff will take immediate action to shelter or otherwise protect the installation population, ensure proper responder forces have been dispatched, assess the situation, and begin to plan future actions.

b. The following is a timeline of response actions:

(1) Within 15 minutes after classifying an incident, CCNPP must notify designated state and local government officials within the Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) via the use of a radio pager system, faxes and a telephone call back system. NASPR would get word of an incident via the state or county EOC.

(2) At the onset of an emergency and every time a public protective action has been implemented, public alerting sirens will be sounded in all communities within the plant's EPZ, to alert residents to turn to an Emergency Alert System (EAS) radio or television station for more information. EAS messages would be broadcast from the State Office of Emergency Management's Emergency Operations Center (EOC).

(3) In the unlikely event of an actual emergency at CCNPP, the Joint Media Center would be activated. This joint state and utility media center is staffed by the Governor's Press Secretary, Maryland's Emergency Response Communications Team and liaisons from CCNPP. Press releases, media briefings and press conferences are coordinated through the joint media center. The Governor's Press Secretary oversees the coordination and release of emergency public information from State agencies, local governments and CCNPP. The Joint Media Center provides specific instructions and supplemental information to enhance the Emergency Alert System (EAS) messages broadcast.

(4) There are sirens located in the communities within CCNPP's EPZ. These sirens have been installed to alert the public to a nuclear power plant emergency, natural disaster, or other major emergency. Each community's officials, as necessary, activate their own sirens. Sirens alert the public to tune to their local emergency alert stations (radio or television) for emergency information or instructions.

(5) If Potassium Iodine (KI) pill distribution is ordered by the state of MD, a limited number of KI pills are maintained by the Naval Health Clinic Patuxent River. Personnel who do not reside on NASPR are responsible for obtaining KI pills from local authorities.

(6) In the event of an evacuation order, NASPR would follow procedures for ordering a mandatory military evacuation per the procedures in Support Appendix F, and Navy personnel would be directed to take shelter in a designated remote safe haven. Unlike other evacuations, however, in route to the safe haven, personnel will be directed to report to the appropriate reception center to be screened for possible contamination and to receive KI pills (if they do not already have them) as appropriate.

6. Administrative.

a. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

b. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

TABS
Tab A: Radiological Emergency CDO Checklist
Tab B: Radiological Emergency EOC Checklist
Tab C: Radiological Emergency Individual Response Actions

Tab A: Radiological Emergency CDO Checklist

_____ IF NOTIFIED THAT THERE IS AN EMERGENCY AT CALVERT CLIFFS NUCLEAR POWER PLANT REQUIRING SHELTER OR EVACUATION, IMMEDIATELY ACTIVATE MASS WARNING SYSTEM PER SUPPORT ANNEX T (EMERGENCY ALERT) TO ORDER NASPR SHELTER IN PLACE PER SUPPORT ANNEX I, AND ACTIVATE THE FULL EOC STAFF, PER EM PLAN, FUNCTIONAL AREA ANNEX B.

_____ NOTIFY INSTALLATION CHAIN OF COMMAND.

- _____ EXECUTIVE OFFICER
- _____ COMMANDING OFFICER
- _____ FIRE CHIEF
- _____ SECURITY OFFICER
- _____ EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICER
- _____ PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

_____ HAVE SECURITY SECURE ALL TRAFFIC INTO THE INSTALLATION.

_____ NOTIFY COMNAVREG NDW CDO/ROC

_____ IF REQUIRED, DRAFT AND RELEASE UNIT SITREP/OPREP-3

_____ IF SHELTERING IS REQUIRED, ISSUE MASS WARNINGS PER EM PLAN SUPPORT ANNEX T AND ENSURE ENTIRE INSTALLATION IS IN COMPLIANCE WITH PROCEDURES IN SUPPORT ANNEX I.

_____ IF EVACUATION IS REQUIRED, SUPPORT EOC PER EM PLAN SUPPORT ANNEX F IN DIRECTING RELEASE OF NON-EMERGENCY PERSONNEL FROM INSTALLATION SO THEY CAN COMPLY WITH CIVIL EVACUATION ORDER.

_____ IF THE STATE OF MARYLAND ORDERS TAKING KI PILLS, INFORM THE EOC IMMEDIATELY, AND PASS WORD TO THE NAVAL HEALTH CLINIC SO THEY CAN BEGIN DISTRIBUTION OF KI PILLS TO RESIDENTS.

_____ PERFORM OTHER TASKS AS DIRECTED BY CO AND EOC.

Tab B: Radiological Emergency EOC Checklist

_____ ACTIVATE EOC USING FUNCTIONAL ANNEX B.

_____ ENSURE THAT CDO HAS DIRECTED SECURITY TO SECURE ALL TRAFFIC INTO THE INSTALLATION.

_____ ENSURE THAT CDO HAS MADE OPREP VOICE REPORT, AND OVERSEE PREPARATION OF OPREP MESSAGE.

_____ IF SHELTERING IS REQUIRED, ENSURE CDO HAS ISSUED EMERGENCY ALERT PER SUPPORT APPENDIX 20, AND ENTIRE INSTALLATION IS IN COMPLIANCE PER SUPPORT ANNEX I.

_____ IF EVACUATION IS REQUIRED, DIRECT RELEASE OF NON-EMERGENCY PERSONNEL FROM INSTALLATION PER SUPPORT ANNEX F SO THEY CAN COMPLY WITH CIVIL EVACUATION ORDER. DETERMINE WHICH EMERGENCY PERSONNEL MUST REMAIN ON BASE (EOC STAFF, MINIMAL SECURITY STAFF). CONSIDER RELEASING PERSONNEL BUILDING BY BUILDING TO PREVENT CONGESTION AT GATES. HAVE SECURITY OPEN ALL GATES POSSIBLE FOR OUTBOUND TRAFFIC TO SPEED RELEASE OF PERSONNEL. SUPPORT APPENDIX 6 APPLIES.

_____ COORDINATE WITH ST. MARY'S COUNTY EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT OFFICE TO DETERMINE SITUATION AND BEST COURSE OF FUTURE ACTIONS.

_____ CONSULT WITH NDW REGARDING EVACUATION MESSAGE, WHICH WILL BE ISSUED BY REGION PER SUPPORT APPENDIX 6. ENSURE PERSONNEL ARE DIRECTED TO REPORT TO MARYLAND STATE RECEPTION CENTERS EN ROUTE TO THE NAVY DESIGNATED REMOTE SAFE HAVEN.

_____ IF THE STATE OF MARYLAND ORDERS TAKING KI PILLS, PASS WORD TO THE NAVAL HEALTH CLINIC SO THEY CAN BEGIN DISTRIBUTION OF KI PILLS TO RESIDENTS. INFORM OTHER PERSONNEL OF THE ORDER TO TAKE KI PILLS, WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE RECEIVED FROM THE TOWN WHERE THEY RESIDE.

_____ DEVELOP INCIDENT ACTION PLAN AND MANAGE FURTHER RESPONSE REQUIREMENTS.

Tab C: Radiological Emergency Individual Response Actions

(Excerpts from the State of Maryland Emergency Management Website: http://mema.maryland.gov/Documents/Calvert_Cliffs_emergency.pdf)

Area Nuclear Emergency Plan
For those within the circled area

State and county officials partner with Constellation Energy on emergency management plans ensuring protection of personnel around the CCNPP in case of an emergency.

This area circled on the map covers most of the southern part of Calvert County, a small portion of St. Mary's County along the Patuxent River between California, Sandgates, and the northern tip of the NASPR, and the Taylors Island area of Dorchester County.

Notification. In the event of an emergency at the plant, people within a 10-mile radius of the plant will be alerted by sirens installed throughout the area. When you hear the sirens' steady blast lasting there to five minutes, tune your radio to an Emergency Alert System station. State and county officials will broadcast information and instructions about protective action. They will keep you informed for as long as any emergency exists.

Emergency Alert System Radio Stations

WKIK	1560 AM	La Plata Z	WWZZ	104.1 FM	La Plata
WKIK	102.9 FM	California	WEMD	1460 AM	Easton
WMDM	97.7 FM	Lexington Park	WCEI	96.7 FM	Easton
WPTX	1690 AM	Lexington Park	WCEM	1240 AM	Cambridge
WSMD	98.3 FM	Mechanicsville	WCEM	106.3 FM	Cambridge
WAAI	100.9 FM	Cambridge	WTOP	107.7 FM	Washington, DC
WGRQ	95.9 FM	Fredericksburg, VA			

Protective Action. There will be time to protect yourself and your family. Protective action may simply involve staying indoors with doors and windows closed. Window fans and air conditioners that use outside air should be turned off. Take potassium iodide pills only if instructed to do so by state or county officials. If state or county officials instruct you to leave the area, use the routes marked on the map. County officials have designated reception centers for your use.

Reception Centers
Designated assembly areas are indicated by "A" on the map. The areas are as follows:

Calvert County:

Huntingtown High School, 4125 N. Solomon's Island Road, Huntingtown, MD 20639

Anne Arundel Co. Southern High School, 4400 Solomons Island Road, Harwood

Points south of Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant would use St. Mary's County reception centers

Dorchester County:

Maple Elementary School, R. 16 & Maple Dam Rd., Cambridge

St. Mary's County:

St. Mary's County Technical Center, Rt. 244 and Rt. 5, Leonardtown



Appendix 18: Shelter-in-Place and Lockdown

1. Purpose. Provide guidance for sheltering in place (SIP). SIP is one of the most basic instructions that may be given during emergencies. SIP means to take immediate shelter where you are - at work, home, or in between. SIP usually requires the room to be sealed; take steps to prevent outside air from coming inside due to chemical or radiological contaminants released into the environment. Lockdown occurs when a human threat exists and all exits are locked to prevent the individual from entering the building.

2. Policy.

a. If directed to SIP, you and individuals under your charge must immediately seek protection for a short time.

b. If directed to Lockdown, you and individuals under your charge must immediately secure all doors into the building or work area.

c. If a decision has been made for areas of NASPR to SIP or Lockdown, every attempt will be made to notify personnel through mass notification systems or other means.

d. The following general information is a guide on how you should act before, during, and after an incident causing SIP or Lockdown actions.

3. Situation

a. General

(1) SIP is a precaution aimed at keeping you safe while remaining indoors. This is not the same thing as going to a shelter or safe haven in case of a storm. Shelter-in-place means selecting a small, interior room, with few or no windows, and taking refuge there. Shelter-in-place is also a means for first responders to control the public from moving from one area to another area that may pose a greater safety hazard

(2) SIP can be more useful than evacuation when dealing with certain hazards (e.g., airborne hazardous materials). Often the first minutes and hours following a release of a hazardous material into the atmosphere are the worst possible times for personnel to leave the relative safety of buildings, structures and vehicles. By securing a building’s ventilation and air conditioning systems, along with securing all windows and doors, a building can provide significant protection against airborne contamination. Even vehicles that have their air conditioning turned off and the windows and doors shut can provide high levels of protection against the airborne contamination of chemical, biological, radiological and hazardous materials.

(3) SIP can also be utilized for explosive hazards. Buildings may in some

instances provide significant protection against fragmentation and blast waves that are byproducts of an explosive detonation.

(4) Lockdown procedures resemble SIP; however, windows and doors remain unsealed with access to or from the building restricted. Locking doors and windows increases control of access and denying access to anyone is not a prohibited measure. Lockdown procedures occur during active shooter incidents or when allowing an individual access to a building increases the risk of serious injury or death to the occupants. The unknown location of a suicide bomber, prisoner escapee, or similar human threats constitutes just cause for lockdown procedures.

b. Assumptions

(1) All facilities and buildings have written EAPs / SOPs to initiate and maintain shelter-in-place or lockdown

(2) SIP materials are assembled and ready for use before an incident

(3) An emergency requiring evacuation of the area or building places individuals at risk when exposed to outside air forces occupants to SIP

(4) Rapid implementation of SIP actions increases survivability against exterior toxins

(5) Incorporation of Lessons Learned from SIP exercises or real world incidents

(6) F&ES may not be able to respond effectively to control the incident or advise the general public in a rapid manner

(7) The EOC requires time to assess the situation causing SIP to potentially last over an hour regardless of an actual threat

(8) For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

(9) For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

c. Limitations

(1) In new building design and construction, construction cost of hardening a small area or room in a building is 10 to 25 percent higher than the construction cost for a non-hardened version of the same area or room

(2) Different hazards require different types of shelter-in-place spaces and limited availability of those spaces

(3) Resource limitations to conduct actual SIP procedures

4. Execution

a. Concept of Operations

(1) Shelter-in-Place can be used when there is little time to react to an incident, and it would be more dangerous to be outside trying to evacuate than it would be to stay where you are.

(2) The intent of Shelter-in-Place is to minimize the amount of outside air that enters the location and for personnel inside to await further instructions (from authorities) indicating the crisis (and danger) has passed.

(3) 90 percent of Category 2-4 personnel SIP within 15 minutes after notification.

(4) SIP Procedures.

(a) Turn off ventilation systems

(b) Close and lock windows and doors

(c) Seal gaps under doorways and windows with wet towels and duct tape

(d) Seal gaps around window and air conditioning units, bathroom and kitchen exhaust fans with duct tape and plastic sheeting, wax paper, or aluminum wrap

(e) Locations should be centralized and be able to be closed off to nonessential rooms

(f) Make sure area has a telephone, water, a toilet, and can be sealed easily

(5) School & Daycare Center SIP Procedures.

(a) Close the Day Care Centers and activate the N9 Emergency Action Plan (EAP).

(b) Follow reverse evacuation procedures to bring students, faculty, and staff indoors.

1. Shut the outside doors.

2. Have all children, staff, and visitors take shelter in preselected rooms that have phone access and preferably access to a nearby bathroom.

3. Lock all windows, shelter doors, and any other openings to the outside.

4. Keep clear of windows, if possible.

5. Heating, ventilating, air conditioning, and systems that automatically provide for exchange of inside air with outside air must be turned off, sealed, or disabled.

(c) One teacher or staff member in each room should write down the name of everyone in the room, and call the school's designated emergency contact to report who is in that room.

(d) Schools will assign one or two people to collect information on who is in the building when an emergency happens, so that first responders will know that everyone is accounted for if necessary.

(e) If visitors are in the building, provide for their safety by asking them to stay.

(f) Ideally, the top school official will have access to the school-wide public address system in the room where he/she takes shelter.

(g) Have at least one phone line under the school's listed telephone numbers in one of the shelter rooms, and a designated person to answer the calls of concerned parents. If it is not possible for a person to monitor the main telephone and the school has voice mail or an automated attendant, change the recording, time permitting, to indicate that the school is closed and the students and staff are remaining in the building until authorities say it is safe to leave.

(h) If children have cell phones, allow them to use them to call a parent or guardian to let them know that they have been asked to remain in school until further notice, and that they are safe. This tactic may reduce the number of incoming calls.

(i) Everyone should stay in the room until school officials, via the public address system, announce that all is safe or say everyone must evacuate.

(j) Once the word has been given that all is safe, everyone will go outside while the building's ventilation systems are turned back on.

(k) Follow any special instructions given by emergency authorities to avoid chemical and radiological contaminants outdoors.

(6) Personnel must be prepared in the event the crisis lasts for a prolonged period of time.

(a) Supplies necessary for successful shelter-in-place operations

(b) Supply of bottled water (a gallon a day per person).

(c) Battery-operated radio and spare batteries.

(d) Flashlight(s) and spare batteries.

(e) First-aid kit with scissors.

(f) Duct tape, plastic sheeting, and towels (for sealing windows and doors).

(g) Nonperishable food (and a non-electric can opener).

(h) Essential medicines/prescriptions.

(7) Lockdown is a protective action implemented when an individual or individuals have gained entrance into a building with the intent to commit a violent act. Included in the lockdown procedure are all Service Members, federal employees, contractors, dependents, and guests. Because of extenuating circumstances, all personnel remain constrained inside the nearest vehicle, structure, or building providing a measure of protection.

(8) According to DHS Occupant Emergency Programs Guidelines, the reasons for initiating lockdown and SIP procedures are markedly different. As a general rule of thumb, a lockdown is implemented due to actions occurring inside the building, such as an active shooter, while a SIP is initiated because of actions taking place outside of the building, such as severe weather or an accidental chemical release. However, it is conceivable that a transition from a SIP to a lockdown could occur based on the incident outside the building. For example, a SIP is declared due to a peaceful demonstration subsequently turning into an imminent threat, such as a destructive riot; causing a lockdown to be declared.

(9) Additional resources.

(a) FEMA Safe Rooms - http://www.fema.gov/safe-rooms

(b) FEMA Storm Safe Sheltering In Place - https://emilms.fema.gov/IS909/assets/05_ShelteringInPlace.pdf

(c) FEMA Shelter In Place Drill Checklist template – https://emilms.fema.gov/is36/assets/Lesson4_worksheets.pdf

(d) FEMA Child Care EAP sample - https://emilms.fema.gov/is36/assets/EAP_Sample.pdf

(e) FEMA Kit Storage - https://www.ready.gov/kit-storage-locations

(f) Allegany SIP Plan template - http://www.alleganyco.com/btn_ph_ep/templates/shelter%20in%20place.pdf

b. Considerations

(1) SIP Locations. As an initial step it may be more practical to build on the organizational structure and personnel already designated in fire evacuation plans. Typically, these fire evacuation positions are Building Coordinator, Floor Monitor, and Muster Location Supervisor. For SIP, the Muster Location Supervisor can be used as a Door Monitor to staff the primary ingress/egress door.

(2) Avoid overcrowding by pre-selecting several interior rooms with the fewest number of windows or vents. If a chemical has been released, take shelter in a room above ground level because some chemicals are heavier than air and may sink nearer to ground level. On the other hand, if there are radioactive particles in the air, choose a centrally located room or basement away from windows that might leak and let in airborne radioactive particles.

(3) The rooms should have adequate space for those being sheltered to be able to sit. Rooms without exterior windows such as utility rooms, break rooms, conference rooms, classrooms, meeting rooms, and gymnasiums work well. Access to bathrooms is a plus. The rooms should be equipped with a disaster supplies kit. Access to a water supply is desirable, as is a working hard-wired POTS (Plain Old Telephone System) telephone. Use cordless phones only if necessary; a power failure will render most cordless phones inoperable. Don't rely on cell phones because cellular telephone circuits may be overwhelmed or damaged during an emergency. In some circumstances, cell phones may be able to send text messaging or may be able to use the press to talk feature, even when cell service is unavailable.

(4) Building Management Team. As an initial step it may be more practical to build on the organizational structure and personnel already designated in fire evacuation plans. Typically, if a supported command has an Emergency Action Plan (EAP) / Fire Evacuation Plan (FEP) coordinator he or she should develop the SIP instruction. Once developed, these plans should be forwarded to the NASPR Emergency Management Officer (EMO).

(5) SIP Management Team. The SIP Management Team (usually designated when the EOC is activated) organization is designed to expand and contract as needed to meet the needs of the incident. One person can fulfill multiple roles, depending on manpower availability and the nature and expected duration of the incident.



(6) Special Considerations for Tornado Warnings.

(a) Storm cellars or basements provide the best protection against tornados and are to be considered as a form of SIP.

(b) If underground shelter is not available, go into an interior room or hallway on the lowest floor possible.

(c) In a high-rise building, go to a small interior room or hallway on the lowest floor possible avoid load-bearing exterior walls with little support.

(d) Stay away from windows, doors, and outside walls. Go to the center of the room.

(e) Avoid rooms with large roof spans, domed or cathedral style ceilings, such as gymnasiums, theaters, warehouses. Move to a smaller more confined room if at all possible.

(f) Stay in the shelter location until the danger has passed and the “All Clear" given.

(7) Hazardous Materials or CBRN Contamination. Depending on the type of incident, mass warning systems and category 5 personnel may instruct people to SIP and “seal the room.” Sealing the room is considered to be a temporary protective measure to create a barrier between persons and potentially contaminated outside air. This type of SIP requires preplanning.

(a) Building Emergency Coordinators should identify the rooms which will be "sealed" in a SIP incident in advance. If feasible, choose an interior room, such as a break room or conference room, with as few windows and doors as possible, in the center of the building. If the department is located on more than one floor or in more than one building, identify multiple shelter locations. The area chosen should have means of quickly (and preferably locally) shutting off the HVAC outside air supply.

(b) If the facility has a Collective Protection system, such as Building 911 there is no need to shut off the outside air; however, other steps may need to be taken to activate the system.

(c) If toxic vapors are present, personnel entering the SIP facility from outside must be isolated from building occupants so that those already sheltering-in-place are not endangered.

(d) If toxic vapors may have entered a building or residence, direct personnel to place a wet towel over their mouths and noses when feasible.

(e) Procedures for sealing a room:

1. Close the building and bring all personnel inside.

2. Lock doors, close windows, air vents and fireplace dampers.

3. Turn off fans, air conditioning and forced air heating systems.

4. Go into an interior room, such as a break room or conference room, with few windows if possible.

5. Be prepared to improvise and use what you have on hand to seal gaps so that you create a barrier between yourself and any contamination.

6. Local authorities may be unable to immediately provide information on what is happening and what you should do. However, you should watch TV, listen to the radio or check the Internet often for official news and instructions as they become available.

7. Take emergency supply kits to the predetermined location in the building for SIP unless there is reason to believe they have been contaminated.

8. Close as many interior doors as possible.

(f) Only if time permits and materials are available, windows, doors, vents, and / or dampers may be taped over or sealed with duct tape and plastic around the top, bottom, and sides.

(8) Planning and Preparedness

(a) Develop a system of knowing who is in each building in case of emergencies.

(b) Develop a list of persons needing special assistance (name, telephone extension, and room number, location of crutches, wheelchairs, and other support devices, and type of assistance required).

(c) Establish a building warning system.

1. Test the system periodically.

2. Plan to communicate with people who have with hearing impairments or other special needs such as persons who may not speak English.

(d) Predetermine exit and entrance doors. Stage signage to assist in directing personnel to the correct door. Signage will be in English and Braille, if applicable. Allow outdoor personnel to enter the building once SIP begins but isolate these personnel from those already in the building when the event occurred.

(e) During the event, identify who is in the building (including visitors), and enter this information into an accountability system.

(f) Military personnel may be required to SIP under the Uniform Code of Military Justice; however, non-military civilians and contractors cannot be required to SIP. Military civilians and DoD employees can be required to SIP when so ordered/directed. Therefore, it is important to develop SIP plans for employee groups to maximize their cooperation. This is especially important for chemical and biological events where they may be exposed to life-threatening conditions, although they may disregard advice and choose to leave a sheltered location.

(g) Plans will allow employees who wish to leave, to use a door that will not endanger those who choose to SIP.

(h) SIP Management Teams, with alternates, will be assigned and trained for each building that has been predetermined as adequate for SIP. A minimum of four types of SIP members for each building are typically needed. Ideally the four types of team members are:

1. Building Emergency Coordinator

2. Floor Monitor(s)

3. Muster Location Supervisor/Door Monitor(s)

4. Building Manager/Maintenance Staff

(i) Assign specific duties to SIP Management Team members in the Building Emergency Plan.

1. Checklists for each team member are located in Tab 1, and may be modified as required.

2. Ensure the plan and checklists involve all groups of employees in the building.

3. Designate and train team alternates in case the assigned person is not there or is injured, and when personnel leave a command or check into a command. A suggestion is to notate this on command's check in and out procedure.

4. Volunteers or recruits should be assigned specific duties during an emergency.

(j) Get emergency supply kits and keep them in SIP locations.

1. Check kits on a regular basis; first aid supplies can disappear when all employees know where they are.

2. Batteries for radio and flashlight will be replaced regularly in accordance with their expiration date.

(k) If possible, ensure at least two people are present who are certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR), first aid, and the use of an automated external defibrillator through a nationally recognized agency (American Red Cross, American Heart Association, American Safety and Health Institutes, and etcetera).

(l) Practice the SIP plan on a regular basis.

(m) During an event, turn off all heating, ventilating, air conditioning, fans, and all systems that automatically provide for the exchange of inside air with outside air.

(n) If possible, move all personnel to the safest place in the residence or building for the particular hazard. Higher-elevation floors are best for floods; basements are better for tornadoes.

(o) If possible, include access to TV, radio, computers and telephone in sheltering locations. Turn on a TV or radio and listen for further instructions.

(p) When the "all clear" is announced, open windows and doors and turn ventilation back on to bring in fresh air. Direct occupants to go outside until the building air has been exchanged with the now clean outdoor air.

c. Responsibilites.

(1) CO

(a) Ensure SIP training during “Indoctrination” briefs and subsequent refresher training opportunities in support of the Emergency Management Program.

(b) Ensure coordination with NAVFAC (PW) and Safety in implementing SIP planning requirements.

(c) Maintain over all command and control for the decision process to SIP.

(d) Ensure all personnel receive guidance on SIP procedures and requirements.

(e) Establish procedures for warning personnel to SIP.

(f) Establish procedures for sounding “all clear” to release personnel.

(g) Ensure shelter rooms for each building on the installation are identified.

(h) Conduct shelter in place exercises.

(i) Designate shelter-in-place wardens, if appropriate

(2) N30, Fire & Emergency Services. Be prepared to respond to a variety of emergencies and ensure personnel are qualified in all training in accordance with required standards.

(3) N37, EMO

(a) Provide a template of a Building Emergency Plan that contains SIP procedures to the supported commands and organizations in each building.

(b) Provide annual training and exercises on SIP notification and procedures.

(c) Maintain documentation records for all shelter-in-place exercises.

(d) Ensure annual training is scheduled for Category 2-4 personnel.

(e) Ensure all personnel receive guidance on SIP procedures and requirements

(f) Establish procedures for warning personnel to SIP; including use of MNS

(g) Establish procedures for sounding “all clear” to release personnel

(h) Determine needs for emergency supplies (i.e. - water & food)

(i) Coordinate plans with local authorities.

(j) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

(4) PW

(a) Pre-incident

1. Designate safe rooms for buildings and place placards on the building indicating safe room availability

2. Where feasible, identify the location of the building’s mechanical room where all Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system locations and review shutdown procedures with building personnel.

3. If designated shelter rooms are not equipped with hard-wired telephones, test cordless and or cell phones to ensure they are operational.

4. Coordinate the logistical issues of SIP, including building systems that can be automatically shut down.

5. Provide status of systems to the EMO for inclusion in the EOC books.

6. Upon direction from the NASPR Commanding Officer, turn off/restore heating, ventilating, and air conditioning fans, and all systems that automatically provide for exchange of inside air with outside air. If HVAC filters are contaminated (such as in the event of a particulate release), they will be replaced before the system is restarted.

(b) During an incident

1. Communicate that there is an emergency to personnel in the area.

2. Inform personnel of the need to shelter.

3. Assist personnel to the area shelter.

(5) N6, Communications. Support communications and information technology requirements of first responders and sheltered personnel.

(6) N9, Fleet & Family Services

(a) Provide general information, counseling, and access to resources that will

assist the effected Navy family population in recovering from the incident.

(b) Keep agencies supporting the incident aware of incident status changes and updates

(7) PAO

(a) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(b) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(c) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

(8) Building Managers

(a) Develop building Emergency Action Plans.

(b) Train SIP Management Team personnel.

(c) Appoint or Delegate necessary assistants.

(d) Identify sealable rooms in advance, and preposition supplies as necessary.

(e) Submit name and contact information to installation EMO.

(f) Participate in SIP training and exercises.

(9) General Personnel.

(a) A HAZMAT emergency may occur at any given time on the installation. While seeking shelter, provide a minimal amount of breathing protection by covering your mouth and nose with a damp cloth or any other available material. During a HAZMAT release take the following actions:

1. A knowledgeable person should use the building's mechanical systems to turn off all HVAC systems. The systems that automatically provide for exchange of inside air with outside air, in particular, need to be turned off, sealed or disabled.

2. Take shelter inside designated room. Make any customers or visitors in the building aware that they need to stay until the emergency is over.

3. Close all doors and windows using duct tape, plastic sheets or towels; seal around doors and windows (SIP kit).

4. Write down the names of everyone in the room. Call the EOC at (301)

342-6325 to report the names of those in the room and their affiliation with your agency.

5. Turn on the radio or television (if you have a computer keep it on) and keep listening for updates until you are told all is safe or you are told to evacuate the building.

6. When you are told that all is safe, open windows and doors, turn on HVAC systems and go outside until the building's air has been exchanged with the now-clean outdoor air. Follow any special instructions given by emergency authorities to avoid chemical or radiological contaminants outdoors.

(b) Non-hazmat emergency may occur at any given time on the depot. Personnel may need to seek shelter in their facility for protection from natural disasters or for concealment from aggressors. During a non-hazmat emergency take the following actions:

1. Proceed to take shelter inside designated room. Make any customers or visitors in the building aware that they need to stay until the emergency is over.

2. Write down the names of everyone in the room. Call the EOC at (301) 342-6325 to report who is in the room with you and their affiliation with your agency.

3. Turn on the radio or television (if you have a computer keep it on) and keep listening for updates until you are told all is safe or you are told to evacuate the building.

4. When the "All Clear" is given, exit the shelter area. Follow special instructions given by emergency authorities to avoid chemical or radiological contaminants outdoors.

d. Coordinating Instructions. Utilize MNS for SIP success and effectiveness.

(1) AtHoc notification system

(2) Giant Voice inside and outside warning sirens / speaker systems

(3) Coordinate with News media sources - radio, television and cable

(4) Public Address Systems, messages announced to neighborhoods from emergency services vehicles equipped with public address systems.

e. Social Media such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and others.

(1) Administration & Logistics.

(2) Administration. See Basic Plan.

f. Logistics. Recommended building emergency supply kit contents.

(1) First aid kit

(2) Flashlight

(3) Battery-powered radio

(4) Extra batteries

(5) A working, non-cordless telephone

(6) Optional, if available:

(a) Scissors

(b) Towels

(c) Drinking water

(d) Non-perishable food

g. Lessons Learned.

(1) Within two weeks after the incident each department and supported commands submit a list of lessons learned regarding the success and / or failure of actions taken or not taken to the EMO.

(2) A written negative reply is required for those who encountered no lessons learned.

h. Reports / Alerts / COR.

(1) Disseminate Emergency Public Information (EPI) to category 1-5 personnel within 15 minutes of an incident based upon initial reports by emergency responders.

(2) Detailed incident notification and reporting requirements are outlined in the EOC SOP's; including, required notification for the installation CDO. The EOC maintains a list of names and phone numbers for required notification.

2. Command and Signal.

a. Command. The NASPR Commanding Officer may order all or a designated portion of the installation under the command to SIP.

b. Signal.

(1) Incident Commander is in charge of initial SIP and evacuation information. The Incident Commander provides the Commanding Officer and EOC of the status of SIP.

(2) The EOC is the primary operations point to initiate mass warning and notification systems, when authorized by the Incident Commander or other appropriate member of the chain of command. Emergency warnings and PAO notification messages will be consistent with public awareness training materials and current national standard alert terminology to avoid confusion. Due to the short time available for emergency messages, there is little opportunity for these messages to explain what is meant by SIP; this understanding must be provided in awareness training. A PAO announcement should:

(a) Identify the authority for the protective action instructions as soon as possible via mass alert methods including All Hands.

(b) Identify the areas where this protective action is required.

(c) Briefly describe the nature of the threat.

(d) Stress the importance of prompt compliance.

(e) Include brief instructions for expedient shelter.

(f) Reference use of sheltering kits, if applicable.

(g) Stress the importance of monitoring computer/radio or TV broadcasts to receive additional instructions.

TABS:
Tab A: Checklists

Tab A: Checklists

Shelter in Place Procedures	
EOC Shelter Manager	
✓	**Task**
	Initial Sheltering-In-Place
	Obtain extent of Incident Commander–directed initial Hot and Warm Zone boundaries (also called “isolation boundaries”) and protective actions (SIP and / or evacuation). Ensure initial SIP and / or evacuation boundaries are reflected in EOC emergency management software database and EOC map displays.
	Ensure initial mass warning and security department vehicle announcements to SIP personnel have been made.
	Determine locations that are not within or anticipated to be affected by the hazard and therefore do not need to SIP.
	Track the progress of establishing SIP in buildings and vessels. Ensure data is entered into emergency management software database and EOC map displays. Keep Incident Commander apprised of SIP status.
	Provide accountability data for SIP personnel to appropriate EOC personnel.
	Ensure computer-controlled building ventilation systems are secured inside the affected area or obtain status shutdowns of building ventilation systems from PW controlled Zone Grid Center(s).
	If the wind direction shifts and an atmospheric release is still ongoing, determine whether additional buildings need to SIP, and provide this information to the EOC/Dispatch.
	Periodically provide updates to personnel in the EOC.
	Obtain approved assessment-based, SIP boundaries and protective action recommendations. Update EOC database and EOC map displays.
	If on-scene isolation boundaries are collapsed, develop a list of buildings and vessels that can be unsheltered. Notify the affected Building Points of Contact of the change or any alternate means of notification.
	Provide assessment-based SIP boundaries to all via mass warning and security vehicle announcements have been made to affected populations.
	Determine whether the source of the hazard has been secured and whether additional releases are expected.
	Determine whether ground contamination exists after an atmospheric release and provide this information to dispatch and or EOC so environmental can be contacted.
	Once the release has stopped, advise dispatch and or EOC to make “all-clear” announcements via mass notification tools and advise personnel they should not be allowed to leave in personal vehicles unless they are deemed to be clean and free of contamination. Incident Commander to determine decon, if needed.

Shelter in Place Procedures	
Building Emergency Coordinators/ Building Points of Contacts	
✓	**Task**
	Establish the Affected Area, upon hearing Mass Warning System announcements to shelter.
	Notify all to implement SIP procedures.
	Initiate building emergency signal (bell, siren, horn, etc.) if available.
	Record the status reports of windows, doors, ventilation, and personnel counts.
	After receiving all information, call the Dispatch and provide the following:
	• (Name) with the SIP data for (building/number).
	• EOC will check building number and location, and provide additional instructions as required.
	The EOC will advise if your building is within the area ordered to be sheltered. If your building is within the sheltering area, give the following data:
	• Number of personnel inside, including those who entered from outside and thus may be contaminated.
	• Report of any unsecured or unusual conditions, if any (e.g., unable to secure blowers or ventilation, injured person, etc.).
	• Phone number(s) for call back.
	• Notify Dispatch of any medical/hazard issues.
	If your building, as determined by the Incident Commander or EOC, is NOT within the affected area:
	• Notify all personnel of the situation
	• Advise managers to pass on the information to all personnel.
	Turn on radios or TVs and monitor network computers for updates.
	When safe, direct that windows and doors be opened; turn on heating, ventilating, and air conditioning systems; and go outside until the building's air has been exchanged with the now clean outdoor air.
	Follow any special instructions given by emergency authorities to avoid chemical or radiological contaminants outdoors.
	Do not allow entry or exit during the plume passage. However, remain alert for personnel seeking entry into the building to seek shelter from the incident. Allow entry if the situation does not present a high risk to others within the building.
	In the Event of a Life-Threatening Injury:
	• If possible help trapped or injured personnel in immediate danger of life and limb.
	• Call 911 at PAX River from a land line base phone or call dispatch at 301 342-3911 and report the location and condition of injured/trapped personnel.
	• Administer first aid, if qualified and do not move seriously injured personnel unless they are in immediate danger of further injury.

Shelter in Place Procedures	
Designated Personnel	
✓	**Task**
	Serve as the single point of contact in receiving and issuing emergency information to those personnel located or sheltered in their area (floor) of responsibility.
	Assign individuals to secure ventilation, windows, equipment, if advised by authorities
	Send pre designated Door Monitors to monitor each door that is to remain unlocked and guarded, if applicable.
	Ensure exterior doors that are locked have a placard attached directing personnel who are outside to a door that will be open (but guarded).
	Secure portable fans to avoid drawing in air from other areas, possibly bringing toxic vapors in.
	Use the preexisting list of persons needing special assistance to ensure they receive proper care.
	Work with supervisors on your floor to carry out other duties.
	Serve as a point of contact for receiving and issuing emergency information to personnel located on their floor.
	Maintain communications with your chain of command.
	If the building is within the sheltered area, give the following data to your designated Shelter in Place Coordinator concerning your floor:
	• Number of personnel sheltered, including potentially contaminated.
	• Report of any unsecured or unusual conditions, if any (e.g. unable to secure blowers or ventilation, injured person, etc.).
	• Notify when floor is completely sheltered.

Shelter in Place Procedures	
Designated Muster Location Supervisor	
✓	**Task**
	Coordinate with your Shelter in Place Coordinator and / or Floor Monitor (if designated) in assigning individuals to secure all equipment, doors, windows, and ventilation in and immediately adjacent to their section or work area, if advised.
	Assign appropriate individuals to check restrooms, conference rooms, and vaults or storage areas.
	If your building section has one or more doors to the outside, assign individuals to monitor each door that will be remaining unlocked and guarded (primary entrances).
	Account for all persons assigned to the area of responsibility.
	Provide a muster report to the Command as soon as possible after receiving the emergency warning.
	Proceed when instructed, with employees (except those assigned to monitor doors) to the pre-designated muster area of the building or floors adjacent to the work area (i.e., floor, lobby, or hall).
	Upon receiving sheltering or evacuation notifications, make sure that ALL employees are notified and that required protective measures are carried out immediately.
	Report to, or assign personnel to be stationed at doors to ensure that entry/exit doors remain closed (but not locked) except when employees outside are seeking shelter in the building or when emergency personnel need to enter.
	Ensure that doors are open only long enough for person(s) to enter.
	Register all employees who may enter the building from the outside by name and badge number. Personnel entering from outside shall be segregated from personnel already in the building at the time of the alert. A pre-designated waiting area should be established as close to entryways as possible. Personnel shall be instructed to minimize their movement to help reduce the spread of possible contamination.
	Record the names of outgoing personnel if they choose to ignore recommendations to SIP.
	Report all entries and exits to your Shelter in Place Coordinator or chain of command.
	Continue door monitoring until directed to secure from SIP.
	If an evacuation is ordered, remain at the assign exit doors until told to evacuate. Count how many exit. Record the number and forward to Command.

Appendix 19: Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E)

Ref: (a) NAVSEA OP 5 Volume 1, Seventh Revision
(b) OPNAVINST 5530.13C
(c) NAVSEA SW020-AG-SAF-010
(d) NAVSEA SW020-AF-HBK-010
(e) NTTP 3-07.2.3
(f) NOSSAINST 8020.18B

1. Purpose. Provide guidance that address emergency preparedness, contingency planning and security. This plan includes provisions that limit access to only properly trained and authorized personnel. Procedures that minimize the possibility of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of ammunition or explosives from any Potential Explosion Site (PES) when such release, discharge, or migration may endanger human health or the environment. Direction for prompt notification of emergency response, environmental agencies, and potentially affected public in the event of an actual or potential detonation or uncontrolled release, discharge or mitigation.

2. General. To mitigate any potential explosive incidents or situations that may endanger human health or the environment at all areas that are currently Explosives Safety site approved for handling and storage of hazard class/division (C/D) 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, or 1.6 material or have personnel that handle or come in contact with explosives are inspected in accordance with (IAW) reference (a) for Explosives Safety compliance; to include, but not limited to, Facility certification, Ammunition and Explosives (A&E) qualification and certification training programs, A&E Standard Operating Procedures (SOP); A&E facilities and operations, lightning protection and ground systems; Arms, Ammunition, and Explosives (AA&E) transportation equipment; Material Potentially Presenting and Explosives Hazard (MPPEH); A&E physical security and A&E Inventory Management.

a. Due to the danger of explosives during emergency situations, such as fire, transportation accidents, structural failure due to a geological event or uncontrolled detonation, only the minimum amount necessary of authorized trained and qualified personnel are allowed in the restricted or affected area. Naval Security Forces will meet the requirements established in reference (b) during each applicable phase of an emergency.

b. During all phases of A&E operations it is imperative that all tenant command maintain communication with their personnel to ensure they may be warned of any severe weather approaching their location(s). Weather conditions are announced via electronic-mail and phone to applicable commands.

c. In the event of an explosive incident, notification of proper authorities is paramount to ensure further danger to personnel, facilities, or the environment is mitigated. Activation of local Memorandums of Agreement/Memorandums of

Understanding (MOA/MOU) along with notification of Local Emergency Planning Committees (LEPC) may be required which fulfills the Emergency Planning Community Right-To-Know Act (EPCRA), sections 302-312. Report damage to the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) of all applicable facility, ordnance, or surrounding areas. When EOC sends damage report it will include ordnance related Plain Language Addresses (PLAD) and Address Information Groups (AIG) as applicable IAW reference (a).

d. For executable checklists refer to EOC SOP.

e. For information on Emergency Public Information (EPI) or Joint Information Center (JIC) refer to Functional Area Annex (FAA) Annex Q.

f. PAO Responsibilities.

(1) Coordinate with local media and NDW PAO.

(2) Disseminate information to base population utilizing all forms of media sources.

(3) Respond appropriately IAW FAA Appendix Q.

g. N37/CDO

(1) Determine if the need for EOC activation is necessary IAW FAA Annex B.

TABS:
Tab A: Destructive Weather
Tab B: Structural Failure
Tab C: Transportation Accident
Tab D: Physical Security
Tab E: Sabotage / Terrorism to A&E
Tab F: Fire
Tab G: Evacuation Plan
Tab H: Recovery Operations
Tab I: Hurricane Action/Recovery checklist

Tab A: Destructive Weather

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

1. Weather definitions can be found in Appendix 1 Tab A.

2. NASPR utilizes sources identified in Appendix 1 Tab B for lightning warning system (LWS) information gathering and dissemination.

a. An automatic generated message is sent via electronic-mail and phone alert to advise local commands of current Thunder warning conditions and time periods. As the weather condition changes, additional notifications are issued. This system allows ample time to secure ordnance operations as required to prevent an explosive emergency.

b. If structural damage is apparent or suspected see Tab B.

NOTE

No current operations on board NASPR require a Pre-Strike system as part of the LWS.

3. Cyclone conditions of readiness (COR) checklists can be found in Appendix 1 Tab C.

4. Ammunition and Explosives (A&E) Missions and Operations

a. General transportation of A&E

(1) Small area storms/warnings. Carry on when continued operations are a necessity and proper Operational Risk Management (ORM) has been considered.

(a) Transporting. If rain is a factor, cover A&E IAW ref (d).

(b) Flight line

(c) Aircraft

(d) Magazines

(e) Operating buildings

(f) Pier

NOTE

Each command maintains communication with ground crew and aircraft during TII and TI conditions

(2) Thunderstorm Conditions

(a) Thunderstorm Condition II (TII) (25 nautical miles), prepare to cease A&E operations for the following

1. Transporting

2. Flight line

3. Aircraft

4. Magazines

5. Operating buildings

6. Pier

(b) Thunderstorm Condition I (TI) (10 nautical miles), A&E must be made as safe as practical, and all A&E operations must cease immediately and all personnel must seek shelter.

1. Transporting

2. Flight line

3. Aircraft

a. Aircraft already loaded with ordnance that does not require arming may taxi and launch at the discretion of the installation commanding officer or as modified by other applicable instructions.

b. Aircraft landing with ordnance requiring de-arming during an electrical storm must remain in the de-arming area until the lightning threat passes.

4. Magazines. At the approach of and during an electrical storm, closed magazines containing A&E must not be opened. If work is being performed in the magazine or open storage site, the work must stop and equipment must be safely secured. The magazine must be closed and locked.

5. Explosives Operating Buildings. Requirements for explosives operating buildings depend on whether they have lightning protection, whether the lightning protection system meets current requirements, the type of operation involved, and the location of other operating buildings.

a. Lightning Protection Systems Meeting Current Requirements. It is not necessary to terminate operations or to evacuate personnel from explosives operating buildings or other hazardous locations that have lightning protection and secondary grounding system meeting current requirements, unless explosive dust, flammable vapors, or exposed EED's are present, or unless there are explosives operating buildings not equipped with lightning protection that are located at less than Public Traffic Route (PTR) distance from the building. These buildings and operations must be specifically identified in the destructive weather plan.

b. Lightning Protection Systems Not Meeting Current Requirements. A risk assessment must be conducted and documented for those facilities protected by a lightning protection system that does not meet the latest lightning protection standards. The need for termination of explosives operations and evacuation of personnel must be based on the relative threat presented by the deficiency. The lightning risk assessment guide contained in NFPA 780 may be used to help determine the risk. Some adjustments to this guide may be necessary depending on the types of operations involved.

6. Pier. There is no Lightning Protection System installed on the pier at NAS Patuxent River. Decisions to continue A&E operations on the pier once TII has been declared must be made by either the installation ESO, CO or XO. Once T1 condition is declared all A&E must be made as safe as practical, all A&E operations must cease, and all personnel will seek shelter.

(3) Tropical Systems, Cyclones, Winter storms

(a) Follow Conditions of Readiness (COR) checklists in Appendix 1 Tab C.

(b) If continued operations are a necessity conduct proper Risk Management.

(c) For Hurricane and Tornado warnings A&E must be made as safe as practical, and all A&E operations must cease.

Tab B: A&E Structural Failure

WARNING

Damage to A&E could cause the packing or body of ordnance related material to be exposed to the elements greatly increasing the cause of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of A&E.

WARNING

Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate A&E.

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

1. When slight structural damage is apparent or suspected

a. Building facilitator contact Public Works Department (PWD) to have an engineer inspect damaged area of facilities. Keep log of trouble ticket.

b. Notify installation Explosives Safety Officer (ESO).

c. Prepare to move personnel and A&E from facility.

2. When moderate structural damage is apparent or suspected

a. Complete Tab B.

b. Notify EOC as applicable.

3. When heavy structural damage is apparent or suspected

a. Notify EOC, ESO, and Emergency services.

b. Contact Explosives Ordnance Disposal (EOD) as required.

c. If A&E can be safely moved, do so under supervision and permission of installation ESO, XO, or CO.

4. Refer to Section 4 Appendix 7 for further detail.

Tab C: Transportation Accident

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

NOTE

If accident involves a Government Owned Vehicle, installation Safety department must be notified.

WARNING

In the event the vehicle is entangled with another vehicle or structure, no attempt should be made to disentangle the vehicle until the load has been removed 200 feet from vehicle or habitation.

WARNING

Damage to A&E could cause the packing or body of ordnance related material to be exposed to the elements greatly increasing the cause of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of A&E.

WARNING

Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate A&E.

1. Vehicle transporting A&E involved in an accident must be reported and safety measures followed IAW references (c), (d), and (f).

a. Stop the vehicle immediately.

b. Turn off the ignition.

c. Set the brake and chock the vehicle to prevent movement.

d. Post warning devices on the highway. Ensure that all turn signals are flashing simultaneously while warning devices are being posted.

e. If fire results, the driver follows the firefighting instructions found on the shipping papers.

f. Notify local law enforcement authorities.

g. Render first aid. Do not move badly injured persons unless absolutely necessary.

h. Notify both shipping and receiving activities by the fastest available method.

i. Notify the Army Operations Center (AOC) at 703-697-0218/0219 collect or DSN 227-0218/0219 should DOD/EOD assistance be required for clean-up operations.

NOTE

EOD personnel or other competent DOD official(s) must be dispatched to the scene of an accident involving damaged A&E materials. See subparagraph (k) below for further instructions.

j. Provide emergency response information (bill of lading and/or DD Form 836) to law enforcement authorities and firefighting personnel. This data will provide the type of cargo, dangerous characteristics, firefighting techniques, operating distances for firefighters and equipment, and personnel evacuation distances.

k. Do not attempt to handle damaged A&E cargo or unload a disabled vehicle. Assist emergency first responders as necessary. Handling of damaged A&E cargo will begin after the damaged cargo has been declared safe to move and transport by EOD personnel or other competent on-scene DOD officials.

l. Do not sign any insurance or release documents.

m. Express no opinions as to who is to blame for the accident.

n. If an unattended vehicle is struck, make a reasonable effort to locate the missing driver, while maintaining constant surveillance over the vehicle and its AA&E cargo. If this is not possible, leave the following information for the owner of the unattended vehicle

(1) Name.

(2) Address or home station.

(3) State or Federal Government license numbers.

(4) Destination.

(5) Any other information pertinent to the accident.

Tab D: Physical Security

1. Respond and secure the scene of an incident. Park the patrol vehicle so as to protect the scene IAW reference (e).

2. Refer to Table 19-1 in Tab F to determine perimeter/withdrawal distances.

3. If the accident standoff distance is determined to reach beyond the base perimeter EOC may have to activate local MOA/MOU's IAW Support Annexes A and B.

WARNING

Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate A&E.

WARNING

Care must be taken not to produce sparks

4. Promptly notify dispatch of other required emergency response agencies.

a. Visually scan area from PES that may endanger human health or the environment.

b. Be mindful of proximity to airfield. If airfield operations may be affected notify Air Operations.

5. Establish access control measures.

a. A list of authorized personnel must be issued by the Explosives Safety Officer.

b. Considerations must be made for Emergency personnel. When victims are transported from the scene, the patrol supervisor or designated person must direct emergency medical technicians or ambulances into and out of the area without disturbing the scene if at all possible.

6. Redirect traffic pattern as required.

7. Maintain perimeter and access control measures until directed to secure by the CO.

Tab E: Sabotage / Terrorism to A&E

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

1. If suspicious activity is taking place, or believed to have taken place, stop work and notify NSF immediately.

a. Secure scene as applicable.

b. Evacuate area as applicable IAW Appendix 19 Tab G.

NOTE

If an explosion occurs, be mindful of secondary explosions

WARNING

Damage to A&E could cause the packing or body of ordnance related material to be exposed to the elements greatly increasing the cause of an uncontrolled detonation, release, discharge, or migration of A&E.

WARNING

Inside established perimeter do not use an electronic device such as a radio to communicate the presence of a suspect item as this may detonate A&E.

NOTE

EOD personnel or other competent DOD official(s) must be dispatched to the scene of damaged A&E materials. See below for further instructions.

c. Owner of damaged property must provide emergency response information to NSF authorities and firefighting personnel. This data will provide type, dangerous characteristics, firefighting techniques, operating distances for firefighters and equipment, and personnel evacuation distances.

2. If structural damage is apparent or suspected see Appendix 19 Tab B.

3. If a Vehicle loaded with A&E was involved see Appendix 19 Tab C.

4. If a fire occurs see Appendix 19 Tab F.

Tab F: Fire

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

1. Safety precautions: All fires starting in the vicinity of A&E must be reported immediately and firefighting must be initiated with all available means and without awaiting specific instructions. If the fire involves explosive material, if it is supplying heat to explosives, or if it is so large that it cannot be extinguished with the equipment at hand, personnel in the area must evacuate immediately and seek safe shelter.

2. In the event a fire involves explosives or involvement is imminent, the initial withdrawal distance applied must be at least the inhabited building distance (IBD) while the appropriate emergency withdrawal distance for nonessential personnel is being determined. When emergency authorities determine that the fire is, or may become uncontrollable and result in deflagration and/or detonation of nearby A&E material, all nonessential personnel must be withdrawn to the appropriate emergency withdrawal distance listed in table 19-1.

3. Buildings or Open Magazines. When employees are in a building or open magazine and a fire occurs in or around the structure, the fire must be reported immediately. Employees must attempt to extinguish the fire using the firefighting equipment that is available in the building or magazine. If the fire involves explosive or toxic material, is immediately dangerous, or is so large that it cannot be extinguished with the equipment at hand, the employees must immediately vacate the magazine or building and seek safe shelter.

4. Closed Magazines. When there is visible smoke or other evidence of a fire in a closed magazine, the magazine must remain closed until the activity commanding officer or their designated representative arrives and decides whether to open the magazine.

5. Ships or boats. When conducting pier operations the applicable SOP will be on hand. Fire considerations are addressed in the applicable SOP.

Table 19-1
Withdrawal distances for nonessential personnel (see note 2)

Fire symbol	Hazard Class/ Division	Unknown Quantity	Known Quantity
Unknown	Facility, Truck, Trailer	4000 ft.	4000 ft.

1	1.1 and 1.5 (See note 1)	4000 ft.	For transportation, use 2,500 ft. minimum distance for 500 lbs. and below. Use 4,000 ft. minimum distance for bombs and projectiles with caliber 5-inch or greater. For facilities, use 2,500 ft. minimum distance for 15,000 lbs. and below. Use 4,000 ft. minimum distance for net explosive weights above 15,000 lbs. and less than or equal to 50,000 lbs. Above 50,000 lbs, use d (distance) =105w1/3
2	1.2 (1.2.1, 1.2.2,d 1.2.3) (see note 1)	2500 ft.	2500 ft.
3	1.3	600 ft.	Twice the building distance, 600 ft. min
4	1.4	300 ft.	300 ft.

Notes:
1. For C/D 1.1 and 1.2 items, if known, the maximum range fragments and debris will be thrown (including the interaction effects of stacks of items, but excluding lugs, strong-backs, and/or nose and tail plates) may be used to replace the minimum range stated in Table 19-1.

2. For accidents involving propulsion units, based upon the potential flight ranges, it is not required to specify emergency withdrawal distances.

3. See Tab G for Evacuation plan

Tab G: Evacuation plan

NOTE

Naval Security Forces will follow TAB D when reporting on scene.

NOTE

NASPR Command Duty Officer (CDO) will be informed of any evacuations.

1. Local Area. If evacuation of local area is required follow county and state issued direction.

2. Buildings. Building fire bills and local SOP's give guidance on evacuation and muster locations.

3. Muster locations may need to be modified depending on the hazard severity. If local buildings require evacuation, not directly associated with affected area, contact building via NSF and Dispatch for POC and give appropriate action for them to take, such as distance or new location for them to muster.

4. Transportation:

a. If the accident standoff distance is determined to reach beyond the base perimeter EOC may have to activate local MOA/MOU's IAW Support Annexes A and B.

b. Buildings and associated locations located in standoff area need to be evacuated to a safe location.

Tab H: Recovery Operations

1. Once approval to return to the work area has been approved

    a. Be mindful of damage that has not been reported.

    b. Assist in returning operations and facilities to normal working order.

    c. Prepare to give feedback on the incident and process.

Tab I: Hurricane Action / Recovery checklist

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Work: (540) 653-7425

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(540) 653-8095/8291

1. Securing A&E operations. During the hurricane season NASPR and all tenant commands recognize that NASPR is in a 96 hour readiness status to secure A&E operations.

72 hour notice

❑ Continue to conduct A& evolutions as mission operations dictate & as determined by use of ORM.
❑ Naval Munitions Command Atlantic (NMCLANT) Detachment Patuxent River plans to move A&E and Explosive Hazardous Waste (EHW) items from EEA Operating Buildings to appropriately site approved earth-covered magazines (ECMs).
❑ The installation ESO will provide the installation CO, EOC, and NDW Explosives Safety Program Manager (ESPM) with status updates.

24 hour notice

❑ Tenant commands move all A&E items in to approved shelter and report updates to installation ESO.
❑ All EEA EHW is stored in EHW ECMs.
❑ The ESO provides the installation CO, EOC, and NDW ESPM with status updates.

12-8 hour notice

❑ Secure all applicable A&E items in appropriate ECMs, directed by the ESO or NMC.
❑ After A&E movement is complete, verify Fire Department Fire Maps are updated.
❑ The installation ESO will provide the installation CO, EOC, and NDW ESPM with status updates.

2. **Restoring operations post-event**

❑ Verify the status & integrity of all A&E storage and operating facilities.
❑ Inspect any/all explosive conveyances at Safe Haven.

❑ With support from EOD as required, check the integrity of ECMs, to include Ready Service Magazines.
❑ NAVFAC PW contacted as required to clear roads/ammunition transportation routes of debris for emergency response.
❑ Prior to A&E operations commencing at a site approved A&E operating building / facility, the location may be required to be inspected utilizing the same protocols as an Explosive Safety Self-Assessment (ESSA).